Need to know:

• Building a new oil pipeline would be a costly mistake for both Alberta and Canada. World oil demand is likely to peak in the next few years, and existing pipelines have the potential to provide adequate capacity at lower cost and risk.
• As the Trans Mountain Pipeline (TMX) shows, building new pipelines is risky because of cost overruns. The TMX was originally forecast to cost CAD 5.4 billion and ended up costing CAD 34.2 billion.
• The TMX pipeline is not recouping its costs. Because the tolls charged to the oil industry do not cover the full project costs, Canadian taxpayers could end up subsidizing oil shipments by between CAD 8.7 billion and CAD 18.8 billion, or up to CAD 1,255 per household, over the life of the project.  
• A new pipeline would have to charge significantly higher tolls than existing pipelines to cover the high construction costs. Higher tolls on a new pipeline would result in lower returns to the oil industry and lower royalty payments to government relative to using lower cost expansion options on existing pipelines.
• A new pipeline to British Columbia’s North Coast would require lifting the current oil tanker moratorium, posing a significant risk of a devastating oil tanker spill.
• All major project proposals should be subject to a cost-benefit study and should not proceed if they do not create a net benefit to Canada. A new oil pipeline is unlikely to meet this standard and is inconsistent with Canada’s emission obligations.
• Pipelines and fossil fuel projects should not receive public subsidies. The subsidies currently being provided to oil companies using the TMX should be removed by applying a cost-recovery levy on oil shipments to cover the full construction costs.

Investing in large-scale nation-building projects has become the priority of the Carney government as it seeks to grow Canada’s economy and diversify exports away from the United States.

While this strategy to stimulate investment has merit in the current economic environment, there is a significant risk of building uneconomic projects that could leave Canadians worse off, especially if the projects are subsidized by taxpayers and expedited by bypassing normal regulatory reviews through the new One Canadian Economy Act.

One project that exemplifies these risks is Alberta’s proposal for a new oil pipeline, which was recently agreed to in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between Ottawa and Alberta.

The MOU contains a number of provisions, including commitments not to implement an emissions cap on the oil and gas sector, to suspend the clean electricity regulations, to maintain an industrial carbon pricing system, to implement a carbon capture project, and to streamline the approval process. The effect of these measures requires further details that the parties are still working out.

But the most controversial initiative contained in the MOU is support for a new oil pipeline to the BC Coast. Alberta supports the pipeline as a means of growing the energy sector and accessing Asian markets. BC and Coastal First Nations oppose it on the grounds that it entails significant environmental risks associated with oil tanker spills, it will increase emissions contributing to climate change, and that there are lower-cost, lower-risk options for shipping oil to markets via existing pipelines.

To better understand these risks of the proposed pipeline, it is helpful to examine the most recent experience building an oil pipeline in Canada: the construction of the Trans Mountain Expansion Project (TMX).

 

Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion

TMX was proposed by the American owner Kinder Morgan (KM) in its application to the National Energy Board (NEB) in 2013. The project tripled shipping capacity on its existing pipeline that brings oil from Alberta to British Columbia and Washington State.  

After receiving regulatory approval in 2016 to build TMX, KM announced in 2018 that it was suspending construction due to increasing concerns about the project’s economic viability. The Government of Canada commenced discussions with KM about the future of TMX and, in May 2018, announced it would purchase the pipeline.  

Following the government purchase, the approval of TMX was subject to an additional NEB review to address omissions in the first review and was reapproved in 2019. Construction resumed with completion in May 2024 at a cost of CAD 34.2 billion, more than six times he original estimate.  

