20 Years of the Environmental Integrity Group in Global Climate Governance:
LESSONS AND PROSPECTS
20 Years
of the Environmental Integrity Group in Global Climate Governance:
LESSONS AND PROSPECTS
© 2022 International Institute for Sustainable Development
Published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development
This publication is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

International Institute for Sustainable Development

The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) is an award-winning independent think tank working to accelerate solutions for a stable climate, sustainable resource management, and fair economies. Our work inspires better decisions and sparks meaningful action to help people and the planet thrive. We shine a light on what can be achieved when governments, businesses, non-profits, and communities come together. IISD’s staff of more than 120 people, plus over 150 associates and consultants, come from across the globe and from many disciplines. With offices in Winnipeg, Geneva, Ottawa, and Toronto, our work affects lives in nearly 100 countries.

IISD is a registered charitable organization in Canada and has 501(c)(3) status in the United States. IISD receives core operating support from the Province of Manitoba and project funding from governments inside and outside Canada, United Nations agencies, foundations, the private sector, and individuals.

IISD Earth Negotiations Bulletin

Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) is a balanced, timely, and independent reporting service on United Nations environment and development negotiations. Our team provides daily coverage at sustainable development negotiations and events around the world, documenting global efforts to tackle climate change, biodiversity loss, sustainable land use, safe chemicals management, deep sea mining, and other global challenges. We distribute our free daily reports and summaries at meeting venues as well as by email to our subscribers, increasing transparency, engagement, and accountability in these vital processes.

With tens of thousands of subscribers—including government ministers and officials, UN delegates, NGOs, the business community, academics, and the media—and an unmatched team of environmental negotiation specialists, Earth Negotiations Bulletin is an essential actor in the world’s journey toward a more just, sustainable planet.

20 Years of the Environmental Integrity Group in Global Climate Governance: Lessons and prospects
June 2022
Edited by Natalie Jones, Jen Iris Allan, and Mari Luomi.
Cover photo: IISD/Kiara Worth
“UN Climate Change warmly congratulates the Environmental Integrity Group on its 20th anniversary in the UNFCCC process. The Group, consisting of developed and developing nations, plays a key consensus-building role in a process where success ultimately depends on multilateral cooperation. We look forward to the Group’s continued partnership in building more climate ambition and as we collectively implement the Convention and the Paris Agreement.”

PATRICIA ESPINOSA, UNFCCC EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
# Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction

Jen Iris Allan, Ph.D., Mari Luomi, Ph.D., and Natalie Jones, Ph.D.

I. The History of the Environmental Integrity Group

2.0 Transparency and Participation for All: The founding of the Environmental Integrity Group

Beat Nobs, Ph.D.

3.0 International Climate Change Negotiations, Bifurcation, and Environmental Integrity: Lessons learned from 20 years of the EIG

Franz Perrez, JSD

II. The Environmental Integrity Group's Role in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Process

4.0 The Environmental Integrity Group: 20 Years contributing to advance collaborative climate action

Andrés Flores Montalvo, Ph.D. and Rodolfo Godínez Rosales, Ph.D.

5.0 The Environmental Integrity Group in the Decision-Making Process of the Cancun Agreements

Alejandra López Carbajal

6.0 Periodic Review, Paris Agreement Warming Limits, and Net-Zero: The result of the EIG commitment to science

Stefan Ruchti

7.0 The Republic of Korea's and the Environmental Integrity Group's Contributions to the UNFCCC Process

Daeho Lee

8.0 The Environmental Integrity Group's Role in Negotiating the Finance Provisions of the Paris Agreement

Lorena B. González and Gabriela Blatter

9.0 The Environmental Integrity Group's Role in Negotiating the Transparency Provisions Under the Paris Agreement

Lydie-Line Paroz and Dina Spörrli

10.0 The Environmental Integrity Group's Role in International Carbon Market Negotiations

Simon Fellermeyer
III. The Environmental Integrity Group Members’ Contributions to Global Climate Governance

11.0 The Republic of Korea’s Experience and Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C ......................................................... 44
   Jieun Park and Junhee Lee

12.0 Carbon Neutrality: Perspectives on achieving ambition in the UNFCCC through the Environmental Integrity Group and national implementation in Monaco ........................................... 48
   Jérémie Carles

13.0 How the Green Climate Fund Came to Be Based in Korea .......................................................... 52
   Tae Yong Jung, Ph.D.

IV. How the Environmental Integrity Group Works Together: Members’ perspectives ............. 54

14.0 Human Rights and Gender Equality as Key Principles of the Environmental Integrity Group ................................................................. 55
   Camila Zepeda and Cristopher Ballinas, Ph.D.

15.0 Georgia’s Experience in Joining the Environmental Integrity Group ........................................ 60
   Maia Tskhvaradze and Jesse Medlong

16.0 The Environmental Integrity Group and Climate Finance: The perspective of Monaco as an important contributing nation .......................................................... 63
   Chloé Petruccelli

17.0 The Perspective of a Small State as a Member of the Environmental Integrity Group .................. 66
   Heike Summer, Ph.D.

18.0 Looking Ahead: The EIG in the Paris Agreement implementation phase .............................. 68
   Jen Iris Allan, Ph.D., Mari Luomi, Ph.D., and Natalie Jones, Ph.D.

References ...................................................................................................................................................... 71

Selected Resources ...................................................................................................................................... 73
Abbreviations and Acronyms

APA       Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement
CBD       Convention on Biological Diversity
CDM       Clean Development Mechanism
CO₂       carbon dioxide
COP       Conference of the Parties
EIG       Environmental Integrity Group
ExCOP     Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties
G7        Group of 7
G20       Group of 20
G-77/China Group of 77 and China
GCF       Green Climate Fund
GHG       greenhouse gas
GIR       Greenhouse Gas Inventory & Research Center of Korea
ICTU      information to facilitate clarity, transparency, and understanding
IPCC      Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KACCC     Korea Adaptation Center for Climate Change
KMA       Korea Meteorological Administration
LWPG      Lima Work Programme on Gender
MPGs      modalities, procedures, and guidelines
NDC       nationally determined contribution
OECD      Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SED       Structured Expert Dialogue
UNFCCC    UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
1.0 Introduction

Jen Iris Allan, Ph.D., Mari Luomi, Ph.D., and Natalie Jones, Ph.D.

All countries—all people—have a stake in the global climate change and biodiversity crises. Some countries suffer the worst effects of both crises while also dealing with some of the most basic human development challenges. Others are better equipped to cope with environmental change. Usually, these same countries have a major environmental footprint and therefore bear more responsibility for reducing their emissions and protecting their ecosystems. Many countries have made great strides in development and are now being called on to leapfrog into a clean future while simultaneously tackling multiple economic and environmental crises. These are truly global challenges that tie the international community together in unique ways. Global cooperation is vital.

This volume brings together the insights of those involved in climate change negotiations throughout its history. To celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), several delegates representing all its member states reflect on the history and purpose of the EIG and its contribution to the making and remaking of global rules for the climate. This is a considerable history. While EIG turns 20, the first treaty to address climate change, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), dates back to 1992. Since that first landmark agreement, climate change governance at the global level has been a series of highs and lows. Countries successfully adopted additional treaties and withstood very public failures.

At its base, governing the global climate faces a fundamental problem: how to get nearly 200 countries to agree on global rules that are fair yet effective? This question has long vexed many international negotiations, including those under the UNFCCC. Countries have different interests and priorities. They often debate which topic should be addressed most urgently: reducing emissions (mitigation), building resilience (adaptation), or providing support to developing countries (finance, technology transfer, and capacity building). UNFCCC parties’ first attempt at emissions reductions resulted in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. While hailed as an achievement at its adoption, the Protocol’s exemption of developing countries, including major emerging economies, from meaningful emissions reduction obligations resulted in a politically unworkable agreement. The United States and other developed countries—labelled as Annex I countries in the UNFCCC vernacular—would only sign on to a new agreement if it included similar commitments for other major economies, that with other developing countries are labelled as non-Annex I countries.

The sheer number of actors and varied interests complicated the search for a new global climate treaty. Indeed, ever since countries agreed in 2007 to begin discussions for a new agreement based on cooperative action, the challenge was daunting. It took a failed round of negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009 and a renewal of the commitment to negotiate a new agreement in 2011 before the Paris Agreement could be adopted in 2015. It was a long, 8-year wait.
The Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015 and started to guide the global response in 2020. It has several features that build on previous treaties. The contributions to this volume speak to the thorny negotiations that led to those provisions. The agreement is built to last and works in cycles. Every 5 years, countries are to submit or update a new pledge, called a nationally determined contribution (NDC). Countries determine the content of their pledge and, importantly, any mitigation targets, but guidance agreed to in 2018 ensures pledges are clear, transparent, and more easily compared. Next in the cycle, countries report on their progress using a common format. There is a Global Stocktake, which has a technical, scientific phase and a political phase. This Stocktake is meant to inform and propel the climate ambition of the next round of NDCs.

Significantly, the Agreement dismantles the “firewall” that existed between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. All countries, large or small, major emitters or most vulnerable, have a legally binding obligation to submit an NDC and a report on progress. Developed countries are expected to lead. This overcomes the major debate about burden sharing that dominated climate change negotiations for nearly 15 years. The Paris Agreement negotiations resulted in a treaty that, in some ways, is unique. Much of this volume provides insider accounts of how that treaty was negotiated.

The Significance of Coalitions

There are many reasons why countries successfully adopted a universal climate agreement in 2015. This publication focuses on one factor that is often overlooked: coalitions. At first glance, coalitions seem like an efficient solution to the numbers problem as they help reduce the number of actors—in the case of the UNFCCC, from 197 countries to a handful of coalitions. This is particularly important under the UN climate convention, which, having never been able to agree on voting rules, relies on consensus-based decision making. There are four large groupings of countries: the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China), comprised of developing countries; the Umbrella Group and the European Union (EU), each made up of developed countries; and the EIG, which has both developed and developing countries among its members. In addition, countries coordinate their positions through various regional, ideological, or special-interest groups, like the African Group, the Alliance of Small Island States, and the Like-Minded Developing Countries (among several others). Each of these groups is made up of developing countries seeking to coordinate in order to effectively represent their shared interests. Coalitions effectively cluster the interests of similarly minded states and allow for more efficient discussions and deliberations. In theory, reducing numbers increases the likelihood of agreement. But, as Copenhagen showed, theory doesn’t always work out in practice.

This publication shows that coalitions are much more than amalgamations of countries with shared interests and have a much greater role than just reducing numbers in a negotiation. In this volume, we hear from negotiators and diplomats at the heart of the EIG. Their insights provide numerous lessons on how and why coalitions matter and can help realize successful negotiations.
First, coalitions are symbolic. The EIG is unique in that it includes developed countries (Annex I) and developing countries (non-Annex I). Practically all other climate coalitions bring together countries from one or the other Annex. Bridging this gap has symbolic importance and shows solidarity among countries on both sides of the divide to realize climate action. The EIG’s diverse membership, as many of the contributions show, also brings unique negotiation advantages.

Second, coalitions help countries share their viewpoints and expertise. In the case of the EIG, this expertise includes the views of Annex I and non-Annex I countries. The diversity of the group’s members allows it to think creatively and provides a wide variety of views and experiences to draw from when looking for solutions. For some contentious issues, like finance, the EIG’s members can share the views of both the providers and recipients of climate finance: how donors want to reduce uncertainty and why recipients need flexibility. The coalition can help provide expertise on the more technical issues under negotiation or those related to implementation. Reporting and developing inventories can be difficult for many countries. For example, the negotiations for a market mechanism can be fraught with technical choices. Working together can help ensure a more robust, informed view of the issues at hand. Diversity helps the coalition formulate proposals that are more likely to be palatable to a wider range of countries.

Third, coalitions help countries pool negotiation resources. UNFCCC negotiations are complex webs of interlocking issues negotiated in different rooms, often simultaneously. Smaller delegations cannot be in all the rooms at the same time. Their ability to effectively participate and have a say in the formulation of rules that will affect them is limited. The EIG includes several such countries. However, by working with others in a coalition, these smaller countries can be represented across the parallel negotiation rooms. In this way, coalitions may be key mechanisms of improving participation in global governance.

Fourth, coalitions can reflect a group’s shared identity. Historically, the G-77/China has been important in this regard, as it represents solidarity among countries with shared histories of colonialism and marginalization. However, for relatively newer coalitions built on diverse membership, like the EIG, that shared identity has been developed over time, around shared principles and approaches.

**A Values-Led Approach**

The EIG is unlike other climate coalitions. It does not have its roots in the UN system, like the G-77/China. It is not regional, like the African Group. It straddles the developed–developing country divide and has members from three continents.

The EIG also has its roots outside the climate change negotiations. While we focus on its contributions to climate governance, the coalition can trace its beginnings in part to biodiversity negotiations. Through an initial idea, a twist of fate, and skilled diplomacy, the EIG found its way to the climate change negotiations in 2000 and has been an important coalition ever since.
The EIG prides itself for sharing common values and attributes. From the contributions in this volume, several themes emerge:

- Emphasizing science, ambition, and the environmental integrity of negotiated outcomes.
- Promoting robust rules on transparency and markets.
- Highlighting transparency and inclusiveness in the negotiations.
- Serving as bridge builders and honest brokers of compromise.
- Striving to be seen as models of climate action.
- Holding human rights and gender equality as universal values and honouring the fundamentals of multilateralism.
- Commitment to diversity and equality: all members can contribute to positions but can choose to have individual positions if they wish.

The EIG often “punches above its weight.” It is not a large coalition, especially compared to other coalitions with members that include several large emitters and powerful countries. But its ethos of bringing parties together to find compromises has led to an influence on the negotiations that is disproportionate to the group’s size and unique membership and has allowed the group that first began as “the Compromise Group” to stay true to its values and drive ambitious climate policy both under the UNFCCC and at home.

### Chapter Overview

This volume is divided into four substantive parts. The first focuses on the history of the EIG. In Chapter 2, the story of the founding of the EIG is told by Beat Nobs, then Head of Delegation for Switzerland, who, as readers will learn, is perhaps more responsible than anyone else for the creation of the EIG. Picking up the baton for Switzerland, Franz Perez in Chapter 3 then discusses the EIG’s subsequent history, underscoring lessons learned in 20 years of its existence.

The EIG’s role in the UNFCCC process, particularly the negotiation of the Paris Agreement, is illuminated in the second part of this volume. Andrés Flores Montalvo and Rodolfo Godinez Rosales, Mexico, introduce the section in Chapter 4 by providing an overview of the
highlights of the EIG’s contributions, as well as a general discussion of the EIG’s strengths and challenges. Then, in Chapter 5 Alejandra López Carbajal zeroes in on the delicate task faced by Mexico as President of COP 16 in Cancun, including how the EIG supported the Mexican Presidency. Chapter 6 sees Stefan Ruchti, Switzerland, discuss the EIG’s commitment to science, including its contributions to the 2013–2015 Periodic Review, which was tasked with determining the adequacy of, and progress toward, the then long-term goal to keep global temperature increase below 2°C above preindustrial times. Four chapters discuss the EIG’s contributions to various Paris Agreement negotiating tracks. In Chapter 7, Daeho Lee, Republic of Korea, details the complex and difficult negotiations on further guidance on NDCs. In Chapter 8, the EIG’s role in negotiating the Paris Agreement’s climate finance provisions is elaborated by Lorena B. González, Mexico, and Gabriela Blatter, Switzerland, whose chapter shows how the EIG’s diversity proved to be its key strength. In Chapter 9 Lydie-Line Paroz and Dina Spörri, Switzerland, discuss negotiations on transparency provisions in the Paris Agreement. This chapter also elaborates the EIG’s thinking on the negotiations, ongoing as of this writing, toward the finalization of the Enhanced Transparency Framework. Finally, in Chapter 10, Simon Fellermeyer, Switzerland, looks at the EIG’s role in negotiations on international carbon markets.

