Press release

Europe’s Dash for Gas in Africa puts Private Profits First—New report

November 19, 2024

November 19, 2024, Baku — Europe’s demand for gas is contributing to expansion of liquid natural gas (LNG) projects in Mozambique, Nigeria, and Senegal. This favours the interests of European oil and gas companies over those of African countries, a new report shows.

The companies, which include UK-based BP, France’s TotalEnergies, and Italy’s Eni, stand to benefit from near-term revenues, finds the report A Precarious Pursuit by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Under their contracts, African governments are often expected to wait until the mid-2030s or 2040s for significant returns.

These delays could prove economically disastrous to the African nations involved. LNG demand may have already peaked in Europe, and will likely decline globally from 2030, according to the International Energy Agency, and the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.

“Europe clamping down on fossil fuels at home while expanding gas exploration and LNG terminals in Africa is problematic,” said Bathandwa Vazi, Policy Advisor at IISD and one of the paper's co-authors.

She added: “The highly competitive LNG markets seen since 2022 are now forecast to give way to a supply glut, with falling prices, tighter margins, and lower profits for exporters. This price risk is being shouldered by countries least equipped to deal with it.”

European governments should work with African nations to expand access to renewable energy and green jobs, not lock them into extractive sectors with high carbon emissions, report authors say.

Richard Bridle, a senior policy advisor at IISD, said: “Europe’s support for LNG infrastructure in Africa is not the product of mutually respectful enterprise. It locks African nations into unstable fossil fuel-based economies, when they could be leapfrogging to clean energy and green jobs.

“At the ‘finance COP’, European governments must deliver the support African countries need to move beyond fossil fuels and harness their abundant renewable resources.”

LNG development in Africa intensified following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as Europe sought to diversify supplies away from Russian gas.

For sub-Saharan economies, the potential to benefit from European gas demand may have been overstated, the research cautions. As global net-zero targets proliferate and the price of renewable energy falls, long-term LNG demand is uncertain. Meanwhile new projects are set to deliver a glut of LNG supplies later this decade, depressing prices.

The relatively high cost of LNG production in Africa makes African producers particularly vulnerable to market volatility, as lower global prices could make these projects unprofitable.

Media Contacts:

Bathandwa Vazi, Policy Advisor, Energy (Cape Town) – [email protected]

Richard Bridle, Senior Policy Advisor, Energy (Europe) – [email protected]

Vance Culbert, Senior Policy Advisor, Energy (Baku) – [email protected]

Megan Darby, Senior Communications Officer, Energy (Baku) – [email protected]

Conference

COP 29 | Europe’s Dash for Gas in Africa puts Private Profits Before African Countries’ Interests

Press Conference

November 19, 2024 4:30 pm - 5:00 pm AZT

In-person COP 29, Press Conference - Natavan, Area D and online.

(For media only)

Europe’s demand for gas is contributing to a wave of liquid natural gas (LNG) projects in Mozambique, Nigeria, and Senegal. This favours the interests of European oil and gas companies over those of African countries, research shows. Experts will set out the risks of banking on LNG for development and call on European leaders to support a more sustainable model.

Speakers

Denis Gyeyir, Africa Senior Program Officer, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)

Karabo Mokgonyana, Power Shift Africa

Vance Culbert, Senior Policy Advisor & Secretariat Manager, COFFIS, IISD

 

Media Contacts

Megan Darby, Senior Communications Officer, Energy (Baku) – [email protected]
 

Press release

Nigeria’s Dash for LNG Risks Asset Stranding with European Gas Demand Forecast to Fall

June 6, 2024

June 6, 2024—Nigeria’s push to expand its Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) production could put the country in a precarious economic situation, prolonging its dependency on fossil fuels and leaving it with stranded assets as international demand for gas falls, according to new research by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).

