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GLOBAL ECONOMY

EU, Japan Leaders Sign Trade Deal, Look Towards 2019 for Entry into Force

Leaders from the EU and Japan signed a sweeping free trade accord in Tokyo, Japan, on Tuesday 17 July, touting the accord as a testament of their support for the rules-based, multilateral trading system in a time of heightened global trade tensions and as an economic boon for producers and consumers alike.

The accord, known as the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), has been under formal negotiation since 2013, with officials wrapping up the trade talks late last year. Earlier this month, the European Council formally gave the go-ahead for the EU to sign the deal with their Japanese counterparts, a pivotal step before ratification can begin.

Speaking in Tokyo on Tuesday, leaders from both sides praised the accord as bolstering a deep-seated alliance between countries who share a set of core values, including a commitment to using trade as a tool to support sustainable development objectives. The EU and Japan also rank among the world's four largest traders, with the US and China rounding out the list.

"Japan and the European Union do both see the world in the same way. We believe that we can make each other stronger, safer, and more prosperous when we work together in a rules-based international system. Nowhere is this more obvious than when it comes to trade," [said](#) European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to reporters on Tuesday.

The EU Commission chief was speaking at a joint press conference with Donald Tusk, the European Council President, and Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Prime Minister.

"The signature of the EPA clearly shows that Japan and the EU have an unshakable political will to lead the world, waving the flag of free trade, even as protectionist movements are on the rise," [said](#) Abe, according to an informal translation of his remarks.

The Japanese leader praised the deal as a means of advancing his Abenomics agenda, the eponymous “three arrow” strategy aimed at invigorating the Japanese economy, including through the use of trade agreements under its structural reform “arrow.”

The EU and Japanese officials also issued a [joint statement](#), welcoming the signing of the EPA as well as a separate accord known as a Strategic Partnership Agreement, which aims to facilitate more in-depth work on a host of shared policy priorities.

“The signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement will set the stage for even stronger collaboration both bilaterally and in multilateral fora. It will enrich the political dimension of our relationship and allow for deeper cooperation in a broad range of sectors, notably with regard to peace and security, migration, the fight against terrorism, energy, climate change, education, research and innovation, and development,” they said.

Trade deal recap

The EPA's commercial scope has been repeatedly touted by its proponents as impressive, surpassing the EU's accord with Canada as the largest trade agreement that Brussels has ever signed. Counting Japan's 127 million and the EU's approximately 508 million consumers together, it would create a market of well over 630 million consumers overall.

Along with slashing duties on nearly all tariff lines, proponents note that the accord will also take various steps to tackle non-tariff measures (NTMs), which the EU has previously referred to as a key objective in its negotiations with Japan. The EPA has chapters devoted to topics such as small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as a sustainable development chapter encompassing various environment and labour-related commitments, including a specific reference to upholding the UN's Paris Agreement on climate change.

Proponents have also highlighted improved market access in several key services sectors, such as telecommunications and financial services; reduced or eliminated tariffs for various key agricultural goods; and with significantly liberalised public procurement markets. For instance, Japan will allow EU companies to bid for government contracts with various sub-national entities, along with making it easier to submit tenders for the country's railway sector, such as with developing and providing the necessary equipment and infrastructure.

Experts say that the accord can also address concerns that bilateral trade flows could be diverted elsewhere in the absence of an EPA, given the plethora of regional agreements that both parties have been inking with other partners. A 2016 Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment [report](#), prepared by LSE Enterprise and commissioned by the EU Directorate-General for Trade, highlighted this potential risk in light of other ongoing negotiating processes, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.

“There will be at least some trade diversion against EU exports from TPP in the short term, which occurs on top [of] the natural increasing importance of intra-Asia-Pacific trade. In the long-term, the trade diversion might lead to dynamic effects that affect EU competitiveness, investment, and productivity,” the report said.

The TPP is shorthand for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is now known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The revised accord has 11 signatories, given the US' withdrawal from the original TPP, and Japan and Mexico have already ratified this updated version. Abe was one of the leaders who was instrumental in driving the accord's revival after the US withdrawal.

Other countries are soon expected to ratify, with some such as Canada already introducing the deal in their legislative chambers for consideration, fuelling expectations that the high-profile Pacific Rim trade deal could enter into force sometime next year.

The EU, meanwhile, is pursuing an intensive trade agenda aimed at developing deeper economic ties with different partners around the globe, such as by launching new negotiations with Australia and New Zealand, recently updating its trade accord with Mexico, and working to finalise the decades-old talks with South American customs bloc Mercosur.