The third part of this volume focuses on the contributions of EIG members themselves to global climate governance. In Chapter 11, Jieun Park and Junhee Lee examine the Republic of Korea’s contributions to climate science, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C. Jérémie Carles discusses Monaco’s role in advocating for ambition and carbon neutrality on the international stage, as well as its national plans and actions to reduce emissions, in Chapter 12. Finally, in Chapter 13, the story of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and how it came to be based in the Republic of Korea is told by Tae Yong Jung.

The final part of this publication highlights EIG members’ perspectives on how the EIG works together. On full display here is the diversity among EIG members’ national circumstances and how, despite—or even because of—their differences, the members all benefit from belonging to, and in turn strengthening, the EIG. In Chapter 14, Camila Zepeda and Cristopher Ballinas, Mexico, discuss how the EIG has prioritized a human rights-based and gender-sensitive approach in the UNFCCC negotiations both pre- and post-Paris. The experience of Georgia, the newest member of the EIG, on joining the coalition in 2017 is then discussed in Chapter 15 by Maia Tskhvaradze and Jesse Medlong. They consider why Georgia wanted to join the EIG, how it was able to do so, and what Georgia’s experience has been like so far. In Chapter 16, Chloé Petruccelli provides a perspective from Monaco, a contributor of climate finance, discussing how the EIG has contributed to negotiations on climate finance and helps to facilitate partnerships. Finally, Liechtenstein is spotlighted in Chapter 17; Heike Summer discusses how EIG membership helps Liechtenstein and how representing a small state comes with certain unique advantages.

The volume concludes with Chapter 18, which gestures toward what comes next for the EIG: the implementation phase of the Paris Agreement. With most of the negotiations concluded, coalitions could still have a pivotal role to play in realizing climate ambition.
I. The History of the Environmental Integrity Group

Ministers of Environmental Integrity Group member countries sign the papers for Georgia’s accession to the Group in 2017. L–R: Marie-Pierre Gramaglia, Minister of Public Works, the Environment and Urban Development, Monaco; Kim Eunkyung, Minister of Environment, Republic of Korea; Doris Leuthard, President of the Swiss Confederation; Rafael Pacchiano Alamán, Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, Mexico; and Dominique Gantenbein, Minister for Home Affairs, Education and Environment, Government of the Principality, Liechtenstein. (IISD/Kiara Worth)
The history of the founding of the EIG in September 2000 is a rather interesting one. The EIG’s founding was due, in part, to a perceived need to move the climate change negotiating agenda forward by simplifying the geometry of the process while maintaining the right of all parties to the UNFCCC to have their say. But the group’s establishment also demonstrates how a single moment can matter; the EIG owes its existence to the ability of heads of delegations to act swiftly on the spot. And last but not least, it gives credence to the idea that, in multilateral diplomacy, system-wide thinking is of the essence.

Several steps were involved in founding the new group: understanding the problem, finding the solution, implementing it quickly and decisively, and adapting it to new circumstances. The journey of the EIG would take place in three cities over three years: Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1998, Cartagena, Colombia, in 1999, and Lyon, France, in 2000. It would also involve learning across both the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

**Buenos Aires**

I still feel the strong grip of the UN security personnel on my upper arm leading me out of the room reserved for representatives of negotiating groups and major countries during the crucial hours of the Fourth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 4) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on November 13, 1998. I had sneaked in as a member of a delegation that was not invited to participate: the Swiss delegation. Rather, our delegation was to be presented with the results after a deal had been struck among the major players. All through the conference, the EU Presidency (Austria at the time) would send a junior member of their delegation to tell us what was happening. While we perfectly understood that the Argentinian COP Presidency—supported by the Secretariat, mind you—had to strike a balance between transparency and full participation, on the one hand, and efficiency, on the other, we increasingly felt during the conference that the method applied erred on the side of efficiency and rather blatantly disregarded our rights and interests.

Being kicked out of that meeting of the privileged few would not stop our efforts to seek transparency and full participation. When the backroom compromise was presented at the eleventh hour, we blocked consensus and, in a very strongly worded statement in the wee hours of the morning of Saturday, November 14, State Secretary Roch made our position very clear. Transparency and open participation of all parties to the Convention were of the essence, working groups had to be open ended, and it was unacceptable to try to limit

---

1 Former Ambassador for the Environment; Head of Delegation, 1997–2005; former Member of the Bureau of the UNFCCC.
participation in negotiations in order to reach a consensus on decisions and to force-feed that consensus to the other delegations. Other delegates found this behaviour unexpected (to put it mildly) since the Swiss had always seemed to be so amenable. In order to bring Switzerland around, then UNFCCC Executive Secretary Michael Zammit Cutajar could do nothing but promise to make sure that henceforth full transparency and participation would be offered to all. The conference came to a close at 8:50 a.m.

In Swiss multilateral diplomacy, party crashing or bringing a UN conference to a screeching halt right before the finish line are rather unusual methods, and in fact had never been done before anywhere in the UN system. Usually, the Swiss are known for their profound expertise pertaining to the issues at hand, their spirit of compromise, or their bridge-building attempts rather than for any diplomatic gunslinging. At Buenos Aires, it had to be done because we were right to feel treated disrespectfully.

It also had to be done to straighten out our own mistake made earlier during COPs 1 and 2, when the leadership of our delegation failed to understand the importance for a mid-size country like Switzerland to be part of a group in order to better protect our interests in both being respected and moving the agenda forward.

Unfortunately, Switzerland had not been able to either form or join a group at the outset of the UNFCCC. There are a number of reasons for that mistake. First, most of the negotiating groups would—for objective reasons—have no place for Switzerland: the Alliance of Small Island States, the G-77/China, and the EU would obviously exclude Switzerland. The only choice would, therefore, have been membership in the Umbrella Group of developed countries. This did not come to pass at COP 1 or 2. For one thing, the differences between Switzerland’s position and those of most of the members of the Umbrella Group were probably far too significant. For another, there seems to have been some personal acrimony between members of the Swiss delegation and those of some Umbrella Group delegations. Never underestimate the human factor!

A year earlier, at COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol had to be dragged over the finish line by the unflinching will of Raúl Estrada-Oyuela, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole of the Kyoto conference, it had become clear to everyone that future COP Presidencies would have to find ways to come to terms with the hugely diverse aspects of climate change by streamlining the decision-making process and overcoming divergent interests. One good way to do that was to focus on groups of countries by transferring some of the opinion-shaping process to the groups and putting the onus on each group to hammer out its internal consensus before bringing it to the actual negotiating table. In doing so, the subsequent consensus-building task of the Presidency would be potentially easier, and the chances of eventual success would increase. Our later experience as the de facto Presidency at COP 7 in Marrakech, Morocco, in 2001, would prove this to be true.

Unfortunately, no attempts were made either by Switzerland or other “orphans” to form a group of their own by the conclusion of COP 3. In Buenos Aires, this lack of initiative would come home to roost.
Just a few months after tempers rose in Buenos Aires, many of the delegates would come together again in Cartagena, Colombia, for the First Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD ExCOP 1). Again, a thorny issue—the negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety—was at hand. On February 28, at 5:00 a.m., the situation seemed hopeless: after the plenary had refused to accept the draft text prepared by the Biosafety Working Group, the conference had ground to a halt. The negotiations had—similarly to the UNFCCC—been carried out mainly by groups, although in a more transparent way where individual countries could have the floor. The three main groups—the EU, the Like-Minded Group (de facto G-77/China), and the Miami Group (with a membership similar but not identical to that of the UNFCCC’s Umbrella Group)—were sheltering in their trenches and refusing to come out unless their opponents offered major concessions. Faced with the very real prospect of a complete breakdown of “his” conference, ExCOP President Juan Mayr, Minister of the Environment of Colombia, after a last-ditch attempt to bring the three groups around, realized the time had come for something new. President Mayr announced a new setting: 10 groups of countries, each represented by one spokesperson only, would from now on meet.
around a table. He named the three existing negotiating groups and added six more of his own making, mainly based on geographical distribution.

My delegation and I realized immediately that the number of groups only added up to nine. What happened next took just a split second: I knew Buenos Aires could never happen again, so I requested the floor and, without consulting anyone, I asked the Presidency that an additional tenth group, called the “Compromise Group,” be included in the new setting. While I still had the floor, I invited other countries not represented in one of the nine other groups to join us in our new group. I had had no time to think, to plan, or to come up with a catchier name: it was done on the spur of the moment. To my satisfaction, President Mayr had no objection, and to my pleasant surprise quite a number of countries would immediately join up: Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Norway, and Japan. New Zealand and Singapore joined at a later meeting in Montreal, Canada. Being the representative of the founding nation of the group, I had the pleasure to serve as the spokesperson in this setting, also known as the Vienna setting.

From the beginning, the ground rules and modus operandi of the Compromise Group were simple and clear. They were of course helped along by President Mayr’s Vienna Setting system of only one spokesperson and one alternative per group. As a principal rule, there was no obligation to come to a common position on any question. As it happened, however, the members of the Compromise Group, having very close positions in the field of biological security in the first place, agreed almost always on the position that I would represent on behalf of the group. About a year later, in January 2000, in Montreal, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted. The Compromise Group had proved its usefulness both to the outcome and to all member countries.

**Lyon**

When in September 2000 the international caravan of UNFCCC negotiators arrived at its next stop, in Lyon, France, for an informal climate change conference (September 4–9) and the 13th regular meetings of the subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC (September 11–15), the cooperation among the member countries of the Compromise Group in negotiating the Cartagena Protocol of the CBD successfully continued during and between meetings in Vienna and Montreal in the course of 1999 and early 2000. The member countries found real value in being part of the group, thanks to its very flexible rules and the absence of a need to come to common positions where this proved to be too difficult. Some of the member countries reacted very positively to my proposal to copy the model across to the UNFCCC arena. The countries that agreed to establish the same system under the UNFCCC as in the CBD were, at the outset, Switzerland, Mexico, and the Republic of Korea. Later, Liechtenstein and Monaco would join. New Zealand, Norway, and Japan would stay on in the Umbrella Group, while Singapore remained, of course, a member of the G-77/China, which, unlike in the Cartagena negotiations, was a very active negotiating group at the UNFCCC.

As I found the name “Compromise Group” a bit weak, I suggested a new, more substantial name that all members would see in a positive light. Having a sandwich all by myself in a park in Lyon on sunny September 6, 2000, I thought “Environmental Integrity Group” would
reflect our common attitude to finding good, forward-looking solutions to environmental challenges in a crosscutting way over all the multilateral environmental agreements and other relevant organizations.

And so it happened: The same afternoon, after consultations with the other heads of delegation, I spoke to the meeting for the first time on behalf of the EIG, announced the inception of the group, and asked the other member countries, the presidencies and chairs, as well as the Secretariat, that we be accepted as partners of good will and positive intentions to jointly advance the daunting task of addressing climate change.

The reaction was positive, and the EIG has tried to act true to its name ever since. It has become part of the family and gained respect both, we believe, through countless contributions to address climate change in a meaningful way over its 20 years, and also for us member states as a very useful diplomatic instrument to make our voices heard and have our positions reflected in a constructive partnership with all other groups and countries.
3.0 International Climate Change Negotiations, Bifurcation, and Environmental Integrity: Lessons learned from 20 years of the EIG

Franz Perrez, JSD

When I joined the climate change negotiation process, I was struck by the divisive approach that shaped thinking and discourse. This perception of climate change as a bifurcated challenge was present not only in large parts of the broader public and the media but in the multilateral negotiation process itself: depending on whether countries were listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC or not, they were categorized either as developed or developing countries. This categorization into two groups has dominated much of the debate, despite the fact that it did not, and does not, reflect either the reality of the 21st century or the language of the text of the UNFCCC. In fact, some non-Annex I countries are among the richest countries in the world and six of the top 10 carbon dioxide (CO$_2$) emitters in absolute terms, and the top eight per capita emitters are non-Annex I countries (Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research [EDGAR], 2020). Furthermore, the language of the UNFCCC refers to the “developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I” (Article 4.2), meaning that not all developed country parties are included in Annex I and that some parties included in Annex I are not developed country parties.

Bifurcation, therefore, misrepresents the reality, responsibilities, and needs of individual countries and of the international community as a whole. Moreover, bifurcation has become an impediment to a constructive process aiming at solving a common problem. It was thus not surprising that Mexico’s chief negotiator, Luis Alfonso de Alba, who was leading the negotiations at COP 16 in Cancun in 2011, a key point on the road toward COP 21 in 2015, invested a lot of time to overcome this polarization and bring the negotiations back on track after the collapse of the Copenhagen talks in 2009 by highlighting that any solution had to reflect the needs of each country, independent of its categorizations.\(^3\)

The EIG does not fit into this simplistic view of a world composed of two categories of countries. It includes Annex I (Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Switzerland) and non-Annex I countries (Georgia, Republic of Korea, and Mexico); members of the Group of 20 (G20) (Mexico and Republic of Korea) and countries with fewer than 40,000 inhabitants (Liechtenstein and Monaco); upper-middle-income countries (Georgia and Mexico) and high-income countries (Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Switzerland) (World Bank, n.d.); countries with above-average per capita CO$_2$ emissions (Republic of Korea) and countries with below global-average per capita emissions (Georgia, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco, and Switzerland) (EDGAR, 2020); countries with more than a 1% share of global

\(^2\) Ambassador for the Environment and Head of International Affairs Division, Federal Office for the Environment, Switzerland.

\(^3\) See on this also the contribution by Alejandra López Carbajal on the Cancun process, Chapter 5 in this volume.
CO₂ emissions (Republic of Korea and Mexico) and countries with 0.1% or less (Georgia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Switzerland) (EDGAR, 2020); countries that provide support (Liechtenstein, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Monaco, and Switzerland) and countries that need support (Georgia and Mexico). And, with the exception of Africa, all UN regions are represented in the EIG.

Each of the EIG members is fundamentally threatened by climate change, and each has an interest in a robust international regime and an effective framework for cooperation and action. Therefore, it was not self-identification as a developed or developing, as a small or a big, or as a rich or a poor country, that brought the members of EIG together. They joined together because they were all interested in contributing to an effective climate regime but did not fit into one of the existing categories of countries and groups. The EIG members share a common interest in robust rules that ensure environmental integrity, such as robust rules on clarity, transparency, and understanding of NDCs, on market mechanisms, and on common reporting (see, e.g., EIG, 2014). And they share the understanding that such rules can only be upheld through solution-oriented interactions, through a process that builds on and does not continually question previous agreements, and a process that builds on and does not continually question science.

Environmental integrity and the integrity of interactions, process, and handling of science are values that bring EIG members together and that they strive to bring into the climate change negotiations.

The first lesson learned from the work with EIG within the international climate change process is that environmental integrity is the key criterion for every effective solution. Solutions that do not reflect this criterion are neither effective nor acceptable. Moreover, striving for environmental integrity also avoids focusing on partial interests. Countries will not develop ownership over solutions that respond only to partial interests, and solutions that are not owned by parties will not be implemented effectively. A good example of this is the EIG’s clear position that emissions reductions can only be counted once—corresponding adjustment is therefore needed under Articles 6.2 (cooperative approaches involving the international transfer of mitigation outcomes) and 6.4 (multilateral mechanism with international transfer of mitigation outcomes) of the Paris Agreement—and that the objective of increasing ambition in emissions reductions must not be undermined by a carry-over of pre-2021 emissions reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol into the post-2020 Paris regime.

The second lesson learned from 20 years of the EIG is that credible differentiation rather than ideological bifurcation is another key criterion for success. Bifurcation prevents, rather than advances, progress. An effective international climate regime cannot be achieved by looking at the challenges and solutions through the lenses of division and bifurcation, but only through lenses that allow an understanding of both the common interests and needs

---

4 For more on the origins and the formation of the EIG, see the contribution by Beat Nobs in Chapter 2 of this volume.

5 See also the contributions by Lydie-Line Paroz and Dina Spörri and by Simon Fellermeyer, Chapters 9 and 10, respectively, in this volume.