With the IEA predicting international demand for natural gas will peak this decade amid global decarbonization efforts, there is a “high likelihood” any scale up of LNG production could leave Nigeria with unprofitable and abandoned assets, and reduce the available financing for clean energy sources, warns IISD’s brief A Balancing Act: Considerations for the expansion of liquified natural gas projects in Nigeria.

The paper also found Nigerian LNG exports may struggle to compete in the global market after 2030, while replacing oil revenues with LNG may not generate the expected income.

Bathandwa Vazi, policy advisor at IISD said: “Nigeria’s LNG dash is short-term thinking that could end up costing the country dearly. Economic diversification away from fossil fuels is critical in building a sustainable future for the country, not locking in further dependence on polluting commodities.”

“Nigeria is already up against bigger players in the LNG market, and new LNG developments take 8–10 years to produce gas. As international demand for gas peaks, Nigeria must recognise that a fossil fuel-based economy cannot carry it far into the future.”

Facing declining oil revenues, economic turmoil following the Covid-19 pandemic, and inflated European demand for LNG following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Nigeria has moved to address its revenue shortfall by significantly scaling up LNG production.

Oil revenues have long underpinned the Nigerian Treasury, accounting for about two-thirds of government earnings and 90% of its foreign exchange income. However, as production has fallen due to lower levels of investment and regional unrest, there is renewed focus on LNG, which provides considerably smaller, albeit growing, revenues. In 2023, LNG revenues reached NGN 74 billion (USD 51 million), accounting for around 7% of total government revenues.

As of 2022, Nigeria was already the sixth-largest LNG exporter worldwide, with a 6% market share. As oil contributes less to revenues, the government plans to build on its existing LNG developments, with ministers declaring 2021–2030 “the decade of gas”.

Currently Nigeria has six operational LNG terminals; nine more are proposed, with LNG construction investment totalling NGN 28.3 trillion (USD 18.5 billion).

But to replace Nigeria’s falling oil revenues, LNG exports would still have to increase “by an order of magnitude,” IISD experts say. Such a scenario would require sustained international demand and high prices for LNG.

Meanwhile, the assets planned would be operating far beyond the middle of this century. The eventual transition to a low-carbon world, expected to accelerate after 2030, could leave LNG assets stranded as demand dries up.

Underscoring this, the researchers note that Carbon Tracker projects a 69% reduction in Nigeria's fossil fuel revenues over the next two decades if global energy trends shift toward a low-carbon pathway.

Instead of investing overzealously in the fossil fuel economy, Nigeria “must manage its gas ambitions realistically, align with transition plans, and prioritize community development in gas projects,” the paper’s authors write.

Electricity access challenges can be met by adding more sustainable and affordable energy sources into the energy mix, and LNG expansion “should not come at the expense of addressing inequality, energy access, and socio-economic challenges,” the paper says.

Media contacts:

Bathandwa Vazi, Policy Advisor, Energy – [email protected]

Harry Cockburn, Communications Consultant, Energy – [email protected]
 

Press release details

Topic
Energy
Region
Nigeria
Impact area
Climate
Sustainable Economies
IISD in the news

Setting Development Agenda for a New Nigeria: Technology Transfer and Foreign Policy as Instruments

“Setting Development Agenda for a New Nigeria: International Technology Transfer and Foreign Policy as Instruments” was the title of the First Public Lecture organised by the Lead City University’s Faculty of Engineering and Technology, on Friday, 23rd June, 2023.

June 25, 2023

IISD in the news details

Deep Dive

Nigeria Must Ensure its Fuel Subsidy Reform Sticks for the Long Term

Q&A with Dr. Neil McCulloch, Director of The Policy Practice

Nigeria's new president, Bola Tinubu, removed gasoline subsidies right after he was sworn in on May 29. To find out what this means for Nigeria and how the country can make this reform a success, IISD's Energy Communications expert Aia Brnic talked with fossil fuel subsidy expert Dr. Neil McCulloch, author of the book Ending Fossil Fuel Subsidies: The Politics of Saving the Planet. Neil is Director of The Policy Practice, a network of experienced development professionals, and has co-authored several IISD reports. The interview has been edited and condensed for clarity.