The Trans Mountain Corporation (TMC) reports that the expanded pipeline is making money for the government, with a net income before tax of CAD 409 million in the first half of 2025. TMC’s income statement is misleading, however, because it does not include the full interest costs to the government on its investment in TMX. TMC’s 2025 financial statements show that only CAD 12 billion of the CAD 35 billion current value of the government’s investment in the pipeline is recorded as debt incurring interest charges on TMC’s books. The remaining CAD 23 billion was converted to equity to remove the interest charges from TMC’s expenses and transfer the debt to a separate entity, TMP Finance, that pays interest to the Export Development Canada. Interest is being paid on the loan but because it is not being paid by TMC it is not shown as an expense on TMC’s financial statements, making TMC appear profitable. If the interest charges on this CAD 23 billion debt are included (assuming a conservative 5% interest rate) the government incurred an estimated before-tax loss from TMC of CAD 166 million for the first 6 months of 2025, not a profit.  

The result is that only CAD 15.4 billion of the CAD 34.2 billion cost of the pipeline is covered by tolls. If toll rates are not increased, Canadian taxpayers could lose between CAD 8.7 and CAD 18.8 billion or CAD 581 to CAD 1,255 per household subsidizing the transportation costs of the oil industry.  

While the financial cost to taxpayers of TMX is high, the total net costs to Canada are even higher when considering environmental costs such as GHG emissions and potential pipeline and oil tanker spill damages as well as other economic costs such as the impact on other pipeline companies. An independent, comprehensive cost-benefit analysis estimates that the net cost of TMX to Canada, when all costs are included, ranges between CAD 11.3 billion and CAD 30.1 billion — even when the potential impact of TMX increasing the price of Canadian oil exports is included.  

Lessons From the TMX for Building Canada Smarter

The lessons from the TMX experience are clear. First, governments should not build or financially support fossil fuel projects such as pipelines that the private sector considers too risky. If projects are viable, they can be built by the private sector without government subsidies. Providing subsidies will simply increase the probability of building uneconomic projects that weaken the economy and damage the environment.

In cases such as the TMX, where the government provided financial support, the terms of the assistance should ensure that the government’s contribution is fully repaid. For the TMX, this could be done either by increasing toll rates or by applying a special levy on transportation costs to fully recover the government’s investment so that taxpayers do not incur a loss.

Second, proposals should be evaluated by the government based on a comprehensive, public cost-benefit assessment of the project to determine whether it is in the public interest.

In the case of the TMX, the NEB review  did not include a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Instead, the review  relied on a simplified qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) assessment of the costs and benefits. The NEB review also focused only on the TMX pipeline proposal without assessing the merits of the TMX relative to alternative pipeline options or considering whether oil production would be sufficient to justify building the TMX.

A comprehensive cost-benefit evaluation would have taken all the relevant factors into account to determine whether the TMX was in the public interest. It would have assessed the significant environmental risks from increased emissions and potential pipeline and oil tanker spills. It would also have fully assessed the economic risks by conducting a supply-and-demand analysis of pipeline capacity and examining the shipping contracts to ensure that tolls would be high enough to cover construction costs. Finally, it would have evaluated alternative, lower-cost options for existing pipelines and alternative configurations for the TMX, such as expanding pipeline capacity to Washington State refineries, which would have reduced environmental risks by avoiding marine oil tanker traffic and increased returns for oil companies by reducing the shipping distance to markets.

By conducting this type of cost-benefit assessment, the government would have been able to more fully identify the economic and environmental risks of the TMX and could have better assessed the options for either addressing them or shelving the project.

A third lesson from the TMX is that major projects consistently experience significant cost overruns. The TMX was originally forecast to cost CAD 5.4 billion and ended up costing just over CAD 34.2 billion. Unfortunately, cost overruns are the norm in major projects. A multi-jurisdictional review of 633 energy projects, for example, found that three quarters of the projects took longer to complete and exceeded their cost estimates by an average of 79%.

The cause of cost overruns is an “optimism bias” that leads project proponents to consistently underestimate costs and overestimate benefits. To address optimism bias, project proponents should use a tool called “reference class forecasting,” which consists of reviewing the costs and benefits of completed projects and adjusting the budget forecasts accordingly for the project under review. In the case of the TMX, the construction cost forecast would have been increased by the average cost overrun experienced in similar projects.

While the overruns for the TMX exceeded the reference class overrun averages and would still have resulted in an underestimate of project costs, the analysis would have provided a more accurate estimate than those the government relied on.