6 The EIG’s role in negotiating market provisions is further described in Simon Fellermeyer’s contribution in this publication, Chapter 10.
of the international community as a whole and the specific circumstances of each country. These specific circumstances, interests, responsibilities, capabilities, and needs of each country cannot be squeezed into two categories. Bifurcation reflects ideology and not reality. But any effective solution has to reflect and address reality, not ideology. A regime in which some of the biggest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters would have less robust transparency obligations than some of the smallest would not reflect reality and could not be effective. Similarly, a system in which not all parties that have the capacity to do so are called to provide support to those in need is neither fair nor credible. Nor is a system that does not address the specific needs of small countries and countries with less capacity. At the same time, there are also areas where differentiation comes up against limits: environmental integrity must not be undermined, nor must respect for human rights and gender equality.

The need for **integrity of the process** is another critical lesson learned from 20 years of EIG engagement in the UNFCCC process. In the climate change negotiations, process is substance: agenda fights can last several days and even more than a week, and parties and groups repeatedly try to influence the process to privilege certain specific interests. This is understandable and legitimate to a certain extent. But solutions and compromises that have been found after long and hard negotiations at the highest level must not be put into question at a technical level at the next meeting. And the process must make sure that the existential needs of the countries that are the smallest, poorest, and most threatened by climate change are heard and addressed.

The integrity of the process also depends on how parties interact with each other in the process: whether they try to power play, outsmart others, impose their views and special interests, or whether they strive to find a solution that is best for all, including themselves. The EIG is always trying to engage constructively and honestly in the negotiation process. The group is not a superpower that can simply impose its vision upon others. Its strength lies in engaging with its partners and sharing its vision and proposals for environmental integrity, but also listening to its partners and trying to understand their vision and find solutions that address their specific legitimate needs. Through this, the members of the EIG try to find compromises that work for all, not only for the biggest players in the game. And most importantly: the group strives to reach compromises that do not come at the cost of environmental integrity but allow all to move toward integrity, robustness, and effectiveness. This is the reason why Switzerland could not agree with the compromise proposal by the COP 24 Presidency for the implementation rules for Article 6 (market mechanisms) in Katowice, and why Switzerland reached out first to its close partners of the Alliance of Small Island States and the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean, and then to the EU and members of the Umbrella Group, to prevent the proposal from being tabled at the closing plenary. The consequence was that no compromise could be found in Katowice and that the adoption of the guidance on Article 6 had to be postponed. This was clearly a better result

---

7 The EIG’s engagement towards robust transparency provisions is further described in Lydie-Line Paroz and Dina Spörrí’s contribution to this publication, Chapter 9.
8 On this point, see the contributions by Maia Tskhvaradze and Jesse Medlong and by Heike Summer in this volume, Chapters 15 and 17 respectively.
9 See on this point the contribution by Camila Zepeda and Cristopher Ballinas in this volume, Chapter 14.
10 See on this the contribution by Andrés Flores Montalvo and Rodolfo Godínez Rosales, Chapter 4.
than one that would have undermined the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Switzerland and the EIG continue to work for a solution that will implement and not change the Paris Agreement.

Finally, respecting and building on the integrity of science is another key factor to advance the climate change process. Climate negotiators must not renegotiate science. On the contrary: they have to be oriented, guided, and stimulated by science and its most robust information, even if this is perhaps inconvenient for some special interests. To demonstrate this point, at a critical moment in the negotiations in 2019 when there was a risk of undermining the credibility of clear scientific evidence, members of the EIG wore T-shirts with the slogan “Science is NOT NEGOTIABLE.”

The key lesson learned from 20 years of the EIG is that environmental integrity requires integrity of the process, integrity of the interaction, integrity when handling science, and integrity when reflecting responsibilities and capabilities, as well as when addressing the fundamental needs of all and of each. Therefore, the EIG has always worked beyond bifurcation and has taken process, science, and the needs of its partners seriously. Most of the major concerns linked to climate change are represented in the EIG. The strength of the EIG is the pursuit of a common interest based not on homogeneity but on its diversity. Pursuing the common objective of environmental integrity by building on manifold diversity, not on ideological bifurcation, has been the leitmotif of the EIG, and it has been critical for the successes in the international climate change regime. The EIG is proud of having contributed to and being part of these successes.

---

11 See on this also the contributions by Stefan Ruchti, Jieun Park and Junhee Lee, and Jérémie Carles, Chapters 6, 11, and 12 respectively.
II. The Environmental Integrity Group’s Role in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Process

EIG Delegates wearing “Science is NOT NEOTIABLE” T-shirts at the 50th session of the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies in June 2019. (IISD/Kiara Worth)
It is probably easier to find differences than commonalities between the countries that form the EIG. The founding members, especially—Mexico, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland—could not be less alike. They are located on three separate continents, with cultures that have very little in common, in different stages of development, and with opposing national interests. Perhaps the only thing they had in common 20 years ago, when they joined forces to create the EIG, was that at the time they were not members of any negotiating group and needed to be in one in order to have a seat at the table where crucial decisions were being made.

The current members of the EIG are allies who, despite their differences, have found common ground in their genuine desire to contribute to solving global climate change and in their wish to push for action. In fact, it is perhaps precisely because of the fact that the EIG is so diverse, and in particular its inclusion of both developed and developing countries, that it has a relevant place in climate negotiations despite being, with six member countries, by far the smallest of the negotiating groups at the UNFCCC. Because the EIG members first have to look for common ground among themselves, they have often contributed proposals that have served as a bridge between opposing positions in the negotiation process. Its joint statements and submissions take a unique view, reflecting the delicate balance between developed and developing countries. This bridging role is one they have intentionally tried to play, with some successes.

A highlight is perhaps the group’s support to craft a comprehensive agreement and achieve consensus at COP 16 in Cancun, helping along the way to get the multilateral climate negotiation process back on track. This contribution has been widely recognized by, among many others, Mexico, the host country. In addition, the group successfully pushed for the adoption of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, and the creation of the GCF, both of which originated as proposals from its members Mexico and the Republic of Korea, respectively. It has also promoted greater inclusion of non-state actors in the negotiation process. Over time, the EIG has also advocated for a robust finance architecture, including carbon pricing, as well as for comprehensive land-use and adaptation frameworks. In general, its members have supported stronger commitments and accountability of Annex I Parties but also greater responsibility (including mitigation targets consistent with their capabilities) of developing countries, accompanied by a strong support package and a transparency framework. In June 2014, the EIG submitted its views on the elements of the Paris Agreement, including compromises on mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation. These compromises included the list of the information that parties may provide when putting

---

12 Flores Montalvo is Director of Climate Change and Energy, World Resources Institute Mexico. Godínez Rosales is Partner at Godínez & González, LLP. Both are former members of the Mexican negotiation team.
forward their mitigation contributions, the rules-based system applicable to all parties, the involvement of local and non-state actors, and a gender perspective in adaptation.

By advocating for the principle of environmental integrity, the EIG has argued for advancing solutions to the global climate emergency that are aligned with sustainable development goals. It is not a coincidence, then, that the EIG has always been supportive of the Paris Agreement, which is so far the most integral global plan we have had to tackle climate change.

Reaching consensus within the EIG is not always an easy task. The decision-making process can mirror the challenges faced within the wider UNFCCC process, including periods of deadlock and many sessions of hard work to find common language that accommodates all interests. In the event EIG members do not reach an agreement, usually on finance-related matters, the group is flexible enough to allow members to submit their own positions. However, in general the cooperative mindset has prevailed, as reflected in the EIG’s joint submissions and statements, showing how Annex I and non-Annex I parties can overcome their differences through intense dialogue.

Consistently with their negotiating positions, EIG members have individually designed and implemented climate policies that are aligned with social and economic opportunities and development goals, always in an attempt to contribute to multilateral efforts but also to balance global concerns with national interests. They have set relatively ambitious mitigation targets and adopted policies to materialize them, including carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes. Still, as is the case for most countries, they have fallen short in view of the global challenge posed by climate change, and we have yet to see whether they will make stronger commitments in their updated NDCs and how much closer these come to alignment with a 1.5°C target.

In the current global context, with the confluence of the health, economic, and social crises on top of a global climate and biodiversity emergency, multilateralism has a role to play to guide actions and support their implementation. It is critical that multilateralism establish more agile and more flexible processes, promoting a real sense of co-responsibility among all groups of society. It is also more crucial than ever to look for integral climate change and recovery actions in which equity, resilience, and sustainability are first and foremost. The EIG has stood the test of time. May it continue pushing for advancing such integral actions collaboratively and for real and measurable progress in their implementation.
5.0 The Environmental Integrity Group in the Decision-Making Process of the Cancun Agreements

Alejandra López Carbajal

After the impossibility of adopting a global climate agreement in Copenhagen in 2009, many voices questioned the ability of the multilateral system to address climate change. Some argued that there was no need for such a complex and slow negotiation process under the umbrella of the UN when a handful of countries—the G20, the Group of 7 (G7) or even the G2 (the United States and China)—could reach agreements by themselves. In response to this scenario, in 2010, the incoming Mexican Presidency of COP 16 declared itself an advocate of multilateralism and promoted it as the only possible avenue to handle one of the greatest global problems that humanity is facing this century.

In 1994, when it joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a developing country, Mexico left the G-77/China, the major group of developing countries in the UN negotiations system. From that moment on, Mexico began a search for identity as a global player through different ad hoc arrangements in international forums, sometimes negotiating with and through the UN Latin American constituency (the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries) but also working to pursue national interests as an individual country.

As for the UN climate regime, Mexico joined the EIG in 2000. In the EIG, Mexico found a unique setting of countries, both developed and developing, Annex I and non-Annex I, that allows for a great sense of flexibility as to positional commonalities and differences amongst its parties, but that also enables agreements on the essentials of the evolution of the regime. During the years that passed between COP 13 (where the Bali Roadmap was adopted in 2007, opening the negotiation of a globally agreed outcome) and COP 15 (Copenhagen, 2009), numerous long, hard, and honest discussions took place in the EIG around the evolution of the climate regime, the development circumstances of developing countries, and the ways in which their efforts could be enhanced and supported. This led all EIG member states to present mitigation pledges in 2009, which were subsequently formalized as part of the Cancun Pledges (see Table 1) and which showed a clear example of the commitment of countries with different capacities for global climate action. Participation in the EIG arguably allowed Mexico to build the central characteristics of its Presidency of COP 16 in 2010: namely the ability to hear the positions of developed and developing country counterparts, and the aim to bridge positions between different realities, circumstances, interests, priorities, and needs.

13 Finance and Capacity Building Advisor for the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean, and former member of the Mexican negotiation team at COP 16.
Table 1. Cancun pledges of EIG countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cancun Pledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>Liechtenstein communicated its commitment to a GHG emission reduction target of 20% below 1990 levels by 2020. If other developed countries agreed to comparable reductions and emerging economies contributed according to their respective capabilities and responsibilities within the framework of a binding agreement, Liechtenstein was prepared to raise this target to 30%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Mexico communicated that it would aim to reduce its GHG emissions by up to 30% compared to a business-as-usual scenario by 2020. It added that the full implementation of its Special Climate Change Programme, adopted in 2009, which included a set of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions to be undertaken in all relevant sectors, would achieve a reduction in total annual emissions of 51 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent by 2012, compared to a business-as-usual scenario. Mexico also stated that the achievement of its aforementioned target would be subject to the provision of adequate financial and technological support from developed countries as part of a global agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>Monaco communicated its commitment to reducing its GHG emissions by 30% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. To achieve this emissions reduction target, Monaco expressed its intention to use the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms, in particular the Clean Development Mechanism. Also, Monaco communicated it would aim to become carbon neutral by 2050 at the latest and, as such, maintained the possibility of exceeding its emissions reduction target for 2020 through the use of the aforementioned mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>The Republic of Korea communicated that it would aim to reduce its national GHG emissions by 30% compared to business-as-usual emissions in 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Switzerland reiterated its conditional offer to move from its target of a 20% emissions reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels to a 30% reduction, provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emissions reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Throughout 2010, the incoming Mexican Presidency organized and participated in a broad range of consultations with a view to creating a common understanding on the main elements that could represent a successful outcome in Cancun. Such an outcome would need to be owned by parties and, ultimately, would return hope and trust to the multilateral system embedded in the UNFCCC. This lengthy process, at all times supported by the EIG, signified...
a display of Mexican diplomacy at its best, involving reaching out to every single negotiation group and actively listening to what parties and negotiators required as essential for an agreement.

Finding the delicate balance between different positions and interests in what later became known as the Cancun Agreements was not an easy task and demanded a great amount of work and compromise from parties during the first two weeks of December 2010. A well-advanced draft of the Agreements was collectively crafted—some would say thanks to the sun, the food, and some tequila. However, in the last two negotiation days, a number of controversial issues that were critical to the final outcome of the COP still remained open.

At that crucial moment, the Mexican Presidency called on its friends to help with finding high-level consensus on these remaining issues. Thus, ministers from Sweden and Grenada (long-term vision), New Zealand and Indonesia (mitigation/measurement, reporting, and verification), Spain and Algeria (adaptation), Australia and Bangladesh (finance), France (technology), Norway and Ecuador (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation), Switzerland (response measures/carbon capture and storage), and the United Kingdom and Brazil (Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period) were summoned to handle these conversations and were requested to reach agreement by the early morning of Friday, December 10, the last official day of the COP.

All ministers involved in these last-minute negotiations used their political power to facilitate several arrangements that were fundamental to the success of the COP. Switzerland, as Chair of the EIG, was called to preside over issues related to response measures and carbon capture and storage. While the first issue was a well-known demand by oil-dependent Arab countries in the climate negotiations, these countries insisted on, as a prerequisite for success in Cancun, the inclusion of carbon capture and storage as an eligible activity under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. This demand encountered significant opposition from other groups of countries. If the Swiss minister had not been successful in these deliberations, there would not have been any Cancun Agreements whatsoever.
When the time came to approve the final package of the Cancun Agreements that was presented that Friday night, the EIG fully supported the Mexican Presidency up till the end, when there was only one single voice opposed to consensus. This enabled the adoption of the Cancun Agreements, a comprehensive package comprising, firstly, global mitigation action, in terms of a global goal to keep the global average temperature rise below 2°C, and a review of this goal on the basis of scientific information, as well as the Cancun Pledges by developed and developing countries up to 2020, taking into account parties’ respective circumstances. Secondly, the package related to transparency through the biennial provision of information through Biennial Reports and Biennial Update Reports. Finally, the Cancun Agreements covered support to the developing world through a pledge to mobilize fast-start finance approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012; the setting up of the GCF and making official the USD 100 billion goal for finance by 2020, first made in Copenhagen; the creation of a Technology Mechanism composed by a Technology Executive Committee and a Climate Technology Centre and Network; and adoption of the Cancun Adaptation Framework that includes the creation of the Adaptation Committee.

The agreements were the result of a collective effort. For the Mexican Presidency of COP 16, the EIG was an unconditional ally in enabling the very adoption of the Cancun Agreements.
6.0 Periodic Review, Paris Agreement Warming Limits, and Net-Zero: The result of the EIG commitment to science

Stefan Ruchti\(^{14}\)

The 2013–2015 Periodic Review of the Implementation of the UNFCCC relied heavily on a science–policy interface called the structured expert dialogue (SED). The purpose of this first periodic review was (a) to determine the adequacy of the long-term goal to keep the temperature increase below 2°C above preindustrial times, and (b) to look at progress toward this goal. The EIG played an important role in the work of the periodic review and its SED.

Previously, the EIG had contributed significantly—and continues to do so—to the growth of scientific knowledge on climate change through its many scientists engaged in climate research and in the IPCC in particular. Scientists of EIG member countries have also participated in the annual Research Dialogue of the UNFCCC since its inception in 2011, where they have shared new scientific knowledge with climate negotiators.

From 2013 until 2015, the SED provided a new format to convey the latest science to negotiators that targeted scientists. This new setting provided at once a space for brief scientific presentations as well as a dialogue between presenters and negotiators. All this regarded a specific task at hand, namely the first Periodic Review of the Convention.