June 20, 2023

Aia Brnic: What's happening in Nigeria with fuel subsidies right now?

Neil McCulloch: Nigeria has just elected a new President, Bola Tinubu, who announced the end of fuel subsidies in his inauguration speech. Nigeria has been subsidizing fuel for more than 40 years, and the one major fuel subsidy left is for gasoline. While this is a very bold thing to do, it is also long overdue. But the inevitable happened—the petrol stations shut up shop because they didn't want to sell fuel until the prices rose, and so suddenly, there were long queues and gasoline shortages. Shortly after, Tinubu announced a new fuel price, which had more than doubled, from about NGN 185 (USD 0.40) to NGN 537 (USD 1.15), due to the removal of fuel subsidies.

Aia Brnic: What is the plan now? Is this it, or is the government planning to go further?

Neil McCulloch: That's a really important question. The problem with Nigerian fuel subsidies has been that the cycle has repeated itself for more than a decade: a new president comes in, realizes that the burden of subsidies on the budget is far too high—Nigeria was spending almost USD 10 billion (NGN 4.39 trillion) last year just on subsidizing gasoline, which is more than four times the health budget (NGN 827 billion)—and takes a bold move to bump up the price. The previous president, Muhammadu Buhari, did the same thing; [former president Goodluck Ebele] Jonathan also tried reform in 2012 with disastrous results.

After the price increase, for a little while, there are no subsidies, but then subsidies always re-emerge because the domestic currency slides relative to the dollar. And as that happens, the cost of fuel goes up—but since the domestic price is fixed, that gap is filled by the budget. Usually, once you've had your one shot at removing subsidies, you don't get another political shot at doing it, so subsidies accumulate, and then they leave it to the next president to do the same thing again. One of the things we will wait to see is whether President Tinubu is going to change the system or just bump up the price as previous presidents did.

Aia Brnic: What has been announced so far?

Neil McCulloch: The regulator announced prices for all the different regions, which was a bit disappointing. I was hoping that he might say to oil marketing companies: "You choose the price; it's a competitive market out there." That would have liberalized the sector. The prices would have been volatile, and they would have jumped around a little bit, but then they would have settled down and continued to evolve depending on the cost of fuel. 

But because the regulator now has set prices for different states, it looks like a rerun of the previous arrangements whereby they've just fixed prices, and it'll be quite difficult for them to adjust. The real telltale sign of whether this is a serious reform or not will come in the course of the next month. If they say, "We're going to have a template and we’re going to adjust prices every month according to that template," then they are serious.

Aia Brnic: What blocked fuel subsidy reforms in the past?

Neil McCulloch: Two things have really affected reform. First, it is politically incredibly unpopular to bump up prices in this way. In 2012, when President Jonathan was in power, he did a sudden fuel subsidy reform where he increased prices by roughly three times. And the country erupted. There was a 10-day national strike, everybody was out on the streets, and people got killed. It was a disaster, and eventually, the government had to back down and reduce the price significantly, which meant that by the end of the Jonathan regime, there were still huge subsidies being paid. Everybody in Nigeria has that experience seared into them, and they want to avoid that. 

The other reason is that there are vested interests in keeping the subsidy regime. There's a very healthy business to be made smuggling fuel out of Nigeria to the neighbouring countries where, prior to the price bump, it was much, much cheaper. Police and customs officials make a lot of money collaborating with people who wish to smuggle fuel over borders.

Aia Brnic: Given how unpopular and difficult it is to remove fuel subsidies, why is it important to do it? How can regular citizens—who may struggle to pay their bills—accept it?