Finally, all project reviews should include extensive engagement with the public and with Indigenous Peoples consistent with the principles of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent.
 

Why Canada Does Not Need a New Pipeline

While a comprehensive cost-benefit assessment of Alberta’s proposed pipeline cannot be completed without more details on the proposed project, current data suggests that it will impose a significant net cost on Alberta and Canada. Forecast growth in oil demand is insufficient to justify a major new pipeline, and upgrades to existing pipelines can meet Alberta’s needs at a much lower cost than building a new one.

Currently, the oil market is experiencing a large surplus, with supply forecast to exceed demand by 4 million bpd in 2026. Forecast production for 2025 of 106 mb/d exceeds the International Energy Agency’s most optimistic demand forecast to 2035 of 105 mb/d, indicating very limited potential for increasing production beyond current levels over the next decade.

Longer-term forecasts point to slower growth or a decline in oil demand, depending on future climate policies. Even in the unlikely scenario where there are no additional climate policy initiatives and the adoption of renewables and electric vehicles slows from their current trajectory, the International Energy Agency shows  that oil demand will continue to grow to 2050, but at a much slower rate than in previous decades. With continued implementation of stated policies, effectively continuing the current trajectory, the world oil demand is expected to peak by 2030 and then decline by 3% to 2050. If global climate change is limited to 1.5°C, demand is expected to decline by about three quarters by 2050.

Private oil companies such as BP forecast a decline in oil demand of between 11% and 68% by 2050, while Chinese demand, which is the target market for a new pipeline, is forecast to peak in about 2030 and then decline due to the rapid electrification of its transportation sector.

With world oil demand growth slowing down and then potentially declining, the rationale for building a new pipeline is weak. The Canada Energy Regulator’s most recent forecast, for example, concludes that no new pipelines are required to accommodate forecast growth in Western Canadian oil production.

But even if oil production grows faster than the Canada Energy Regulator forecasts and more pipeline capacity is required, an additional 1.1 million barrels of capacity can be provided by upgrading existing pipelines at much lower cost and lower risk than a new greenfield project.

Building a new oil pipeline to BC’s North Coast would also pose a significant environmental risk by requiring the removal of the current oil tanker moratorium, which was put in place to protect the marine environment from oil tanker spills. Research on the previous Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline proposed for Northern BC showed that there would be a 64% chance of a major oil tanker spill of 10,000 barrels or more, even with improved safety standards, over the first 30 years of operation. The impacts of a tanker spill would be devastating to the region’s environment and economy. Other research has documented that the new pipeline would increase greenhouse gas emissions, even if the proposed project is accompanied by carbon capture.

Given these market fundamentals, there is no rationale for building a new oil pipeline and, if one were built, the tolls required to pay for it would be significantly higher than those of existing pipelines, reducing returns to the oil industry and the Alberta government while putting the environment at risk. This is why no private pipeline company has come forward with a proposed new project and is unlikely to do so without government subsidies.

While some may have a more optimistic view of future oil demand and the viability of new energy projects in Canada, the TMX experience provides valuable lessons for building economic and environmentally responsible projects.

First, governments should not build or subsidize fossil fuel projects that the private sector considers too risky. Rapid deployment and cost reductions in electric vehicles, renewables, and battery technologies mean that the economic risks of oil and gas projects will only increase with time.

Second, proposed projects should be subject to a comprehensive public cost-benefit analysis to determine whether they are in the national interest. An economic assessment should include reference class forecasting to counter the optimism bias that leads to unrealistic cost and timeline estimates.

Finally, all project reviews should include extensive public engagement and consultation with Indigenous Peoples consistent with the principles of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent. These tools will help ensure that the projects built will strengthen the economy and not waste resources on poor investments that would make us all worse off. 
 

Summary

• LNG is a fossil fuel; producing it will increase Canada’s domestic emissions.  
• Canadian LNG exports are likely to increase global emissions by adding to fossil fuel consumption and slowing the transition toward renewable energy.
• New Canadian LNG is incompatible with climate targets and diverts resources away from real climate solutions such as renewable power generation and a clean transportation system.