The EIG had put forward one of their own, the Swiss professor, climate scientist, and experienced negotiator Andreas Fischlin, to take up the important but challenging task of guiding this new science-driven process. Supported by his Chinese co-facilitator Zou Ji as well as by Florin Vladu and his colleagues in the UNFCCC Secretariat, Andreas Fischlin managed to deepen negotiators’ understanding of climate science. Occasions for scientists to broadly share their work and insights had already existed in the realm of the UNFCCC. But here, in the SED, they had been invited for a very specific cause, namely to convey to the negotiators the intricate relationship between anthropogenic activities and the climate system. Uniting both spheres of science and negotiations, the co-facilitators kept a tight rein on the presentations and exchanges to serve this purpose. In the end, the SED united a panoply of scientists and experts with negotiators over a period of 3 years, in parallel to and ultimately influencing the negotiations that culminated in the Paris Agreement in 2015.

The key outputs of the SED, taken up by the periodic review and also informing the final text of the Paris Agreement, were threefold:

- There is no accurate and system-wide measure that lends itself as a unique and sole approach to gauge the impacts of climate change on the environment, society, and the economy. Global warming, expressed in temperature increase, can nevertheless serve as a proxy for the impacts of climate change.

\(^{14}\) Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland.
• There is no secure threshold of global warming below which the impacts of climate change are benign across all domains and geographical regions. Therefore, global warming of 2°C, previously often regarded as a measure of safety, is not a safe global threshold.

• Staying well below 2°C of global warming and steering the world to limiting global warming to 1.5°C is the only promising avenue to secure a livable world for this and for future generations.

The EIG and its member countries have long been committed to a science-driven approach in the climate negotiations. Guided by Andreas Fischlin, they participated actively in the SED and eventually secured the reflection of its output in the Paris Agreement.

The second periodic review of the implementation of the Convention spans the years 2020 to 2022, and the first Global Stocktake of the implementation of the Paris Agreement will take place from 2022 to 2023. The fact that both will employ and rely heavily on a science–policy interface to inform negotiators (SED for the second periodic review and a technical dialogue
for the first Global Stocktake) is also a testament to the EIG’s leadership, mirrored in the work of Andreas Fischlin, during the first periodic review and its SED.

Lastly, with its support for the reflection of the 1.5˚C global warming limit in both the periodic review and the Paris Agreement, the EIG also contributed to preparing the groundwork for the new net-zero emissions by mid-century goal. Today, the net-zero goal is intimately tied to limiting global warming to a maximum of 1.5˚C.

The EIG is known for its strong focus on—and support for—climate science. It has shown this with its commitment to the SED and its resolute engagement through both the scientists and negotiators of its member countries. The example set by the EIG will have a lasting impact on upcoming and future science–policy interfaces in the realm of both the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Twenty years after the founding of the EIG, the continued pledge of EIG member countries to the essential role of climate science in the negotiations remains crucial to secure a livable future for our children and grandchildren.
7.0 The Republic of Korea’s and the Environmental Integrity Group’s Contributions to the UNFCCC Process
Daeho Lee\textsuperscript{15}

The Republic of Korea has been an active and responsible participant in the UNFCCC process since its inception. Being keenly aware of the gravity and the collective nature of the task, Korea has been willing to assume greater responsibilities and has striven to make measurable contributions wherever possible. In 2012, Korea was selected as the host country of the GCF, and Korea has since then pulled out all the stops to put the fledgling institution on a solid footing, making significant contributions (financial and otherwise) to the fund. Also, the former Head of the Korean delegation, Ambassador Yeonchul Yoo, assumed a leadership role in the UNFCCC process, as the Vice-Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation from 2019. In addition, other members of the Korean delegation have spared no efforts, expending their energy and expertise in the service of the collective aims of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Jae H. Jung, for example, made a

\textsuperscript{15} Sogang Institute of International and Area Studies (Sogang University, Seoul, Korea). He has been a member of the Korean delegation since 2014.
considerable contribution in relation to the negotiations on the modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) for transparency, and he now renders invaluable service as one of the co-facilitators for the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice agenda item on the training program for experts participating in the technical expert review.

In all key issue areas, such as mitigation, adaptation, transparency, technology development and transfer, and finance, the members of the Korean delegation have been doing their best, in ways large and small, to shoulder the collective task. As an illustration of our efforts to contribute to the UNFCCC process, we offer below an account of how Korea, together with other member countries of the EIG, contributed to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) negotiations on further guidance on NDCs.

The EIG’s Contribution to the APA Negotiations on Further Guidance on NDCs

Climate change negotiations are difficult and complicated undertakings, as all multilateral negotiations inherently are. Not only is the number of parties involved vastly extensive, but they constitute a truly diverse cohort. In terms of their capacities and national circumstances, no two parties are alike. It is thus quite natural that an agreement is rarely reached without a long and painful birth process. The negotiations for further guidance on NDCs, which took place from 2016 to 2018, were no exception. The negotiations took a full 3 years to conclude, and the process was a very arduous one with many twists and turns. There were many factors that made the journey difficult and perilous, but none was more fundamental and critical than the paradoxical nature of the task itself.

The mandated task of developing further guidance on NDCs was a contradictory one. Parties had agreed in Warsaw, at COP 19 in 2013, that their contributions in the post-Kyoto Protocol era were to be nationally determined. Thus, parties would nationally determine their contributions to the collective goals enshrined in the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. But the essential function of the set of guidance on NDCs—further guidance on features, information to facilitate clarity, transparency, and understanding (ICTU), and accounting for NDCs—would be to guide the national determination of NDCs. In other words, the further guidance was to be in essence “guidance on national determination.”

Implicit in this was a fundamental tension, if not an outright contradiction. Guidance on national determination implied that the determination of NDCs was to be guided. The intended, if not the explicit, purpose of guidance on NDCs was to ensure that NDCs would not become cartes blanches. But NDCs are nothing if not objects of national determination. Thus, the guidance could not impose a straitjacket either. The further guidance was to somehow guide, but not predetermine, the national determination of NDCs. Hence, there was the risk of doing too much, but also that of doing too little. If the guidance provided too much direction, it would by and large predetermine NDCs. And if it furnished too little guidance, it could turn NDCs into virtual cartes blanches. A delicate balance had to be struck. It was with this understanding of the delicate balance needed that Korea approached the mandated task.
Further Guidance on Features

Of the three pieces of guidance, the guidance on features was from the outset the most contentious. Parties deeply disagreed and were intensely polarized as to what “features” were, what features had already been agreed in the Paris Agreement, and whether some additional features, if any, were needed. The confusion and disagreement surrounding the further guidance on features had arisen mainly from the fact that the very word, “feature,” is not found in the Paris Agreement. Parties, hence, found it quite perplexing to develop further guidance on something that seemed totally new, when no original guidance seemed to have been given. It was thus imperative that parties should first come to an agreement as to what features were and what the original guidance on features was.

In this much-confused context, Korea proposed in its national submissions (Republic of Korea, 2017a, 2017b) a definition of features and the notion of boundary conditions to help foster a common understanding of what features are and what they are for. We defined features as “certain procedural and substantive characteristics of NDCs that function as boundary conditions within which Parties are to nationally determine their NDCs.” We further elaborated that “as boundary conditions, features delimit the scope of national determination,” providing “procedural and substantive guidance to Parties as to when, how and what to communicate through [their] NDCs.” Korea also maintained that features were outlined in the Paris Agreement, mainly in its Article 4, and we identified a number of existing key features (as shown in Table 2), indicating where the original guidance on features could be found.

Such a definition of features and the identification of the existing key features in Article 4 made two things clear. First, features are directly related to, and potentially intrusive to, the national determination of NDCs. Features indeed delimit the scope of national determination, functioning as boundary conditions. Second, the Paris Agreement had achieved a truly remarkable balance between doing too much and doing too little. As the original guidance on features, the Paris Agreement sufficiently guides, but does not predetermine, the national determination of NDCs. It says enough about when, how, and what to communicate through NDCs. It says that NDCs cannot be intermittent, backsliding, without ICTU, or lacking informed consideration of the outcomes of the Global Stocktake, and so on. But it does not prescriptively predetermine parties’ NDCs in terms of substantive elements—ambition, scope, target type, and other such considerations. The key substantive content of NDCs is reserved as a matter solely for national determination. With this delicate balance, the original guidance on features seemed to have accomplished the extraordinary feat of both guiding and preserving the national determination of NDCs at the same time.
Table 2. Existing key features defined in Article 4 of the Paris Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Application/legal nature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4.2</td>
<td>Successive communication</td>
<td>Each party/shall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4.9</td>
<td>Five-year communication cycle</td>
<td>Each party/shall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4.12</td>
<td>To be recorded in a public registry</td>
<td>NDCs/shall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4.2</td>
<td>To be anchored in domestic mitigation measures</td>
<td>Parties/shall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4.3</td>
<td>Progression and highest possible ambition</td>
<td>Each party’s NDC/will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4.8</td>
<td>ICTU</td>
<td>All parties/shall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4.9</td>
<td>To be informed by the outcomes of the Global Stocktake</td>
<td>Each party/shall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 4.13</td>
<td>To be accounted for</td>
<td>Parties/shall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, it became increasingly clear to us that it was better to preserve the fine balance achieved in the original guidance rather than trying to find a better balance through further guidance. Such a change in direction seemed not only appropriate but necessary because the APA discussion on features remained at an impasse until the final hours of the last session of the APA. It was in this context that Korea proposed a way out of the stalemate: that the APA should conclude its work in relation to the further guidance on features by noting that the features are outlined in the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement. In the end, the APA concluded its work on features without producing further guidance. This outcome, or rather lack of outcome, was itself a wise achievement because, more often than not, the perfect is the enemy of the good. We believe that was the case with developing further guidance on features.

Further Guidance on ICTU

The central questions regarding further guidance on ICTU were whether the guidance should be (and could be) mandatory, and whether it could be commonly applicable to all parties. A key issue regarding these two questions was whether providing ICTU was a matter of capacity. If it were a matter of capacity, the guidance on ICTU could not be mandatory for those parties that lacked such capacities, and the guidance should be bifurcated or multifurcated according to the disparate levels of capacity. Parties were diametrically opposed to each other regarding this central question. Those parties who regarded the provision of ICTU as a matter of capacity adamantly maintained that the guidance should be voluntary and differentiated. On the other hand, some parties were equally unwavering that the guidance should be mandatory and common to all parties, arguing that the provision of ICTU had little to do with capacity. These two lines of arguments clashed head-on with each other throughout much of the APA sessions. But no convincing argument was
put forward from either side as to why the provision of ICTU was, or was not, a matter of capacity. It was thus vital to address this issue.

Korea, together with other EIG members, addressed this vital issue in an EIG joint submission (EIG, 2017). In it, we pointed out that the problem of capacity had already been addressed by parties themselves when they nationally determined their NDCs. In consideration of their capacities and national circumstances, parties had self-determined “the sectors and coverage, and target type of their NDCs.” Under the Paris Agreement, in terms of substance, parties could self-determine anything and everything related to their NDCs. As such, the national determination of NDCs “ensures that [Parties’] different capacities and circumstances are accommodated.” This built-in accommodation of different capacities and national circumstances is the singular beauty of NDCs. ICTU is simply an ex post explanation of what parties have nationally determined in the light of their capacities. Thus, the provision of ICTU is by no means a matter of capacity but purely “a matter of disclosure.” This elucidation by the EIG of NDCs’ built-in accommodation of parties’ different capacities made it quite clear that the dispute over the problem of capacity in relation to ICTU was largely misconceived and hence unnecessary. If the provision of ICTU was a matter not of capacity but of simple disclosure, there was no reason why the further guidance on ICTU could not be mandatory and common to all parties. With the national determination of NDCs, no party would be forced to provide ICTU beyond its capacity. ICTU is essentially self-imposed by parties’ own choosing (i.e., by their NDCs).

Eventually, parties agreed on and adopted mandatory and common guidance on ICTU with the ingenious phrase, “Parties shall provide the information . . . as applicable to their nationally determined contributions” (UNFCCC, 2018). We believe that the EIG’s clarification of the nature of ICTU was a significant contribution that greatly helped to
bring the APA discussion out of an unnecessary standoff and put it on track toward its successful conclusion.

**A Few Closing Words**

Climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC are uniquely blessed in many aspects. Few multilateral forums are convened for nobler and more legitimate purposes than that of ensuring the survival of life on earth, including the very survival of humanity itself. The membership of the UNFCCC (numbering 197 parties) is one of the most extensive of all international regimes; it is even more extensive than the membership of the United Nations (which numbers 193 member states), symbolically demonstrating the universal appeal of, and shared interest in, the problem of climate change. Furthermore, the sense of interdependence—the understanding that there is no hope of solving the problem unless everyone works together—is arguably greater and more strongly shared among the member countries than in any other international regimes. It is not inaccurate, therefore, to say that climate change negotiations are more fortunate than other multilateral efforts, in terms of the legitimacy of purpose, the extent of shared interest, and the sense of interdependence. The “climate” of climate change negotiations is indeed quite auspicious.

These three blessings, one might naturally expect, should combine to make climate change negotiations an exemplary model of multilateral effectiveness. But the history of climate change negotiations has shown that such an outcome does not happen of its own accord. Rather, it requires purposeful, sustained hard work. The EIG is committed to bringing about such an outcome, and we believe that the EIG is uniquely positioned to make valuable contributions in this regard.

The EIG occupies a unique place within the landscape of the UNFCCC forum. Its membership is not regional. Nor does it represent a political grouping. Its members represent three continents. It consists of both developed and developing countries. The size of an economy is not an eligibility criterion either: the economic size of the member countries runs the gamut from large to small. The EIG is truly a microcosm of the broader macrocosm of the UNFCCC. But the EIG is not a mere composite. If there is one thing that unites the EIG members, it is environmental integrity. This unique composition and set of characteristics of the EIG are special advantages that enable it to play a bridging role. Its joint positions represent neither regional nor political standpoints. More than anything, they represent balance: balance between developed and developing countries, between regions, and between other diversities. As such, the positions of the EIG can serve as bridges between diverse polarities—regional, political, or otherwise. But the bridge that the EIG offers, we believe, is not a mechanical midway between two opposing sides that can take us only halfway, but an environmentally integrous way that can lead us to a sustainable future for all.
8.0 The Environmental Integrity Group’s Role in Negotiating the Finance Provisions of the Paris Agreement

Lorena B. González and Gabriela Blatter

Climate Finance as a Key Enabler

In the runup to the 2015 UN Paris Climate Change Conference, it became evident that finance would be a key enabler for enhanced action on mitigation and adaptation. The entire EIG was committed to delivering a robust new climate agreement and acknowledged the crucial enabling role of finance in the negotiations. During its internal preparatory discussions, the EIG soon realized that the diversity of the group would clearly be a strength in these intense negotiations for a robust new climate agreement, in particular in the area of finance. The representation of climate finance providers and recipients within the same negotiation group, combined with a strong basis of trust among the different country representatives, allowed for a frank and critical exchange of views that enabled a mutual understanding of the challenges at hand.

Based on these exchanges, progressive views regarding climate finance started to emerge and were shared by all EIG members. The group had a robust bridge-builder attitude toward the negotiations as a whole. The foundation was a strong commitment from everyone to honour the principles of the UNFCCC and the fundamentals of multilateralism, while clearly acknowledging countries’ changing circumstances. With Mexico and Switzerland as co-leads on finance issues, the EIG had a strong leading team representing a diversity of views and equipped with a good understanding of the various national circumstances, expectations, challenges, and red lines related to the finance negotiations.