Neil McCulloch: The standard reason most Westerners would give is that we must stop subsidizing fossil fuels because of climate change. Honestly, that argument doesn’t resonate very well in Nigeria and, indeed, in many poor countries. While it's not that people don’t care about climate change—in fact, many of them are more impacted by climate change than people in wealthier countries—they have more pressing concerns like feeding their families and being able to get to work. So, they appreciate the subsidy and don’t want it removed. And you can totally understand why. 

At the same time, spending billions of dollars of the government budget subsidizing gasoline is one of the worst possible ways of spending your money if you care about development and the poor. That's because most of that benefit goes to the better off—people who have cars and motorbikes—rather than ordinary working people who might be on foot or taking buses. These subsidies are very unequal, but they're also not contributing to anything that's useful in the long term, like health services, roads, education systems, and social protection. It's just subsidizing the price, and it makes people burn more gasoline—which, of course, causes all sorts of environmental damage. Unfortunately, reforming subsidies also hurts the poor—not directly because the gasoline price went up, but rather because of the knock-on impact on food prices. And that's an area where the government really has to look out and do something to help people.

Aia Brnic: What is the solution to this?

Neil McCulloch: The standard solution—which the World Bank always pushed—is that there should be cash transfers. In many countries, the World Bank has supported the implementation of cash transfer schemes for the poor and the near-poor. Sometimes these systems are targeted at the bottom 40% of the population. Indonesia has done it, and it turned out that the cash given to the poorest 20% of the population more than compensated them for the petrol price rise. So, they were better off as a result. Having cash transfers, I think, is part of the solution, and the World Bank in Nigeria has been trying to support the government in introducing a similar cash transfer mechanism. If you don't have some sort of compensatory mechanism, then people will be very upset, and rightly so. 

However, it's not the only thing. You have got to have mechanisms that reach out to the bulk of the urban working class and the people who aren’t necessarily the poorest of the poor, but who do have to get on a bus, who do have to get to work, who live in Lagos or Abuja and are going to be very severely affected by these kinds of reforms because they buy gasoline. One mechanism, for instance, is for the government to provide explicit temporary subsidies to public transportation, ensuring the bus fares don’t go through the roof when the gasoline price rises. That way, you are enabling people to continue their livelihood.

There are other things, though, that can be done. In countries with successful reforms, we've often found that politicians turn it from a bad thing into a good thing. They have a political offer, and they say, "I'm sorry about this reform, it is very painful, and we'll do everything possible to protect you. But now that we've saved these resources, I'm going to give you something in return." And the thing that they offer is deliberately something that is very politically popular. For example, in the Indonesian case, that was a health card and an education card. Zambia recently made a major reform in 2021, and they said, "We're going to give you free secondary school education." This offer was very popular because secondary school education is expensive, but the cost of the subsidies was way more than the cost of secondary school education. So, the idea is to redirect funds toward something that is very popular. Having a political offer moves the story away from being a negative one to being, "This government is giving us something that’s very important." The Nigerian government needs quickly to come up with a politically credible offer so that it can say to Nigerians, "We’re going to make things better, and here’s how."

Aia Brnic: How important is clear communication about the reform?

Neil McCulloch: One of the points I make in my book Ending Fossil Fuel Subsidies is: communication, communication, communication. The presidents and prime ministers who have been successful in making fossil fuel subsidy reforms have generally been the ones who haven’t just suddenly launched it on people but who have talked about it and explained, "This is why it has to be done; this is how we got into this mess, how we’re going to get out of it, and why it’s going to make you better off in the longer run." Building that credibility and explaining to the population diffuses a lot of the anger against reform. If you don’t communicate and you launch it on people suddenly, then they are understandably angry and then they take to the streets. Who wouldn't? We saw this not just in developing countries but also in France with the gilets jaunes [(yellow vests) movement in 2018]. It’s really important that the government communicates these things in advance and makes sure that people understand why the reform is being done, even if it is unpopular.

Aia Brnic: The world is still in the middle of a cost-of-living crisis. Is this good or bad timing for such reform?