The leading cause of climate change is burning fossil fuels—and this is causing more frequent and intense wildfires, storms, droughts, and floods. With Canada’s first large-scale LNG terminal beginning operations in June 2025, and several others proposed or under construction, it is crucial to understand the impact that this fossil fuel could have on people and the planet. That means answering questions such as:

• Will new LNG production increase Canada’s emissions?

• How would Canadian LNG exports affect global emissions?

• Is Canadian LNG a climate solution?

Recently, senior government officials have suggested that expanding Canadian LNG production would be good for the climate. For example, some have argued Canadian LNG has the “lowest carbon footprint of any produced in the world” and that LNG Canada Phase 1 is “60 per cent lower carbon than the average LNG plant in the world.” The federal government has suggested LNG exports “could help reduce greenhouse gas emissions by reducing coal combustion,” and a minister for the Government of British Columbia (B.C.) has added, “It's not just a question of displacing coal or other dirtier fuels … it's displacing other LNG, which has dramatically higher emissions.”

Statistics and arguments like these, however, don’t tell the full story.

Here’s why.

Q: Will new LNG production increase Canada’s emissions?

A: Yes, LNG is a fossil fuel; producing it will increase Canada’s domestic emissions.

How much carbon is expected to be emitted from Canada’s current LNG facility?

Producing LNG requires a lot of energy as it involves cooling standard piped natural gas to -162°C. LNG Canada Phase 1—Canada’s only active LNG export terminal—uses natural gas turbines to do this. That means Canada’s current LNG production relies on burning fossil fuels, with LNG Canada Phase 1 expected to emit 2.1 megatonnes of CO2e annually. This is roughly equivalent to the annual emissions of around 450,000 passenger vehicles and would make LNG Canada Phase 1 one of the most climate-polluting projects in all of B.C. These emissions could double if LNG Canada Phase 2 goes ahead as initially planned with partial electrification.

What about Canada’s proposed net-zero LNG facilities?

Most other proposed LNG projects in Canada—such as Woodfibre LNG, Cedar LNG, and Ksi Lisims—intend to be powered by hydroelectricity rather than natural gas. This could reduce their overall carbon footprint, with a goal to achieving net-zero operational emissions; however, electrifying B.C’s oil and gas industry—including all proposed LNG projects—in line with provincial climate targets would require over 40,000 GWh per year of electricity by 2030. This huge surge in demand would require the equivalent of eight Site C hydroelectric dams, just for the oil and gas sector. Electrification would also be very expensive, with a significant share of the cost expected to fall to the public—either in the form of direct government financing, government-funded infrastructure support, and/or subsidized electricity rates. Finally, due to a recent policy change from the Government of B.C., new LNG plants are no longer required to be net-zero by 2030. Instead, they only need to be “net-zero ready,” placing the burden on the province to ensure clean electricity supplies are available. In the meantime, most LNG facilities would operate by burning natural gas, increasing emissions.

Would net-zero LNG facilities produce net-zero LNG?

LNG facilities account for less than 10% of LNG’s average life-cycle emissions (figure below)—that is, the total emissions generated by a product’s life cycle from start to finish.  Far more emissions—twice as many, on average—come from upstream gas extraction, transportation, and shipping (figure below). If all proposed B.C. LNG projects go ahead, the increase in upstream emissions from natural gas extraction, processing, and transportation could be 10 Mt per year. Implementing the federal government’s proposed regulations to limit methane emissions from the oil and gas sector could help reduce this figure, but only partially. Electrifying LNG facilities themselves, moreover, does nothing to reduce these upstream emissions. In other words, a net-zero LNG facility does not produce net-zero LNG. This means that new LNG production will increase Canada’s emissions—even if the facilities’ own net-zero goals are met.