Preparing the Ground and Building Up the Network

Due to the high sensitivities attached to the climate finance negotiations, we realized that it was essential to prepare a foundation of trust for the negotiations and build up a personal network of key negotiators. The aim was dual: to bring together both those who would be willing to work toward a common ground and those who would have the convening power to convince others in their negotiating groups. It was essential to build trust between the negotiators and to facilitate a frank exchange between the various groups, similar to the exchange that was already happening among the EIG members. As lead negotiators for the EIG, we convened and participated in various informal dialogues and exchanges with delegates from other groups that took place over dinner, drinks, or coffee and, often, sharing

16 Lorena B. González is Senior Associate for United Nations Climate Finance at the World Resources Institute in Washington, D.C., and Gabriela Blatter is Senior Policy Advisor for Environment Finance and Lead Negotiator for Climate Finance for the Swiss Delegation to the UNFCCC. The views expressed are those of the authors, not of the institutions they represent.
a piece of Swiss chocolate. We listened to the views and concerns raised by others, shared
their progressive views, tested ideas, and tried to push the boundaries to slowly move toward
common ground.

**Distinction Between Provision and Mobilization of Climate Finance**

The nature of the decisions on climate finance is complex and has evolved under the
UNFCCC. For example, to address developments in the climate finance architecture,
such as the inception of the GCF, the operationalization and functions of the Standing
Committee on Finance, including the continuous enhancement of provisions related to
the measurement, reporting, and verification of support, among others. Based on the many
discussions at and away from the negotiation table in 2015, it became clear that one would
have to distinguish between the provision and the mobilization of climate finance in the
agreement to enable differentiation between core responsibilities and desired actions to
be undertaken by the different countries. On one hand, some developing countries were
concerned that developed countries would walk away from their commitments anchored
in Article 4 of the Convention (on commitments), namely, to provide new and additional
financial resources and assist developing countries in complying with their obligations.
On the other hand, some developed countries were concerned that changing national
circumstances and efforts made by all countries would not be properly reflected in the
finance text.

The EIG realized that the distinction between the provision and mobilization of climate
finance was needed to acknowledge the different nature of both components and the
obligations attached to them across the entire finance article, namely the provision and
mobilization of public and private resources for climate action in developing countries,
reporting, and monitoring, as well as the indication of future commitments. The EIG also
realized that this could facilitate a solution that would provide reassurance to, and address
the concerns of, both developed and developing countries. In their conversations with the
various countries and other negotiation group representatives, we started to discuss this idea
of separating the two concepts of mobilization and provision. It was generally well received,
and several delegates requested concrete proposals in writing.

**Hands-on and Creative Approaches**

We started drafting several language proposals in bilateral brainstorming exercises in coffee
shops in Bonn, Germany, Paris, France, and anywhere else a formal or informal meeting was
taking place. The goal was to craft a possible finance article that would distinguish between
the two concepts of provision and mobilization of climate finance. Shortly before COP 21 in
Paris, discussions and consultations on the various draft language proposals with key finance
negotiators from other groups and countries began. To avoid the circulation of preliminary
drafts and limit the number of attachments to written proposals, a decision was made to
use a digital version of the text on a tablet as input for the discussions. During exchanges
with the various negotiators, the EIG tried to understand the bottom-line concerns of all
negotiating groups and, in a constructive dialogue, also suggested ways to address them. After each discussion, the EIG negotiators adjusted the draft language on the tablet to address the feedback and concerns raised by their negotiation partners. Gradually, a common ground acceptable to the various groups started to emerge, and the number of brackets in the draft proposal was continuously reduced.

We then started to read in our textual proposals during the formal negotiations in Paris. Some proposals were read in by Switzerland and some by Mexico, but none of them were read in as group proposals by the EIG. This allowed the group to take advantage of its diversity: the group knew that some proposals would be more acceptable to all if they were introduced by Mexico and supported by Switzerland, and some would be more acceptable the other way around. Since many of the key negotiators had seen the text or a similar version of the text informally beforehand, the level of acceptance of the proposals was often very high and several of the paragraphs proved to be acceptable with only minor changes.

**A Success Story**

Many of the original draft proposals written on the tablet found their way into the Paris Agreement in one way or the other. The idea of separating the concepts of the provision and mobilization of climate finance proved to be a key element to unlock the finance negotiations. This success story is a demonstration of the many strengths of the EIG as a negotiating group under the UNFCCC and of the importance of trust and personal relationships between negotiators to facilitate solutions. Without the strong personal bond between us, the two lead finance negotiators from Mexico and Switzerland, the trust of the EIG in us, and the robust network we had built with many of the key negotiators from the various groups and countries, it would not have been possible to create this safe space from which to build common ground positions and language.

The diversity of the EIG and its member countries allows the group to “think outside of the box,” draft bridging proposals, and push the boundaries to facilitate solutions on both sides of the table. The EIG’s role in negotiating the finance provisions of the Paris Agreement also clearly shows that progressive ideas are more acceptable if members of the EIG table them, particularly in heavily polarized negotiations such as the ones on climate finance. Five years on, with the challenging discussions around the deliberations on the new collective post-2025 goal for climate finance ahead of us, the EIG will once more have a chance to play its role as bridge builder and solution provider to enable enhanced ambition by all.
The Paris Agreement brought a paradigm shift in international climate governance: for the first time, national emissions reductions targets were not to be enshrined in an internationally legally binding instrument but rather established by parties themselves in the course of the implementation of such an instrument. The submission of NDCs is legally binding, while the attainment of targets is a political commitment that is essential to maintain trust amongst parties. Transparency lies very much at the heart of the Paris Agreement. In a system in which each country sets its own objectives, knowing what other countries are doing is necessary to build confidence amongst parties and a willingness to commit internationally to domestic mitigation measures. A transparent reporting system allows a country to place its own climate action in the context of a broader effort. This can send an important market signal to economic players. In turn, private sector and subnational actors will be more likely to accept environmental regulations if they are confident that similar policies and measures will be implemented in other countries. This is true for all countries, but the importance of transparency is especially felt by countries whose emissions reductions have a smaller direct impact on the global climate system, and who therefore depend on emissions reductions from bigger emitters.

Transparency in the context of climate change negotiations has always been a key focus of the group, even for members with small delegations and limited capacity to follow negotiations.

**Bridging Positions on Transparency Provisions of the Paris Agreement**

EIG members were ideally placed to play an important and active role on transparency during the negotiations toward the Paris Agreement. The transparency provisions negotiated under the Paris Agreement represented a significant progression from arrangements under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, which include different guidelines as a basis, including different IPCC methodologies for Annex I and non-Annex I countries (see e.g., UNFCCC, Articles 4.1(a), 4.2(b), and 12; Kyoto Protocol, Articles 5, 7, and 8). As a result of lengthy negotiations, under the Paris Agreement, the scope and frequency of reporting will be the same for developing countries and developed countries, with flexibility provided where needed for developing countries (Article 13).
Developing the Enhanced Transparency Framework under the Paris Agreement required a good understanding of how reporting requirements vary according to national circumstances, including the requirements of both developing and developed countries. Up to just a few weeks before the adoption of the Paris Agreement, countries were still divided over differentiation and bifurcation under the transparency article of the Paris Agreement. The EIG, with its wide diversity of member countries, was well placed to argue in favour of common transparency arrangements and build up support. The EIG comprises both developed and developing countries, or Annex I and non-Annex 1 countries under the UNFCCC. While some EIG member countries have long-standing experience in reporting—Switzerland has compiled its annual emissions since 1990, for instance—others, such as Georgia, are just about to establish systems that allow for regular reporting. Capabilities vary greatly between EIG member countries: human resources fluctuate, as does financial ability. In addition, EIG members present different emission profiles due to geography and size. A country like Monaco reports no emissions due to changes in land use because of its small size, to the point that Monaco had to account for emissions removals from a football field. By contrast, the abundant, lush forests of Mexico make a significant contribution to its national emissions reductions. EIG members include both large and small countries, meaning the total GHG emissions of one country may be the same size as only one sector in another country.

Moreover, EIG members present different levels of economic development resulting in different historical emissions profiles, from which differences in future emissions profiles will emerge. Some EIG members intend to use the cooperative approaches under Paris Agreement Article 6 to offset their emissions by purchasing carbon credits, while others plan to sell carbon credits. This led some EIG countries, especially Switzerland, to advocate for robust reporting rules for emissions reductions abroad under Article 6. The EIG has played an active role in requesting that parties specifically report on Article 6-related activities under Article 13, a provision included in the MPGs adopted in Katowice in 2018.

Finally, countries are supposed to report not only on their emissions reductions (transparency of action) but also on their financial contributions to support climate action in developing countries (transparency of support). The EIG includes countries that are receiving support, countries that are providing support and others that fall under both categories. Under the Paris Agreement, developing countries are not required, but are encouraged, to provide support voluntarily under Article 9.2. Developed countries have the obligation to provide information on financial, technology transfer, and capacity-building support provided to developing country parties, while other parties are not required to but should do so, as per Article 13.9 of the Paris Agreement.

Due to its cross-regional nature, the EIG was one of the only negotiating groups under the UNFCCC whose members represented such a variety of national circumstances. Bridging the interests of developed and developing countries alike required finding commonalities within the EIG. As ever, this was only possible by listening to, and understanding, each others’ perspectives. As a result, positions first elaborated within the EIG often represented a useful option for a possible common ground in the broader negotiation context (this was the case, for example, for the coverage of emissions to report in the GHG inventory). Because its members
included both recipient and donor countries, the EIG offered a unique perspective and credibility when negotiating transparency of support provisions that could work for all. This conferred a significant advantage on the EIG during the negotiations of the Paris Agreement.

The EIG sought to make the most of its unique composition. During negotiations toward the Paris Agreement, as well as toward the Katowice implementation guidelines, EIG members divided responsibility among their experts for different elements of the transparency framework (inventories, tracking progress, support received, support provided, and review processes). For each area of the negotiations, one EIG member took the role of lead negotiator. This allowed experts to engage on the topics they knew best. As in the negotiations themselves, experts often found that cooperation and collaboration were easier the more technical the discussions were. The depth and intensity of cooperation in this area also reflected the high level of trust within the group. With this approach, the EIG was able to play an active role in the transparency negotiations, even though some delegations were extremely small. This was the case not only for transparency of action but also for transparency of support, where the EIG has been particularly engaged on developing reporting guidelines.

**Reporting Provisions Around the NDCs**

Transparency serves not only to report on past action but also to foster confidence in a shared vision for future efforts on climate action. For this reason, the EIG has been particularly engaged in negotiating how countries communicate their national climate plans and strategies, including negotiations on features of NDCs, ICTU guidelines, and the mandate for the invitation to submit long-term low-emissions development strategies under Paris Agreement Article 4.19.
The objective of the Paris Agreement, as well as recent IPCC reports, points to the prime importance of urgent and rapid action, with a clear destination: net-zero emissions, or in other words, a balance between sources and sinks of emissions, in the second half of this century, with science telling us to reach this objective sooner rather than later. Following the wave of countries (including big emitters) that have announced goals to achieve net-zero emissions by mid century, transparency in how countries intend to translate these long-term objectives into short-term planning will be particularly critical.

The EIG is committed to transparency on mitigation as well as adaptation actions. Since adaptation actions have mostly a local, national, or regional impact, as opposed to a global impact, reporting on adaptation is less instrumental for trust building among countries but rather important for domestic purposes. At the same time, it is widely recognized internationally as an important means of sharing experiences and best practices. During negotiations toward the Paris Agreement, the EIG supported the proposal for parties to submit and periodically update an adaptation communication, which may include information on a country’s priorities, implementation and support needs, plans, and actions. With members like Switzerland, a highly mountainous country, and Mexico, which lies in the path of hurricanes, adaptation remains of critical importance for EIG members. Adaptation communications serve the important purpose of incentivizing countries to prepare their plans. They also provide key information to help understand capacity constraints. The EIG remains committed to producing a mandate for the appropriate registry for adaptation communications.

Looking to the Future: Agreeing on and implementing the Enhanced Transparency Framework

For the first time, under the Paris Agreement, developed and developing countries are due to report using the same guidelines. The new Enhanced Transparency Framework should pay due consideration to capacity constraints and avoid placing strain and administrative burden on developing countries. Under the Paris Agreement, it will be particularly important to listen to one another to understand where capacity constraints lie.

As parties develop common tabular formats for reporting, it is similarly important to consider how the reporting formats can best accommodate different NDC types and sectoral profiles. Regarding these questions, and many more, the EIG can bring a substantial contribution to the negotiating table by once again pooling its members’ experiences and testing possible common ground. These experiences will be equally important when countries review and revise the reporting tables in a few years’ time. This exercise will require a good understanding of the technical difficulties that some countries may face in fulfilling their reporting obligations.

As we work to finalize the Paris Agreement rulebook, transparency has to remain a core pillar of the Agreement’s architecture. A transparent reporting system will be critical to ensuring a robust carbon market under the Paris Agreement that ensures environmental integrity. It will be key to understand progress toward the achievement of NDCs, ensure robust accounting
toward NDC implementation and achievement, avoid double counting, and, ultimately, define a correct price on carbon.

With the conclusion of the final elements of the Paris Agreement rulebook, focus will shift away from international negotiations to implementation efforts at the national level. The EIG is convinced that regular reporting under the Paris Agreement will bolster the effective implementation of climate policies at the national level. Reporting can help small countries and countries with limited capacity establish a rigorous and accurate data collection method. This will be key to tracking domestic emissions reductions, even when capacity is scarce.

Finally, effective climate action will require buy-in from the whole of society. EIG members share the conviction that transparency is key, not just at the international level but also to empower a vibrant civil society that can understand and engage with policy-makers at the national level.

The EIG will remain committed to ensuring transparency as a key principle in our efforts to ensure a safe global climate system for present and future generations.
10.0 The Environmental Integrity Group’s Role in International Carbon Market Negotiations
Simon Fellermeyer

International carbon markets have a more than 20-year history in the UNFCCC process. This history started with the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint implementation in 1997 (Kyoto Protocol, Articles 6 and 12). The inclusion of Article 6 (market and non-market approaches) as part of the Paris Agreement in 2015 ensured a continued role for market-based mechanisms in the years to come. Many parties and negotiating groups have engaged actively in the design and operationalization of these market-based instruments. The EIG, founded just 3 years after the launch of the Kyoto Protocol, has been one such group. This chapter sheds light on the role of the EIG in shaping the UNFCCC negotiations on markets and on its priorities for operationalizing Article 6.

The EIG has been a constructive player in the international carbon market negotiations that helped prepare the path toward the creation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The EIG understands its role as an honest broker and bridge builder that looks at the multitude of controversial issues with pragmatism and an open spirit. Despite having only six member countries, the EIG brings together a tremendous diversity of perspectives and interests. Its members come from different continents, cultural backgrounds, and levels of development. EIG’s credibility in international carbon market negotiations derives from the different elements of the group’s diversity.

**Type of Market Actors**

In contrast to most other negotiating groups, EIG members represent a mix of both traditional buyers and sellers that have been very active players in international carbon markets. The combined perspective of parties that hosted projects under the CDM (Mexico, Georgia, and the Republic of Korea) and parties that used credits from CDM projects to meet their Kyoto targets (Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Switzerland) allowed the group to gain an all-encompassing view of the learnings from the past. Looking to the future, some of the EIG’s members may turn out to be both active buyers and sellers at the same time: Article 6 does not limit the roles to developed and developing countries, respectively. In fact, some of the EIG’s members (for instance, Switzerland and Mexico) have already launched first exchanges on potential Article 6 cooperation in the years to come. This mix of perspectives, combined with a strong level of engagement within the group on the issue, has allowed the group to shape multilateral discussions with a balanced perspective on what hosts and buyers alike expect from a well-functioning international carbon market.

---

18 EIG market negotiations group coordinator, Policy Advisor, Federal Office for the Environment, Switzerland.
Geographic Distribution and Alliances

Through its wide geographic reach, wide cultural spread, and mix of informal alliances, the EIG’s members manage to bring together the perspectives and interests of other negotiation players. Its members’ physical, diplomatic, and cultural closeness to other important negotiating groups such as the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean, the EU, and the Umbrella Group, and particularly individual members of coalitions such as China, Japan, and the United States, has enabled varied outreach strategies. The EIG’s members play active roles in different informal negotiating forums related to market mechanisms, such as the Cartagena Dialogue, the OECD/International Energy Agency Climate Change Expert Group, the San José Principles Coalition, and the European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition, and share their varied learnings at the core of the group. This has allowed the group to gather a comprehensive understanding of other parties’ interests and needs and propose constructive multilateral solutions.