Neil McCulloch: It's a terrible time for the reform, but I think that President Tinubu has no real choice but to take these difficult steps now. Nigeria's finances are in a terrible state, partly because of the perpetuation of this subsidy. He must take bold measures—and the only time he can realistically take them is within the first 6 months of his presidency. But that's why it's so important that he and his government also provide measures to protect the people. I believe they are thinking seriously about that. The question is how they go about it. The inauguration speech mentioned several measures about jobs and prosperity. I think President Tinubu is right to focus on getting the economics and macroeconomics right, and fixing fossil fuel subsidies is one of the most important things he can do. But that’s not going to make it easy in the short term, particularly because prices are already rising.

Aia Brnic: How can Nigeria do things right this time?

Neil McCulloch: The number one thing, in my view, is to change the system. This is my big concern and my big hope as well. President Tinubu is a very smart man. He was very successful as Governor of Lagos, and he understands the depth and nature of the problems that Nigeria faces. So I hope that he will really grasp the nettle and recognize that gasoline is a commodity, just like every other commodity, and that its price needs to vary with the price in the world market in order to ensure that subsidies never re-emerge—because there are much better things for the Nigerian government to spend its subsidies on. It could spend them on promoting jobs, having an industrial development strategy or an agricultural development strategy that supports farmers, helping the poor ,and building a health service. But it will only have the resources to do that if it stops wasting so much money on subsidizing petrol. I hope that Tinubu doesn't simply bump up the price and that he also changes the system—by either liberalizing it entirely or setting up a template that shifts that price every month, as is done in South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, and many other African countries. It's really important that he makes sure that this reform sticks for the long term rather than just as a one-off shift.

Aia Brnic: What are the next three things that Nigeria should do, in your opinion, to get this reform done?

Neil McCulloch: Number one, there's got to be a mechanism for compensating Nigerians who will be badly impacted by the current price rise. That is essential because, otherwise, people will be negatively impacted. Number two: make sure it's clear this is not just a bump in price, it's a change in the system, then announce what the new system will be, how the petrol price will be calculated, and how it will change. And make sure it changes at least every month to deal with exchange rate movements and movements in the international market so that subsidies never re-emerge. That is critical. And number three—and this is where it aligns very well with the inauguration speech and all the positive measures that the president is pushing—align the reform with politically popular offers to the population about how jobs will be created and how the services will be delivered. Those three things are vital for making the reform stick.

Aia Brnic: What is the renewable energy sector's potential in Nigeria? Could this reform contribute to building a more sustainable energy sector?

Neil McCulloch: The challenge has always been that the Nigerian electricity system is broken. The distribution companies don't collect enough money for the electricity they sell. They therefore don't pass enough money back to the bulk supplier, then the bulk supplier doesn't pay the generators, and the generators don't generate. Nigeria has 13 gigawatts of [installed] power, but it only actually generates around about 4–5 gigawatts every day. Despair over the power system has meant that a lot of people have just opted out completely—large businesses and households as well—and just built themselves solar panels. Mini-grids and solar are a fantastic solution for a lot of Nigerians, particularly in more remote locations where the grid can't reach, but getting the grid to function effectively for most of the urban areas is the answer—and that's another difficult long-term and very political reform.

Meanwhile, the government has been refusing to supply a sovereign guarantee—which ensures the government will pay the electricity provider if the utility fails to do so—for independent renewable power developers, who, as a result, find it very hard to get financed. So there are all sorts of problems with getting the renewable sector going in Nigeria, and that's one of the reasons why a lot of people are looking at the off-grid rather than the on-grid sector.

Aia Brnic: How can Nigeria build a cleaner and more sustainable energy system?