Illustrative Life-Cycle Emissions of LNG

Source: Haig et al., 2024, based on data from Nie et al., 2020. A similar emissions distribution was also found in a recent global study of average LNG life-cycle emissions: International Energy Agency (IEA), 2025.

Q: How would Canadian LNG exports affect global emissions?

A: Canadian LNG exports are likely to increase global emissions by adding to fossil fuel consumption and slowing the transition toward renewable energy.

Will Canadian LNG reduce global emissions by replacing coal use abroad?

There is little evidence to suggest that Canadian LNG will significantly displace coal use abroad. For example, in China, it is renewable energy, not imported LNG, that is reducing the market share of coal in the power sector. The cost of new utility-scale solar photovoltaic power and storage is also falling rapidly in other countries such as India, meaning this trend of shifting from coal to renewables is expected to be replicated in other Asian markets, too. LNG, meanwhile, is typically twice as expensive to produce than it needs to be to compete with coal and renewables in China, India, and many other emerging economies.

Moreover, life-cycle emissions from LNG are typically underestimated—often by a large margin. This is mostly because a significant portion of LNG-related emissions comes from methane leaks throughout the supply chain. These leaks are systematically underreported and thus underestimated in life-cycle emissions comparisons. While most studies do conclude that life-cycle emissions from LNG are still lower than those of coal (e.g., 25% lower on average, as estimated by the IEA), the emissions benefits of switching are often less dramatic than assumed and vary widely depending on the emissions intensity of the LNG in question.

Is the LNG Canada project “60%” cleaner than the global average LNG production?

The commonly cited claim that LNG Canada is “60%” cleaner than average is based on the environmental assessment report from the LNG Canada project. That report estimated the emissions intensity of both LNG Canada Phase 1 and 2, operating together at full capacity, would be 0.15 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per tonne of LNG produced (t CO2e/t LNG). This was then compared to the average of several international LNG facilities, calculated as 0.35 t CO2e/t LNG. The comparison assumes partial electrification of the total facility (Phase 1 and Phase 2). As noted above, there may be insufficient hydroelectric power available to achieve this, in which case the emissions intensity of LNG Canada could be higher than expected. Other relevant factors include policy settings, such as the stringency of industrial carbon pricing. As such, the emissions intensity of LNG Canada—and all proposed LNG projects in Canada—is uncertain, given that these figures are based on projections rather than observed emissions from operating facilities.

Even if LNG Canada was 60% less carbon intensive than international competitors, this offers an incomplete view of the relative climate impact of LNG produced in different countries. This is because the liquefaction process only refers to a small part (less than 10%, on average) of LNG’s total life-cycle emissions (figure above), as highlighted above. Assuming other emissions from upstream processing and transportation are kept constant for the purpose of illustration, 60% cleaner liquefaction processes would result in LNG that is only 5% cleaner overall (figure below). When comparing the climate impacts of LNG, what matters most is total life-cycle emissions, not the emissions intensity of the liquefaction facilities alone. 

Is Canadian LNG (in general) cleaner than the global average, and if so, could this help reduce global emissions?

Estimates regarding the total life-cycle emissions of LNG vary widely due to differing methodologies and assumptions. Emissions estimates for Canada’s LNG facilities, moreover, are based on projections that have not been confirmed with observed data.  In this context, one meta-analysis of emissions studies for Canadian LNG found the average estimate for total production, transportation, liquefaction, and shipping emissions (“well-to-tank emissions”) to be 23.35 gCO2e/MJ. The average well-to-tank emissions for LNG delivered to Europe were estimated to be 21.31 gCO2e/MJ using the same methodology.

The IEA has estimated that Canadian gas production is generally less emissions intensive on average than that of some LNG producers, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, but significantly more polluting than Qatar, which is the world’s cheapest LNG exporter. Indeed, Canadian gas is typically extracted by fracking, a highly polluting process. Relative to these estimates from the IEA, expanding LNG production in Canada would increase the emissions intensity of Canadian gas production overall (due to the increased energy requirements of LNG production and transportation), while reducing methane leakage, venting, and flaring would lower the emissions intensity.  The carbon footprint of Canada’s LNG facilities themselves may also be higher than expected if electrification is not possible in the short-to-medium term (as is likely) and facilities are powered by natural gas instead of hydroelectricity. The bottom line is that the potential emissions advantage of Canadian LNG over international competitors is currently unclear.