Domestic Market Experiences

The EIG’s members have implemented a range of domestic market-based climate policy instruments, often with links to the UNFCCC’s certified emission reduction credits. These range from emission trading systems to CO₂ levies and domestic offset systems. The varied practical experiences of preparing and implementing such instruments have allowed the group to enrich the international negotiations with key insights into many technical issues. For example, Switzerland’s experience with its domestic offset mechanism allowed for concrete learning about baseline-setting approaches that could inform EIG and multilateral discussions. New activities in preparation for Article 6 implementation, such as Switzerland’s pilot engagements or Mexico’s participation in the Joint Crediting Mechanism, further reinforce these learnings (Federal Office for the Environment, 2018; Joint Crediting Mechanism, n.d.). Among the EIG’s members, technical experts are often involved in both domestic implementation and international negotiations, which helps the group in shaping international guidance with practical experience. Market mechanisms are no exception.

These examples show how different perspectives, networks, capacities, and knowledge unite favourably to form a negotiating group that understands different viewpoints and can think creatively in finding multilateral solutions for international carbon markets.

Toward Operationalizing Article 6

Despite the diversity in backgrounds, the EIG derives its main strength from the fact that its members align closely on the vast majority of negotiation issues. The EIG shares a joint vision for international carbon markets. It is one shaped by the conviction that only with credibility, transparency, and integrity can markets contribute to raising the ambition inherent in the Paris Agreement pledges. It has always been a vision guided by the principle in the group’s name: environmental integrity. This means that any emission reduction recognized under the Paris Agreement must be real, verified, additional, and permanent. Double counting or
double claiming must be avoided in all circumstances. Projects have to go beyond mitigation and deliver real sustainable development benefits for the host party, while respecting human rights. Going forward, the EIG will continue to shape future guidance for Article 6 and implement activities on the ground that are fully in line with this vision and the spirit of the Paris Agreement.
III. The Environmental Integrity Group Members’ Contributions to Global Climate Governance

Ministers of EIG member countries at COP 19. L–R: Marie-Pierre Gramaglia, Minister of Public Works, the Environment and Urban Development, Monaco; Marlies Amann-Marxer, Minister of Infrastructure, Environment and Sports, Liechtenstein; Yoon Seongkyu, Minister of Environment, Republic of Korea; Juan José Guerra Abud, Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, Mexico; and Doris Leuthard, Federal Councillor for Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications, Switzerland. (IISD/Francis Dejon)
11.0 The Republic of Korea’s Experience and Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5˚C

Jieun Park and Junhee Lee

Korea in the IPCC

The IPCC is an international organization that regularly publishes reports on climate change. The IPCC’s reports are widely cited as a key evidential base in international negotiations on climate change, and they have influence on climate change response at different levels, from national, to regional, to global.

Being aware of the importance of the reports produced by the IPCC, Korea has actively participated in IPCC activities as well as climate change negotiations. Hoesung Lee of Korea serves as the sixth chair of the IPCC, and currently leads the preparation of the Synthesis Report of the panel’s Sixth Assessment Report. Korea fully supports the chairperson’s activities, under the leadership of the Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA), and has also contributed to the scientific base informing the implementation of the Paris Agreement by successfully hosting the 48th Session of the IPCC, where government representatives approved the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5˚C.

The 48th Session of the IPCC

Major decisions of the IPCC are made by consensus among all member countries at IPCC plenary sessions. Korea was therefore honoured to host the IPCC’s 48th Session and support the successful approval of the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5˚C which demonstrated its strong will and leadership on climate change.

The sheer number of attendees was a clear demonstration of the gravity of the session. The session, including the first Joint Session of Working Groups I, II, and III, was convened in Incheon, Korea, from October 1 to 6, 2018, bringing together 570 people from 135 member countries and observer organizations. The opening ceremony commenced with a congratulatory video message from Korean President Moon Jae-in. The discussion of the Special Report then began at the Joint Session of Working Groups I, II, and III, and the delegates put their heads together long into the night to review the Summary for Policymakers line by line in order to reach an agreement. The gathering was initially scheduled to end on October 5. However, intense discussions were held not only at the plenary session but also in contact group meetings, and the participants ended

---

19 Jieun Park is Assistant Director, Climate Policy Division, Climate Science Bureau, KMA. Junhee Lee is Deputy Director, Climate Policy Division, Climate Science Bureau, KMA.
up working through the night. Finally, on the afternoon of October 6, the Special Report was unanimously approved by all member countries, and the IPCC Bureau and the authors of the report celebrated its approval and the tireless work of the participants with a standing ovation.

Prior to the session, the Korean government encouraged different ministries involved in the work on climate change to attend the session in order to facilitate their active participation in the process for approving the Special Report. A number of specialists from 11 ministries involved in climate change negotiations attended the session, which contributed to the smooth approval of the report.

**Korea’s Contribution to Climate Science**

The KMA acts as a focal point between the IPCC and Korea, and contributes both domestically and internationally in the field of climate science. The KMA actively participates in the preparation of the IPCC reports, including during the government review of the reports, to ensure objective and fair reports are produced. In 2020, Korea formed a national Council for Preparation to the IPCC, consisting of relevant ministries and experts, with the aim of responding to the IPCC more systematically.

In addition, the KMA continuously monitors climate change and produces climate change scenarios. Most importantly, the KMA participates in the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 6, led by the World Meteorological Organization, contributing to joint research on the development of climate models and production of future scenarios on climate change. Based on the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways scenarios, newly introduced and used in the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report, it has created and provided characteristics of climate change projections, including changes in temperature and precipitation, sea level rise, and extreme climate events for both the globe and the East Asia region in 2020.
Box 2. The History and Performance of the UNFCCC–Greenhouse Gas Inventory & Research Center of Korea–Climate Action and Support Training Programme on Greenhouse Gases for Building Greenhouse Gas Inventory Capacities of Developing Countries

Jaein Kim*

In March 2017, the Greenhouse Gas Inventory & Research Center of Korea (GIR) signed a memorandum of understanding with the UNFCCC Secretariat. Together, the organizations agreed to organize a training program for institutional and technical capacity building for developing countries to effectively participate in the measurement, reporting, and verification arrangements under the UNFCCC and the transparency framework under the Paris Agreement: the UNFCCC–GIR–Climate Action and Support Transparency Training Programme on Greenhouse Gases. So far, 92 experts from 67 countries have completed the program, and the training program for 2020 took place in a virtual format due to the COVID-19 crisis.

Before the training program was offered in collaboration with the UNFCCC, GIR had provided (since 2011) the GIR GHG Training Program, which covered both GHG inventory compilation and mitigation analysis. That program was designed to provide capacity building and knowledge transfer training based on the country’s belief that investing in human resources was the most effective and successful way to support development.

The UNFCCC–GIR–Climate Action and Support Transparency Training program covers the basics of national GHG inventories, updates from relevant international climate negotiations, and measurement, reporting, and verification arrangements under the transparency frameworks. Based on the 2006 IPCC guidelines, the program focuses on GHG inventory compilation by sector, providing lectures as well as various hands-on exercises. All trainees are required to give presentations on assigned topics and apply their topics to the case of their own country so that every participant has an opportunity to learn about the GHG inventory and mitigation policies of 30+ countries.

Some graduates of the program have become UNFCCC review experts, negotiators, and IPCC authors. This demonstrates that trainees have been making progress at their own pace based on the knowledge and opportunities gained from the training program. GIR, the UNFCCC, and trainees still retain strong networks, prolonging this unique relationship, and share GHG inventories and climate change-related issues by holding seminars at UNFCCC meetings. The training program represents a significant platform for developing countries in terms of capacity building and knowledge transfer regarding GHG inventories and climate change-related areas.

* GIR, Ministry of Environment of Korea.
Plans for the Future

The countries most affected by GHG emissions and climate change are not necessarily the world’s historically largest emitters. International cooperation, therefore, is the key to an effective climate change response. As the IPCC is at the heart of international cooperation and collaboration for climate change, Korea will continue to actively participate in its activities to set an example for climate change cooperation in the field of science. Moreover, Korea will continue its efforts to solidify cooperation and collaboration between member countries of the EIG on international negotiations on climate change, supporting the EIG to play a key role in the international response to climate change.

Box 3. The Republic of Korea’s Contributions to the UNFCCC’s Process in Adaptation: Spearheading engagement in adaptation

Over the past 10 years, the Republic of Korea has made significant strides in research on climate change adaptation and outreach activities. By supporting and planning international training workshops on adaptation capacity building with the UN Environment Programme, the Asia Pacific Advanced Network, the UN Development Programme, and many other international organizations, the Ministry of Environment, with the Korea Environment Institute’s Korea Adaptation Center for Climate Change (KACCC), has shared knowledge and hands-on experience with the international community.

Topics of the workshops have included prioritization of adaptation options and mainstreaming adaptation into water resources management. The trainings encourage participants to establish a South–South network by sharing their own experiences, while also seeking opportunities and support for a South–North network.

Sharing Knowledge for All

A climate change adaptation newsletter entitled “Adaptation” is published semi-annually in English and Korean by KACCC. The newsletter aims to share in-depth papers and trending issues related to adaptation and to disseminate the most recent research outcomes in adaptation for all stakeholders.

2019 Korea Global Adaptation Week

The 2019 Korea Global Adaptation Week accelerated progress towards a more climate-resilient future while identifying innovative ideas in the spirit of raising ambition. The Korea Global Adaptation Week was held from April 8 to 12, 2019, in Songdo, co-hosted by the Ministry of Environment, KACCC, and Incheon Metropolitan City. It brought together over 400 participants, including adaptation experts and opinion leaders from around the world. During the week, the NAP Expo 2019 was held, organized by the Least Developed Countries Expert Group. The week also featured the Adaptation Forum, organized by the UNFCCC Adaptation Committee, and a regional Technical Expert Meeting on Adaptation organized by the GCF.
A Transformation of Political Ambition Driven By the EIG

The EIG, by its nature and by the diversity of its members, has always wanted to act on and drive an ambitious climate policy, informed by science, equity, and environmental integrity. The EIG also allows small states such as Liechtenstein and Monaco to bring these issues to the forefront on an equal footing with large nations and organizations.

The Paris Agreement is now the cornerstone of global and collective efforts to combat climate change. In 2016, the EIG welcomed the adoption of, in its words, this “fair, dynamic, robust, universal and legally binding agreement that will shape our future actions and represents a signal to people and stakeholders around the world that all Parties are willing to do and will do their part to fight climate change.”

Since that date, the EIG has not stopped its action to preserve these foundations adopted in Paris with the objective of preserving their scope and balance.

Nonetheless, in order to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement, it is absolutely necessary that all countries define their objectives in accordance with their means, and over time increase their national commitments, in order to achieve the long-term goal. Article 4 of the Paris Agreement states that

In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal [holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and

---

20 Head of Climate, Energy and Urban Activities Division, Department of the Environment, Ministry of Public Works, the Environment and Urban Development
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C], Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.

Compliance with the provisions of Article 4 and the achievement of carbon neutrality will require a radical transformation of international political ambitions and rapid implementation by all actors in the territories.

The inclusiveness and universality of the Paris Agreement are reflected in that mitigation commitments made under it are nationally determined by each country. Thus, if each party sets its own contribution to the global effort to reduce GHG emissions, taking into account its specific national circumstances, this should not result in reducing its national commitments and a wait-and-see attitude with respect to the commitments of other nations. Rather, each party should aim for the maximum possible ambition.

In this respect, the support of science is paramount. Science can act as a lighthouse that guides the necessary level of ambition of the commitments and sheds light on the irreversible consequences of their weaknesses. At a time when societies are traversed by currents of doubt, it is necessary to provide all the confidence necessary for reliable scientific information.

The EIG has always supported the IPCC and the entire scientific community for the work they have carried out and acknowledges the quality of the special reports and assessment reports on the effects of climate change. To cite only two examples, the IPCC’s *Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5˚C* and *Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate* provide crucial information to decision-makers and populations around the world. It is important to underline that these reports were approved by the IPCC in the Republic of Korea and Monaco, respectively, which demonstrates the interest in and support of science by the member countries of the EIG.

EIG as a group works to better integrate science into the UNFCCC process. One will recall the episode during the 48th session of the subsidiary bodies, in Bonn in June 2019, where the whole EIG decided to wear T-shirts with the slogan “Science is NOT NEGOTIABLE.”

The issue of science is linked to transparency. For national policies and measures to be implemented and GHG emissions to be estimated, a solid, comprehensive, and comparable basis is required. This is crucial for an effective global response to climate change and to ensure confidence both between parties, and between parties and civil society. The question of transparency is essential.

On this critical question, the EIG and Monaco are very concerned that flexibility should take into account the national circumstances of each party. However, transparency should aim to ensure that globally the level of quality of the data and information is high and continuously improved. Accordingly, any use of flexibility needs to be justified. The common MPGs will establish a good base for the future.
A Proactive National Strategy and Action Plan

If international action makes it possible to achieve a shared and global ambition, political commitment must be translated and transposed into territories. Collective action, guided by governments, must be operational, rapid, and exemplary. In addition, states must have a clear vision of the long-term trajectory of their territory and the changes that decarbonization implies. This vision must be built through dialogue within society. This strategic projection toward the future makes it possible to illuminate the measures and actions that are required in the short, medium, and long term to achieve the objective. At the instigation of H.S.H. Prince Albert, Monaco very early on set ambitious targets to reduce its GHG emissions targets, which were based on the best available scientific data, calling for carbon neutrality by the middle of the century. Monaco has recently increased its ambition to 2030, in the 2020 revision of its NDC based on science and in particular on the trajectory set by the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C. Now, we have to reduce our emissions by 55% by 2030 compared to 1990. In addition, Monaco has committed to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.

Time is the heart of the matter. Moreover, the climate transition, and more broadly the environmental transition, must lay the foundations for carbon neutrality now to enable people and regions to support it rather than suffer it. Extreme climatic events, such as fires, floods, landslides, marine submersion, and droughts, whose frequency, intensity, and extent are increasing day by day, impose radical changes on everyone. Faced with this fact, all states must act together and without delay to reduce GHG emissions quickly and significantly. Strong breakthrough decisions must be made immediately.

Major economies and citizens must drastically reduce the use of fossil-based materials and products, as well as practices that generate significant GHG emissions. Monaco, having a territory of only 2 km², can only change certain habits as far as it can. Nevertheless, Monaco must set an example. It is necessary to reduce the burning of oil and related products. Monaco is implementing several policies in this regard. From 2022 onwards, Monaco will no longer consume fuel oil to heat its buildings. This decision will have a significant effect on its emissions. Even though in the short term the substitution of this fossil energy will only partially be achieved by the use of renewable energy, the longer-term objective is to reduce the energy needs of buildings and to eliminate the use of fossil fuels.

With regard to plastic, which is the source of irremediable damage to the oceans and biodiversity, in Monaco in 2018, the energy recovery of plastic accounted for nearly 25% of the country's emissions. Consequently, we have established a plan to reach zero single-use plastic in 2030. Plastic can be replaced by reusable products and utensils and biogenic materials in many uses.