Neil McCulloch: Number one, I think that fossil fuel subsidy reform is a very important part of that because it stops wasting vast resources on fossil fuels and makes [these fuels] reflect their true cost. People will, over time, shift to more efficient vehicles, which reduces fuel usage. And the second thing is to continue to pursue the reforms in the power sector. A lot of good work has been done already, but there really needs to be a way of ensuring that independent power producers can produce and inject their electricity into the system and get paid for it. That could be done either by bilateral contracts between generators and consumers, without necessarily having to go through a central buyer, or by improving the market system of the central buyer. This is going to be one of the central industrial policy challenges of the new government—and if they get that right, the benefits will be enormous. Nigeria is a country of over 200 million people with a 13-gigawatt grid—this is nothing, and it should have a grid 10 times that size. But to get there, it must have a grid that is profitable and self-sustaining so that it can expand. If you get that, suddenly all the solar, wind, and biogas become viable, and investors will be more than willing to invest in them.

Deep Dive details

IISD in the news

Nigeria : un investissement public annuel de 4,9 milliards $ par an d'ici 2030 pourrait transformer le secteur agricole (in French)

En Afrique, l’insuffisance du financement agricole est l’une des principales barrières à l’augmentation de la production alimentaire. De nombreux pays de la région ont le potentiel pour accroître durablement leur approvisionnement agricole et réduire leurs importations.

March 28, 2023
IISD in the news

Mixed reactions greet release of IPCC's Synthesis Report

A flood of reactions has greeted the Synthesis Report of the Sixth Assessment Cycle (AR6) and Summary for Policymakers, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report released on Monday, March 20, 2023.

March 20, 2023
Report

Achieving Sustainable Food Systems in a Global Crisis: Summary Report

Ceres2030 Deep Dives into the Nexus of Food Systems, Climate Change, and Diets

This report summarizes the evidence-based and costed country roadmaps for effective public interventions to transform agriculture and food systems in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nigeria in a way that ends hunger, makes diets healthier and more affordable, improves the productivity and incomes of small-scale producers and their households, and mitigates and adapts to climate change.

January 26, 2023

The world is not on track to achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. The prevalence of hunger and poverty—the two core goals which are the litmus test for everything else—are on the rise. This is being made worse by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, skyrocketing food, fertilizer, and energy prices, COVID-19, and climate change. In Africa, the situation is exacerbated by internal conflicts, political unrest, economic recessions, and swarms of desert locusts. To get back on track, it is critical to pursue policy pathways that encourage synergies and limit the trade-offs between hunger, poverty, nutrition, and climate change. This report summarizes the evidence-based and costed country roadmaps for effective public interventions to transform agriculture and food systems in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nigeria in a way that ends hunger, makes diets healthier and more affordable, improves the productivity and incomes of small-scale producers and their households, and mitigates and adapts to climate change.

The financing gap is immense. This report shows that while it is possible to achieve sustainable food system transformation in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nigeria, in the next decade, it would require an average additional public investment of USD 10 billion per year from 2023 to 2030 and targeting spending on a more effective portfolio of interventions that achieve multiple sustainable development outcomes. Of the total USD 10 billion, the donor share averages USD 5.8 billion per year, and the country share averages USD 4.2 billion per year. Importantly, comparing the financing gap between the long-term investment needed to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 2 and the short-term investment needed for emergency food assistance shows that while emergency assistance has increased in recent years, there is significant underfunding of the longer-term investment needs. The shortfall in longer-term funding increases the vulnerability to shocks, pushing the number of people affected by hunger and poverty higher. Donors should therefore complement and better link the increased allocation of emergency food assistance with increased investments in longerterm agricultural development priorities to prevent future crises when the next shock hits.

Filling the financing gap of USD 10 billion per year will yield immense economic, social, and environmental benefits. The prevalence of undernourishment in all three countries will decrease to under 3% in 2030 from a current projection of 22% in Ethiopia, 25% in Malawi, and 21% in Nigeria, by 2030. The transition toward healthier diets will be achieved for 248 million people, or roughly 60% of the population in each country. The incomes of 29 million small-scale producers will double on average in 2030 compared to 2015 levels. These economic and social gains will be achieved while confining greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to nationally determined contribution goals and increasing resilience to climate change of the most vulnerable.