Even if Canadian LNG were cleaner than international competitors, we cannot assume that it will replace LNG produced elsewhere. Rather, new LNG projects will generally add to the total global production and consumption of LNG (while reducing profits for producers). In other words, addition is more likely than substitution, and thus emissions are expected to rise. Because of this, it is best practice to consider the emissions impact of new fossil fuel projects in absolute terms—that is, relative to no expansion—rather than in relation to other projects elsewhere.

Would LNG help or hinder the global transition to renewable energy?

Instead of displacing coal use abroad, or even other LNG products, flooding the market with more LNG could disincentivize investments in electrification and new renewable power generation. This is because an oversupply of LNG would deflate gas prices (at the cost of exporters, like Canada), making it more likely for governments and/or companies to lock in long-term fossil fuel infrastructure. This effect may be amplified by market distortions, such as fossil fuel subsidies and geopolitical pressure to expand LNG trade, even as market dynamics increasingly favour renewables over imported LNG. Considering factors such as these, detailed modelling from the U.S. Department of Energy in 2024 found that new LNG exports from the United States are expected to displace more renewables than coal abroad, all while increasing total fossil fuel consumption. The study concluded that “in every scenario, increases in [U.S.] LNG exports would lead to increases in global net emissions.”

Q: Is Canadian LNG a climate solution?

A: No. New Canadian LNG is incompatible with climate targets and diverts resources away from real climate solutions, such as renewable power generation and a clean transportation system.

Is more Canadian LNG compatible with a safe and stable climate?

Regardless of LNG’s emissions relative to other sources of fuel, new LNG production will make it more difficult to stabilize the climate. To maintain the science-aligned 1.5°C limit on global temperature rise, no new long-lead time upstream oil and gas projects are needed—as confirmed by the IEA and others. This includes new LNG facilities that would enable increased upstream gas extraction in Canada’s Montney Basin—one of the world’s largest sources of unburned carbon emissions. In fact, projected fossil fuel production in 2030 is more than double what would be consistent with the 1.5°C limit. Even many existing fossil fuel projects would need to shut down early—including some in Canada—if demand declines in line with this target.

Alternatively, if new projects are developed and fossil fuels continue to be consumed at a level needed to support them, the climate will be destabilized further. Every tenth of a degree of warming matters, with climate impacts on people and the planet expected to increase dramatically as temperatures increase. That means more wildfires, tropical storms, food insecurity, flooding, droughts, human displacement, and wildlife extinctions. The science is clear: a safe and stable climate requires transitioning away from fossil fuels and scaling up clean energy as quickly as possible. For governments that are serious about meeting globally agreed climate goals and protecting their citizens from the worst impacts of climate change, LNG expansion is simply not an option.

Do LNG projects come with opportunity costs?

The governments of Canada and B.C. have allocated at least CAD 3.93 billion in financial support for new LNG projects by the end of 2030. This creates an opportunity cost as public money is used to enable fossil fuel development at the expense of other projects that could create jobs, reduce household costs, and facilitate the transition toward a cleaner economy. For example, a clean transportation system could employ over 1.6 million people by 2050. A net-zero electricity grid could save Canadian households CAD 15 billion annually by 2050. Meanwhile, a wave of clean energy retrofits for Canadian homes could save households CAD 10.8 billion annually by 2050 while creating over 100,000 jobs. The more public money is used to expand fossil fuel infrastructure, the less is available to support real climate solutions.

When it comes to understanding the environment, some plucky scientists in Canada over half a century ago discovered that working directly on the environment can result in richer and more accurate results than conducting research in a classic laboratory.

It was that discovery that led to the ribbon-cutting of the Experimental Lakes Area in 1968—a series of 58 lakes and their watersheds in northwestern Ontario.