The size of the territory and the absence of forests in the Principality do not allow the development of carbon absorption sinks. We are certain that solutions based on nature and the protection of the oceans have an essential role to play in increasing climate resilience. The ocean, in addition to its major role in the carbon cycle and carbon sequestration, is a potential source of renewable energy that is important for many regions of the world. Monaco derives a very significant part of the energy it consumes from seawater heat pumps, a carbon-neutral energy source, and is continuing to extend these networks.
To conclude, I would like to quote the words of H.S.H. Prince Albert II of Monaco during the opening session of COP 21: “Today, it is not possible to be satisfied with a warming estimated at 2.7°C, because it is not acceptable to build our prosperity at the expense of future generations. [...] We must admit that each of our actions has an ecological and climatic cost. We must pay it and not leave this burden to our children and the generations to come.”
13.0 How the Green Climate Fund Came to Be Based in Korea

Tae Yong Jung, Ph.D. 21

The UNFCCC has dealt with a variety of issues over the years. Issues relating to finance and technology have been the subject of substantial disagreements among the negotiating parties. In the early days of the UNFCCC negotiations, high on the agenda was the question of how responsibility for GHG emissions should be distributed among developed and developing countries. However, finding the solution to this led to another question, namely who should provide the financial resources to tackle climate change. In particular, climate change negotiations have focused on the important issue of providing financial and technical support for developing countries that are vulnerable to climate change and have limited financial capacity. To effectively channel and distribute financial support, member countries of the UN agreed on the establishment of the GCF at COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico.

For Korea, a country in a unique position in the climate negotiations, the process of being selected to host the GCF was a combined result of a very interesting domestic situation in Korea at the time and the dynamics of the international community.

The Origins of Korea’s Campaign to Host the GCF

Korea’s reasons for offering to host the GCF are deeply linked to its recent history of green policy-making. The Lee Myung-bak administration, which took office in 2008, set forth and strongly promoted a national agenda of “green growth.” In the process of overcoming the global financial crisis of 2008, Korea introduced green growth programs that were implemented through large-scale fiscal support, aimed at transforming the country’s socio-economic systems into green systems. Korea's efforts became an example within the global community of successfully overcoming the financial crisis.

In 2010, the Korean government led the establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), which in 2012 became an international organization headquartered in Korea. The purpose of the Institute is to support the implementation of the concept, and programs of, green growth in the international community. At that time, Korea also formed a Green Growth Alliance with Denmark and was overall making great efforts in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in support of green growth. It actively promoted green growth policies in order to set the paradigm for environmentally friendly economic development while also addressing climate issues.

Moreover, Korea saw the important role that the GCF would play as the world’s largest climate fund. The government, therefore, decided that, alongside the GGGI, Korea would

21 Tae Yong Jung is currently a professor at the Graduate School of International Studies and the Director of the Center for Global Sustainability at Yonsei University. He was seconded to the GGGI as the Deputy Executive Director and helped Korea’s campaign to host the GCF as a senior advisor to Korea’s Minister of Strategy & Finance.
also be well placed to host the GCF, to further its leadership of the green transformation in the international arena.

The campaign to host the GCF was led by the Office of the President, where a task force led by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance was formed to bid on hosting the fund. Private experts also formed a committee to help the campaign. Cities prepared their own campaigns to host the GCF. Out of the two final candidates—Seoul and Songdo—the GCF Host City Selection Committee of the Korean government selected Songdo.

The International Campaign to Host the GCF

In the effort to bring the GCF to Korea, the Office of the President systematically supported and initiated various campaign activities outside the country. Korean government officials and experts gathered regularly to review and discuss the various factors involved. Experts and members of the task force visited relevant international organizations and other countries to communicate Korea’s will to host the GCF, as well as how the country could contribute to the fund’s activities. Moreover, efforts were made through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels to promote Korea’s intention to host the GCF within the international community.

Meanwhile, progress was being made in climate change negotiations based on concrete discussions for climate finance, and the Transitional Committee for the design of the GCF was formed. Korea, together with China, represented the East Asia region in the four meetings of the Transitional Committee, and actively participated in the discussions. The foundation of the GCF was prepared when the committee’s design, including the Governing Instruments of the GCF, was approved at COP 17 in Durban, South Africa, in 2011. At that meeting, Korea first expressed its wish to host the GCF.

On October 20, 2012, the second meeting of the GCF Board was held in Songdo, where it was finally decided that the city would host the GCF Secretariat. With the support of the Korean government, private experts, citizens, and other countries, Songdo was successful in its bid to host the GCF.

Looking back, this successful hosting of the GCF in Korea was the result of many successes over the years: Korea’s remarkable economic development, its efforts to share its knowledge and experiences with the international community, its outstanding work on green growth, and its experience in climate negotiations.
IV. How the Environmental Integrity Group Works Together: Members’ perspectives

L–R: Franz Perrez, Switzerland, and Yeonchul Yoo, Republic of Korea, during COP 25. (IISD/Kiara Worth)
IISD.org

14.0 Human Rights and Gender Equality as Key Principles of the Environmental Integrity Group

Camila Zepeda and Cristopher Ballinas, Ph.D.22

Bearing in mind that existing inequality gaps remain a pressing concern regarding the fulfillment of all human rights, the international community has adopted various multilateral instruments. In 2015, human rights were placed at the heart of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, considerable progress has been made on eradicating poverty, reducing inequalities, accelerating climate action, and improving gender equality, among others. However, in the midst of the current COVID-19 health crisis and the climate emergency, it is imperative to redouble our collective efforts to protect all human rights.

Environmental degradation and climate change are two of the most pressing and serious threats for present and future generations. Climate change impacts an array of human rights, particularly for the most vulnerable populations, as the increased frequency and intensity of extreme environmental events exacerbates poverty and existing inequalities.

Tackling climate change through a human rights and gender-sensitive perspective is essential and has been of the utmost interest for the EIG, which has historically advocated for mainstreaming human rights in the negotiations under the UNFCCC.

Intersections Between Climate Change, Human Rights, and Gender

The diverse impacts of climate change affect people differently. Pre-existing inequalities, such as differentiated access to goods and services, tend to exacerbate climate vulnerabilities. As stated in the 2019 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2019), poorer countries and people will be hit earliest and hardest. Moreover, women and marginalized groups will suffer the most.

In 2008, the UN Human Rights Council unanimously adopted Resolution 7/23, raising the concern that climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the world and has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights.

Subsequently, the UN Human Rights Council reaffirmed and expanded this statement the following year, with the adoption of Resolution 10/4, by recognizing that the adverse effects of

22 Camila Zepeda is Director General for Global Affairs at the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of Delegation 2019–2020, UNFCCC National Focal Point. Cristopher Ballinas is Director General for Human Rights and Democracy at the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNFCCC National Gender & Climate Change Focal Point.
climate change have a range of direct and indirect implications for the effective enjoyment of human rights and that the effects of climate change will be felt most acutely by those segments of the population that are already vulnerable owing to geography, gender, age, Indigenous or minority status, or disability.

In 2015, the UN Special Rapporteurs issued a joint statement drawing attention to the severe harm that an increase in average global temperature would represent to the enjoyment of human rights globally (Human Rights Council, 2015). The statement, issued under the Human Rights Council, listed deaths, injuries, displacement of persons from climate-related disasters, diseases, and malnutrition, amongst other examples of how climate change threatens human rights.

It is worth mentioning that such a strong message helped pave the way toward the inclusion of human rights in the Paris Agreement.

**Mainstreaming a Human Rights-Based and Gender-Sensitive Approach in the UNFCCC Negotiations: EIG leadership on the road to Paris**

The UNFCCC has reiterated the importance of incorporating a human rights and gender perspective in the adoption of measures to tackle the challenges posed by climate change. The EIG has solidly supported the inclusion of these approaches in the climate agenda since its formation in 2000.
In 2001, the UNFCCC, recalling the Beijing Declaration of the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, urged parties to improve gender balance to enable women to participate fully in all levels of decision making relevant to climate change (UNFCCC, 2001). Since then, the EIG has promoted women’s empowerment, including participation in decision-making processes within climate negotiations.

With the adoption of the Cancun Agreements following COP 16 in Mexico in 2010, parties were explicitly called by the Human Rights Council to fully respect human rights when taking actions to address climate change (Human Rights Council, 2009). The EIG played a key role in pushing forward this crosscutting item, highlighting the need to address existing social disparities while implementing climate action. Initially, expectations for Cancun were modest, but Mexico’s Presidency proved to be successful in fostering fruitful, transparent, and inclusive consultations on important items, such as the long overdue acknowledgement of human rights on the climate agenda. Moreover, Mexico, as President of COP 16, enabled dialogue between representatives of Indigenous Peoples and government officials to raise their concerns at the climate negotiations.

In 2014, the EIG had a strong voice at COP 20 toward the adoption of the Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) to promote gender sensitivity in discussions under the UNFCCC and, later on, the Paris Agreement. The decision established a 2-year work program to advance implementation of gender-responsive climate policies and mandates across all areas of the negotiations. Reaching consensus was no easy task, as some parties were adamant about trading the concept of “gender equality” for a watered-down concept of “gender balance.” As the deadline to reach a compromise approached, most parties backed down on the “gender equality” language in order to ensure an outcome on the agenda item. Nonetheless, Mexico pushed strongly until the very end, standing out as the sole leader, to ensure gender equality was included in the decision. Mexico’s negotiators raised support among fellow EIG members and other parties by convincing them that countries could not back down from language that had already been agreed in UNFCCC decisions. The strategy worked, and the LWPG decision, in the end, contains two references to gender equality, in its mandates and its preamble.

Years of advocacy toward the inclusion of human rights language within the climate regime came to a fruitful outcome in 2015, with the adoption of the Paris Agreement at COP 21. Since its initial intervention, the EIG urged parties to adopt an ambitious, robust, and durable agreement that would prioritize the needs of those most vulnerable and exposed to the impacts of climate change.

During the twelfth hour of negotiations toward the historic Paris Agreement, a reference in the preamble that acknowledges parties’ respective obligations on human rights when taking action to address climate change was going to be dropped, as a concession in order to reach an outcome. However, for the EIG, its inclusion was a red line. If this historic compromise was going to be significant, it needed to be progressive and include the human rights language. Otherwise, a climate agreement without a human rights perspective would be pointless. After long hours of negotiations, the reference was finally kept.
Post-Paris Leadership: The EIG, gender, and human rights since 2015

Since Paris, the EIG’s work on human rights and gender has not stopped. At COP 22 in 2016, the EIG argued for the extension of the LWPG to ensure progress on gender equality. Parties agreed on a 3-year extension and mandated its review in 2019 at COP 25. This decision contained two elements that were relevant for the EIG: a permanent mechanism and a crosscutting UNFCCC focus, instead of a focus by selected subsidiary organs only.

Subsequently, the first Gender Action Plan under the UNFCCC was agreed at COP 23 in 2017. It set out objectives and activities in five priority areas to advance knowledge and understanding of gender-sensitive climate action and its coherent integration in the implementation of the UNFCCC’s mandates. The challenge was to improve the gender-responsiveness of all climate actions and then provide guidance and tools to be implemented in all UNFCCC proceedings. The name “Gender Action Plan” was symbolically chosen to reflect the lack of a gender perspective in actions under the climate change negotiations.

In 2019, EIG negotiators strongly advocated for references to human rights in the decisions taken at COP 25, including safeguards and explicit protection for Indigenous Peoples and local communities. In addition, the EIG pushed on the inclusion of human rights in the controversial negotiations on carbon markets, particularly in respect of the transition from the mechanisms mandated by the Kyoto Protocol toward the operationalization of Article 6 of the

Sandra Leticia Guzman Luna, Mexico, speaking for the EIG at the 50th session of the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies. (IISD/Kiara Worth)
Paris Agreement (cooperative approaches). The discussions on Article 6 turned tense in some negotiation rooms due to the strong reluctance of certain parties to incorporate references to human rights. Therefore, the EIG members raised their voices during the plenary session with the COP 25 Presidency, to call for political commitment to human rights at the highest possible level.

Gender was also a topic of contention during COP 25. During the review of the LWPG, negotiations in the first week came to a deadlock over previously agreed language on human rights and just transition, as well as over references to finance and means of implementation. As parties failed to deliver a text in time for the closing of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation halfway through the talks, as had been mandated, the COP 25 Presidency was reluctant to include the agenda item in the final week of negotiations, arguing that consensus was not in sight. Realizing strong political will was required to move this forward, Mexico approached EIG members and other key stakeholders, including civil society allies, to convince the Presidency and parties that a robust outcome was possible. This worked: the issue was included on the second week’s COP agenda, and EIG members mobilized efforts inside and outside of the negotiation rooms in order to reach consensus, which eventually materialized.

Civil society highlighted the strong leadership of Mexico in facilitating parties to come to an agreement on a 5-year enhanced LWPG, which has the following priorities:

- Mainstreaming gender equality in all actions to reverse climate change, considering its differentiated impacts on women and girls.
- Emphasizing the importance of a human rights approach in climate action, considering its impacts on human rights.
- Highlighting the need for an intersectional approach, considering the disproportionate effects of climate change on women, particularly for Indigenous women and women living in poverty.

In the opinion of the EIG, the protection of human rights across all climate actions is paramount. There is no chance of achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement and limiting warming to 2°C, or even 1.5°C, without a wide representation of the needs, perspectives, and ideas of those in situations of vulnerability, including women and girls.

Furthermore, this universal topic brings together parties: it unites them beyond their negotiating group or their level of development. This is in line with the EIG spirit of bringing together diverse countries in order to advance a common cause. The EIG will keep leading to mainstream a human rights-based and gender-sensitive approach across the diverse negotiation items under the UNFCCC to guarantee the right to a healthy environment for all and leave no one behind.
15.0 Georgia’s Experience in Joining the Environmental Integrity Group

Maia Tskhvaradze and Jesse Medlong

When Georgia joined the EIG in 2017, it became the group’s only member from Eastern Europe and the only member not in the OECD. Joining the EIG has brought Georgia’s unique perspective to the group while also giving Georgia an understanding of the group’s diverse insights. Joining has also expanded Georgia’s access to the UNFCCC process. Today, Georgia is a proud partner in the EIG family. Joining EIG has helped Georgia enjoy a level of engagement and participation that was simply unavailable to it before.

Georgia is a developing country with a small economy and limited resources. Fielding a large delegation of experts is prohibitively difficult for a developing country like Georgia. Wealthy countries usually have large delegations to coordinate on all topics in a process that routinely involves as many as 10 separate, simultaneous negotiating tracks. Yet countries with fewer resources can typically send only a few delegates.

In addition to lacking the resources of richer countries, before joining the EIG, Georgia was also unaffiliated with any negotiating group. Whereas other delegations with limited means can rely on coordination in the G-77/China, Georgia’s interests are too different from those of the G-77/China.

Despite these limitations and Georgia’s own extremely small historical responsibility for climate change, Georgia has long actively engaged, as much as circumstances have allowed, in UNFCCC negotiations. But the combination of having a small delegation and being unaffiliated with a group meant that Georgia could not monitor most workstreams and was locked out of much of the process. Georgia was unable to engage in bilateral meetings with the COP Presidency, the UNFCCC Secretariat, or the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice Chairs. And when negotiations in the waning hours of a COP shrank from universal access to consultations with only a few delegates from each group, Georgia had no choice but to wait and hear what other countries had decided.

The situation reached a head in 2015 in Paris. In that most difficult and important of COPs, Georgian delegates were prevented from participating in the final negotiations. When the biggest decisions had been made without it, Georgia’s only options were to join or break consensus—essentially no choice at all for a country in Georgia’s position. At that point, it became clear that numbers alone were not the answer. Even if Georgia could have more negotiators, it would not be enough to overcome the other barriers to Georgia’s full participation. The solution was plain: Georgia needed to join a negotiating group. It was there, in Paris, that Georgia began a long-term project to determine how it could accede to a group and thus be treated as the sovereign equal it is.

Maia Tskhvaradze is the Head of the Climate Change Division at the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture of Georgia. Jesse Medlong is a sustainability lawyer and climate diplomat with the global law firm DLA Piper, which supports the Georgian delegation to the UNFCCC.
The EIG’s diversity weighed strongly in its favour. The presence of both developed and developing countries amongst its membership was especially attractive. The EIG’s geographic diversity—with members in Western Europe, Latin America, and Asia—was another benefit. But perhaps the most important factor was the EIG’s sincere commitment to pursuing pragmatic but principled multilateral solutions for addressing climate change. Georgia saw that this common purpose gave the EIG flexibility and a reputation as an honest broker of compromise. It was thus a perfect fit for Georgia’s priorities.