The findings in this report are based on analysis of academic and grey literature, as well as donor-funded projects, micro- and macroeconomic modelling, and engagement and consultations with key stakeholders in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nigeria. The report summarizes the findings of a project that explores the interactions between reducing hunger and poverty, achieving healthy diets, and addressing climate change within the evolving food systems in three countries—Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nigeria.


The project is funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the European Commission, through the GIZ implemented projects Knowledge for Nutrition (K4N) and Agricultural Policy and Food and Nutrition Security. The project was designed as a contribution to, and to build upon the progress made at,  the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit.

Report details

IISD in the news

The Next President's Fuel Subsidy Challenge

The next Nigerian president will have their job cut out for them. Whoever wins the February 25, 2023 presidential election will be taking over a country that is neck-deep in serious economic, political and security crises, assuming all goes well with the election in the first place.

November 13, 2022

IISD in the news details

Report

Achieving Sustainable Food Systems in a Global Crisis: Nigeria

This report presents an evidence-based and costed country roadmap for effective public interventions to transform agriculture and food systems in Nigeria in a way that ends hunger, makes diets healthier and more affordable, improves the productivity and incomes of small-scale producers, and mitigates and adapts to climate change. The report is part of a project that explores the interaction between achieving healthy diets, reducing hunger and poverty, and addressing climate change within the evolving food systems in three countries—Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nigeria. 

August 31, 2022

Agriculture and food systems in Nigeria face key challenges.They need to simultaneously provide sufficient food for all, improve incomes and productivity for small-scale producers, make diets healthier and more affordable, reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and build capacities needed to adapt to climate change. However, in the past few years, as a result of internal conflict, low oil prices, an economic slowdown, COVID-19—and now rising food and fertilizer prices, made worse by the Russian invasion of Ukraine—hunger and poverty have been rising steeply, healthy diets are unattainable for most people, and the impacts of climate change are experienced more frequently and severely.

Hunger and poverty are projected to keep rising until 2030. Even among those who do get enough calories, many will be malnourished due, in part, to the unaffordability of diets that both provide sufficient calories and satisfy the complex nutritional requirements of human bodies. The demographic dynamics in Nigeria will continue to exacerbate these challenges, with the population expected to grow from 206 million people in 2020 to 263 million people in 2030. As the population and incomes grow in Nigeria, so too will demand for food and more diversity in food choices, which will exacerbate environmental challenges. At the same time, Nigeria is home to some of the global public goods that are needed to address climate change, preserve biodiversity, and achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).Transforming food systems to deliver on hunger, poverty, healthy diets, and climate change while safeguarding global public goods will require significant efforts and resources and therefore global solidarity—in other words, more external aid.

To support the transformation to sustainable food systems in Nigeria, this report aims to equip country-level decision makers and the donor community with knowledge regarding the cost of sustainable food system transformation; evidence on which to base decisions regarding where and how to make investments to simultaneously contribute to access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food (SDG 2.1 and 2.2); smallholder productivity and incomes (SDG 2.3); and environmentally sustainable agriculture production (SDG 2.4).

The report combines a review of country-level policy documents and peer-reviewed literature with a microeconomic analysis of changing diets, food consumption habits, and nutrition; three rounds of consultations with in-country stakeholders; and the country-level findings for Nigeria from the project Ceres2030: Sustainable Solutions to End Hunger. The findings are integrated into a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that estimates the cost of ending hunger, doubling the income of small-scale producers, and transitioning to healthier diets while protecting the climate and investing in climate change adaptation. The report is part of a project that explores the interactions between reducing hunger and poverty, achieving healthy diets, and addressing climate change within the evolving food systems in three countries—Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nigeria.

Report details