It is the only place in the world where scientists can experiment on and manipulate real lakes to build a more accurate and complete picture of what human activity is doing to our fresh water. The findings from its over 50 years of ground-breaking research have rewritten environmental policy around the world—from mitigating algal blooms to reducing how much mercury gets into our waterways—and aim to keep fresh water clean around the world for generations to come.

Just over 10 years ago it found a whole new lease on life, coming under the wing of the International Institute for Sustainable Development.

And ever since then, it has never looked back. From opening its doors to students, journalists and scientists from around the globe to working with local communities and kicking off new and exciting research into microplastics and oil spills, IISD Experimental Lakes Area—as it is now known—has never had more of an impact on the lives of those who depend on fresh water.

But don’t just take our word for it. 

Here are five stories from people who have seen, firsthand, the impact of IISD-ELA over the last decade.

IISD Experimental Lakes Area Embraces Africa

It’s not only North America that houses massive freshwater lakes. Africa’s seven Great Lakes are highly valuable natural resources, renowned for rich fisheries and biodiversity hotspots” that underpin the welfare and livelihoods of over 50 million people across 10 countries.

That’s why over the last decade, IISD-ELA has teamed up with the African Center for Aquatic Research and Education (ACARE) to strengthen science on large freshwater resources and the countries in which they reside.

That means sharing knowledge between experts on both continents. It means building projects that benefit Lake Erie and Lake Edward. And it means building the future of African Women in Science.

Let's hear what The Honourable Terry Duguid, Member of Parliament, Winnipeg South has to say...

Click here to learn more about how and why we are collaborating with those who work hard every day to protect Africa’s Great Lakes.

How Our Science Changes How Industry Acts

Science only matters if it makes our lives better. 

That’s why, ever since 2014, the world’s freshwater laboratory has committed to ensuring that all the science we do is converted into policy recommendations for industry and governments to change how they act.

Here’s a great example of how research into cleaning up the shorelines of lakes after oil spills immediately changed how industry dealt with those spills—for the better.

Here's more from Vince Palace, the head Head Scientist at IISD Experimental Lakes Area.

Click here to learn more about what IISD-ELA has discovered when it comes to oil spills in freshwater systems, and how best to clean them up.

Building the Next Generation of Freshwater Scientists

At IISD-ELA, we believe in the power of engaging students directly in hands-on science to inspire, interest, and motivate young people to examine the world around them, encouraging the process of lifelong learning.

And we need to nurture the next generation of freshwater scientists to ensure that freshwater protection continues way into the future.

That’s why we have spent the last decade building a whole suite of educational programming and community outreach that gets young people from all walks of life interested in freshwater science—all while getting their feet wet in the process.

Here's the story of Savana Theodore-Maraj, our Former Education and Outreach Assistant.

Click here to discover all the educational programming—for students and the general public—that IISD has to offer.

Honouring the Land and Water

For almost a decade, the world’s freshwater laboratory has been building relationships with local First Nations communities and working to understand their concerns and needs. 

Our activities with our neighbours in Treaty 3 communities involve collaboration and communication in areas of common interest, including the environmental impacts of resource development, education, youth engagement, and traditional ecological knowledge.

Giniw’ikwe/Laura Horton of Rainy River First Nation/Tulita offers us her perspective.

Click here to learn more about IISD-ELA is committed to working closely with Indigenous partners.

Where does the science go from here?

A decade passes by in the blink of eye. But IISD Experimental Lakes Area is committed to protecting freshwater resources for generations to come. 

And this means more science on the biggest threats to our fresh water—from plastics to pharmaceuticals and more. It also means building bigger audiences, in part thanks to a new Centre for Climate and Lake Learning that will function as a hub for education and outreach on freshwater science in northern Ontario.

Chelsea Rochman—Research Fellow at IISD Experimental Lakes Area and an Associate Professor of Ecology at the University of Toronto—gives us her take...

Click here to learn more about how and why IISD-ELA is exploring the impact of plastics on fresh water—and where it goes from here.