Georgia has long sought to be seen as a “model developing country” within the UNFCCC. Its professional bureaucracy, sophisticated accounting practices, and low level of corruption can attract greater foreign support for its national climate-related activities and provide an example to other developing countries. Georgia is also a very small emitter of GHGs and is one of only a few countries that today emits significantly less than it did only a few short decades ago. These are precisely the traits that foster the kinds of enabling environments for climate action and international cooperation, for which the EIG has long advocated in negotiations under the UNFCCC. The EIG’s commitment to diversity was also key, since Georgia is, at least superficially, rather different from the other members in terms of development and geography.

Once Georgia identified the EIG as the best fit, the delegation began approaching various EIG members in forums such as the Cartagena Dialogue and the Partnership on Transparency in the Paris Agreement, which Georgia hosted in 2017. Georgia formally presented an accession proposal to the EIG via a bilateral meeting in 2016 at COP 22 in Marrakesh. Finally,
following a consensus vote by EIG members, Georgia was granted observer status for the duration of COP 23 in Bonn, after which Georgia acceded to full membership in the EIG.

Membership in the EIG has allowed Georgia to participate directly in the UNFCCC process and even to influence outcomes in ways previously impossible. Georgia can now have its unique national perspective and interests heard and accounted for in the text of the decisions that constitute the primary outcomes of UNFCCC negotiations. For instance, Georgia has distinguished itself in advocating for fair representation in the UNFCCC decision-making process for Eastern Europe’s developing countries—a group that has long faced structural impediments to participation similar to those Georgia faced before joining the EIG. Georgia has also provided meaningful input regarding the challenges developing countries face in obtaining support through the Convention’s financial mechanisms. Access to the process allows Georgia to engage in the kind of broad coalition building that makes achieving such ends possible. Much of this is made possible by the unique partnership the EIG represents. Georgia and the EIG are both richer for it.
Since his accession to the throne in 2005, H.S.H. Prince Albert II of Monaco has placed the preservation of the environment and support for the most vulnerable populations at the heart of his government's priorities.

Building upon the heritage laid by his predecessors, he has personally committed to carrying this message of cooperation and solidarity onto the international scene in order to promote sustainable development.

However, it is impossible to achieve sustainable development goals without taking concrete and ambitious actions regarding the consequences of climate change.

From this perspective, becoming a member of the EIG in 2001 has provided important leverage for Monaco. This membership, together with national determination, has enabled Monaco to fully participate in the climate negotiation process under the UNFCCC.

**Monaco and Climate Finance**

I served for 6 years as the Principality’s Head of Delegation between 2013 and 2019. During this entire process, the EIG has been especially active and ambitious on climate financing issues, both in terms of political positioning and commitments.

I joined Monaco’s delegation to the UNFCCC at a key moment in the climate negotiation process which would culminate in an outcome far beyond what we thought could have been achieved at the onset of the process: the adoption of the Paris Agreement on December 12, 2015.

In 2013, COP 19 was held in Warsaw, Poland, and was part of the renewal of climate ambition. It was the start of a new process for finance issues with the recent establishment of the GCF. Just before Warsaw, the GCF’s Secretariat had been established in the Republic of Korea, one of the members of the EIG.

Monaco, like other EIG members, has always advocated for the GCF to have a central role in providing climate finance to developing countries in order to streamline efforts and avoid the multiplication of financing windows.

24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Monaco.
In 2014, at COP 20 in Lima, Peru, the first capitalization process of the GCF was finalized. Extremely positive signals resulted from this capitalization, including a financial commitment from developing countries. However, discussions had been going around in circles regarding the financial elements that should be included in the new legal regime. The opposition between developed and developing countries was obvious. Moreover, I also remember that we had to push very hard for our Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to be able to participate in the High-Level Ministerial Dialogue on Climate Finance. My delegation felt that, under the pretext of respecting the timing, small states were being sidelined. In the end, the minister took part in the Dialogue and advocated the involvement of the private sector and a better understanding of developing countries’ needs.

In 2015, COP 21 was the culmination of negotiations, a moment eagerly awaited by all the negotiators after a very intense pace of discussions over the previous months. In Paris, all the members of the EIG pledged to contribute to the GCF, in order to show their support to the Paris Agreement’s financial instrument. We were the only negotiation group that committed financially to this fund.

This unprecedented political mobilization even surpassed our expectations, resulting in the entry into force of the Paris Agreement just before COP 22 in Marrakech, Morocco, earlier than negotiators had foreseen while drafting decision 1/CP.21 in Paris.

My personal experience ended 2 years later, after COP 24 in Katowice, Poland, and the adoption of the eponymous rulebook.

Since COP 21, the Monegasque contribution to the fund has increased significantly. For the period 2015–2019, Monaco provided a grant of EUR 2.5 million. For the GCF’s First Replenishment (2020–2023), our pledge amounts to EUR 3 million. Monaco has become one of its major contributors, per capita. Having in mind that Monaco intends to fully assume its responsibilities with regard to the collective mobilization objective for climate action in developing countries, our public climate financing has seen considerable growth since 2014. These resources are allocated exclusively in the form of donations and are an integral part of Monaco’s overall commitment to sustainable development.

Each of us knows that the issue of climate financing has always been the subject of lively debate. The stumbling blocks have been numerous: predictability of funds, balance between mitigation and adaptation, diversity of funding sources, and so on.

The Principality recognizes the need, both for the recipient developing countries and for the organizations implementing climate actions, to benefit from transparent information on the volume of resources provided, and those that will be available in the future, in order to improve the planning process as well as access to financing.

The EIG: Working together on climate finance

The EIG somewhat stands out amongst other negotiating groups in the UNFCCC landscape. Reflecting its own identity, independent of unifying political ties, economic prosperity, or geographical features, the EIG is recognized as a group that listens to others, seeking
consensual decision making. The member countries are driven by the will to propose compromises whenever possible, especially in the area of climate finance.

This desire to foster cohesion is not only directed outwards. More than just a negotiation group, the EIG is a constant network for exchanging ideas, perspectives, and advice between colleagues. Monegasque experts benefit directly from close cooperation with the specialized representatives of other EIG member groups and their expertise on specific issues. As we all know, the global climate finance architecture is complex and evolving. Several times, Monaco has benefited from EIG members’ knowledge to get a better understanding of the interactions between the several multilateral funds, committees, and institutions within and outside the UNFCCC system.

Moreover, due to the size of its delegation, Monaco simply is not able to follow all the work of all the committees at all times. There, too, membership in the EIG provides us with a backchannel to precious information that would otherwise be lost on us. This is especially true for the work of the Standing Committee on Finance and the GCF, on which Monaco is routinely updated by its EIG partners.

It is important to recognize that the discussions and feedback that have taken place within the EIG have enriched reflections at the national level, contributing to defining Monaco’s strategic orientations with regard to the climate portfolio. For example, as a result of discussions with EIG members, we have decided to develop the financing of co-benefits projects, with special attention on climate projects that have co-benefits on human health.

In addition, thanks to the EIG network, Monaco has been able to develop its partnerships, responding to its priorities in terms of international cooperation. For instance, in June 2015, during the meeting of the subsidiary bodies in Bonn, the EIG had an informal meeting with another negotiation group, the Alliance of Small Island States. On this occasion, I was able to have an exchange with a representative of the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme on our common interest in climate change and ocean links. This discussion has resulted in a strong and fruitful partnership that has materialized in the signature of a cooperation agreement between Monaco and the Secretariat during COP 21. Monaco is thankful to be part of this negotiation group. To conclude on a personal note, I sincerely hope that the collaboration within the EIG members will continue in this fruitful and constructive manner.
17.0 The Perspective of a Small State as a Member of the Environmental Integrity Group

Heike Summer, Ph.D.25

Climate change is one of the major challenges of today’s environmental policy. It has wide impacts not only on nature and the environment, but also on society and the economy. Since temperature recording began in 1871, the average temperature has increased by 1.9°C in Liechtenstein (Amt Für Umwelt, 2020).

The Government of Liechtenstein is convinced that the global threat of climate change needs a global answer in the form of the legally binding Paris Agreement. We are progressing on our path to decouple economic growth from GHG emissions. Slowly but steadily, we will transform to a sustainable and renewable energy-based society. We, like all parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, are committed to solving the climate crisis.

Liechtenstein has followed the climate negotiations since COP 3 in 1997 and was present in the discussions toward founding the EIG in 1999. For small parties, it is highly beneficial to obtain the support of a core negotiation group. For one thing, even though Liechtenstein takes its commitment to, and responsibilities under, the UNFCCC very seriously, some of the reporting obligations are very challenging for small parties. For instance, for some subsectors, Liechtenstein does not have its own data because of its customs treaty with Switzerland.

Furthermore, as a small delegation, keeping up with all parallel negotiations during UNFCCC meetings is impossible. Being part of the EIG ensures that Liechtenstein is able to focus on the key issues and its voice is heard. Within our group, every opinion and contribution counts. Having a small delegation at UNFCCC meetings has its advantages. The main advantage of representing a small state is that the small number of delegates can have a broad overview of the whole process. This allows delegation members to instantly translate negotiation text into reporting or legal obligations while keeping an eye on overall organizational and budgetary implications. As a result, on many occasions Liechtenstein has been able to argue that a negotiation text under discussion would pose a huge burden to small parties. For instance, this point was brought up in several meetings before and at COP 24, especially in all informal meetings regarding transparency.

As a corollary of the small delegation size, each person in the Liechtenstein delegation must have a sound knowledge of national policies as well as international treaties and processes. Usually, international negotiations are just one part of the job description of Liechtenstein’s delegates, who also take on the role of enforcing national climate laws, carrying out reporting obligations under the UNFCCC, and developing domestic climate strategies and measures. Hence, our experts are able to translate a negotiation text into implications for their daily, practical work. We have found that this broad knowledge and perspective brought by our

25 Head of Bureau International Affairs & Climate.
delegates is beneficial to the process because it helps highlight the possible implications of a
draft negotiation text, including potential difficulties or burdens, to other parties.

However, the downside of having a small delegation is that keeping up to date with the
many parallel tracks of negotiations can at times seem impossible. And the downside of
each member of the delegation having a broad knowledge base is that sometimes detailed
knowledge is missing. This means it is sometimes quite difficult for Liechtenstein’s experts to
keep up with experts from other countries who are in the comfortable position of being able to
focus on just one topic.

Being part of the EIG ensures that Liechtenstein is able to focus on the most important issues
and that its voice is heard. This is helped by the collaborative culture in the EIG. Within the
EIG, every opinion and contribution counts. Moreover, being part of the group helps to make
the UNFCCC applicable and manageable for Liechtenstein. A small state like Liechtenstein
might be wealthy in per capita GDP terms but is highly limited by the size of its workforce.
The workforce is sufficient for Liechtenstein’s national implementation of climate mitigation
and adaptation obligations, but it is not enough to cover all international obligations.
Liechtenstein can’t participate in all international meetings and sessions, and therefore
has to prioritize. The UNFCCC is one of the priorities of our Office of Environment, and
participation is desirable. The EIG assists with enabling this.

In conclusion, Liechtenstein highly values being a member of the EIG and feels the group
can offer lessons in cooperation and innovative ways of working between larger and smaller
countries. We look forward to many more years of fruitful collaboration with the EIG.
18.0 Looking Ahead: The EIG in the Paris Agreement implementation phase

Jen Iris Allan, Ph.D., Mari Luomi, Ph.D., and Natalie Jones, Ph.D.

The varied experiences shared by EIG members in this volume speak to the many benefits of joining a coalition. But the EIG is a coalition that is understudied by academics and other scholars. The academic literature on the roles of coalitions in international climate change negotiations (see Resources below) tends to highlight the experiences of developing country coalitions. Perhaps owing to this focus, the literature draws out themes such as how coalitions help pool diplomatic resources and expertise, and form around common identities and symbols. This literature sometimes focuses on a specific issue, commonly forests, in the climate negotiations to explore how national interests can bring countries together or challenge the unity of a coalition.

As these contributions show, the EIG in some ways conforms to our understanding of the role of coalitions. Georgia, Liechtenstein, and Monaco highlight how joining the EIG facilitates their ability to engage effectively in the negotiations. As a group, EIG can draw upon the varied experience and experiences of its membership. Unique to EIG, these experiences bridge the divide between developed and developing countries.

This distinct composition offers new insights into how common identities can form. Some coalitions form because of their status as developing countries standing together against the Global North’s domination (such as the G-77/China). Other coalitions form around common identities and interests as particularly vulnerable to climate change or as emerging economies. The EIG, however, forged its identity as holding a common position to protect the environment and nature. Rather than sharing common national interests, members share an interest in environmental protection. As various new issues in the negotiations arose, EIG members found common positions while still allowing for flexibility.

Through unity, the EIG’s experiences show how coalitions can have influence in negotiations. Member countries can, together, influence the structure and direction of negotiations. Coalitions carry a type of brand or badge that can confer legitimacy on an individual member, allowing them to more effectively speak to other countries and formulate compromises. The contributions in this volume also highlight the benefits of a diverse coalition like the EIG. With members spanning three continents, various levels of development, and different relationships to international climate finance, the EIG has contributed immeasurably to the negotiations under the UNFCCC.

Usually, we think of coalitions in negotiation settings. But what happens now with the global climate change regime entering “implementation mode”? Since 2007, countries have been negotiating a new global response to climate change. With the Paris Agreement adopted and operational, the negotiation phase is largely over. While there are still details to iron out and review in the future, countries must now implement its provisions with the highest possible climate ambition.
In this new era, coalitions still have an important role to play. First, there will continue to be negotiations on the various MPGs that support the Paris Agreement. In this light, maintaining a technical negotiating capacity remains vital. Going forward, UNFCCC negotiations will likely be more technical, and small wording changes can have lasting implications for how countries interpret and enact provisions. This may require the pooling of technical knowledge and expertise. For smaller countries, in particular, agreement on a “division of labour” among coalition members could represent the specialization necessary to maintain a strong presence. As revealed in the contributions to this volume, the EIG has already been employing such divide-and-specialize tactics among its experts as a key means of maximizing its influence, such as in negotiations on transparency.

A second area where negotiations will continue is related to raising ambition under the Paris Agreement. The Global Stocktake, for example, is a 2-year process, with a scientific and technical phase, that takes place every 5 years. Throughout the scientific phase, a considerable amount of information will be collected and provided to countries and other stakeholders. Negotiators will have to absorb, interpret, and translate this into advice for their respective political-level actors. It is these leaders who will decide how to respond to the Stocktake at the international level, during the political phase. Coalitions like the EIG will have a role in this process by helping to build consensus around the findings of the Stocktake and what they mean for future NDCs. The EIG has long supported climate science. It could take on the role of championing science and push for the strongest possible response based on future scientific input. Domestically, policy-makers will take the Stocktake’s findings and use them to formulate future domestic climate plans and NDCs.
Third, implementation often benefits when governments and other stakeholders learn from others. There are many opportunities for learning in the UNFCCC, ranging from technical examination processes and thematic expert meetings to the upcoming peer review processes under the Enhanced Transparency Framework of the Paris Agreement. Coalitions like the EIG bring together countries with unique viewpoints on key issues from mitigation to capacity building. By sharing these experiences, and perhaps finding commonalities among a larger number of countries, coalitions can help build a set of lessons and models of implementation that could in turn inform other countries’ efforts. This might be particularly true for boundary-spanning coalitions like the EIG.

Perhaps beyond all else, as this publication has made clear, coalitions can powerfully demonstrate how diverse countries can work together to build consensus and raise ambition, which is vital as the world tries to urgently—and collectively—tackle the climate emergency.
References


Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2018). *Global warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.*


download

Selected Resources

Coalitions in International Climate Change Negotiations


Pflieger, G., & Ingold, K. (2011). Switzerland and the Environmental Integrity Group: From the margin to the intersection of parties’ interests within the global climate regime? In *ECPR Joint Session, Thematic Session on The Transformation of Global Climate Governance: Assessing Architecture, Agency and Accountability*.


Resources Related to the Paris Agreement Negotiations