Investment talks continuing

The original EU-Japan EPA negotiations had included investment, such as investor protections and dispute settlement. That aspect of the talks have been spun off into a separate process, given that the two sides have expressed differing views on how to handle these issues.

The EU has been advocating for the inclusion of its new Investment Court System (ICS), which it has begun to incorporate into newer trade agreements with interested partners, and which officials say will address some of the downsides of the past investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. Improvements include, for example, the addition of an appellate mechanism and stronger language protecting the right to regulate in the public interest.

In its July 2017 [factsheet](#) on the EU-Japan EPA, the European Commission stressed that it would continue to insist on including an ICS in any deal with Japan.

"Anything less ambitious, including coming back to the old investor-to-state dispute settlement, is not acceptable. For the EU ISDS is dead," the factsheet says.

The negotiating teams working on investment convened in Brussels, Belgium, last week on the subject, but did not announce any breakthroughs. An EU Commission [press statement](#) afterward highlighted investment disputes as a key sticking point in the talks.

ICTSD reporting.

GLOBAL ECONOMY

EU, Chinese Leaders Pledge to Escalate Cooperation on Trade, Investment, and Environmental Priorities

Chinese and EU leaders met in Beijing, China, on Monday 16 July for a high-level summit, which saw them [affirm](#) their support for a rules-based trading system with the WTO at its core, establish a working group on reforming the organisation, and confirm key advances in a separate negotiating process for a bilateral investment treaty.

In a [joint statement](#), both sides highlighted their ongoing investment treaty negotiations as "a top priority and a key project towards establishing and maintaining an open, predictable, fair, and transparent business environment for their respective investors." They confirmed that they have exchanged market access offers, a long-awaited development which they say could add essential momentum to the talks, now entering their sixth year.

Following the summit, the parties also endorsed the EU-China Leaders' Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy, which was incorporated as an annex to the joint statement, and includes references to collaboration in climate finance and carbon markets.

Both sides also committed to deepening their partnership across on a range of issues through the implementation of the [EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation](#).

The EU was represented by President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, along with other top EU officials such as European Commission Vice-President for Jobs, Growth, Investment, and Competitiveness, Jyrki Katainen, Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, and Transport Commissioner Violeta Bulc.

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Chinese President Xi Jinping both met with EU leaders, as did other top-level officials.

Trade discussions on WTO reform, steel overcapacity, and intellectual property

In a speech to business community leaders in tandem with the summit, Juncker [said](#), "I am more convinced than ever that, in the era of globalisation and of interdependence, multilateralism must be at the heart of what we do. We expect all our partners to respect international rules and commitments that they have taken, notably within the framework of the World Trade Organization."

Juncker noted that the WTO's current rulebook needs updating to better address "unfair practices," while adding that "we must all preserve the multilateral system and improve it from within."

At the summit press conference, Li agreed, [saying](#) via a translator that both sides "need to improve the governance system, including the WTO, while upholding the WTO principles and the rules-based order and free trade."

The summit's joint statement confirmed previously-announced plans for a joint working group on WTO reform, which will be chaired by vice ministers from both sides, and allow for exploring options in further depth.

Additional details on how the working group will function, what deliverables it aims to develop for contributing to ongoing or new negotiations among the WTO membership in Geneva, and how other interested parties may participate in these talks, have not been publicly confirmed. (See Bridges Weekly, [28 June 2018](#))

Tusk appealed to all EU partners to contribute positively to WTO reform goals. He [highlighted](#) the need for “new rules in the field of industrial subsidies, intellectual property, and forced technology transfers, reduction of trade costs, as well as a new approach to development and more effective dispute settlement.” He added, “The aim of this reform should be to strengthen the WTO as an institution and to ensure a level playing field.”

Tusk then called on US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who happened to be meeting for a bilateral summit in Helsinki, Finland, this week, to support WTO reform efforts.

“It is a common duty of Europe and China, America and Russia, not to destroy this order, but to improve it. Not to start trade wars, which turned into hot conflicts so often in our history, but to bravely and responsibly reform the rules-based international order,” Tusk said.

EU and Chinese leaders also discussed industrial overcapacity concerns and reforms in the steel industry, which have been areas of past trade tensions between them. These topics have also been the focus of recent collective efforts to resolve the global steel crisis, with the goal of bringing production back to more sustainable levels and ensuring fair competition.

Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, set up nearly two years ago following the G20 summit in Hangzhou, China, along with implementing the policy recommendations from both that summit as well as last year’s G20 gathering in Hamburg, Germany.

The Forum was created at the Hangzhou summit in response to an unprecedented level of steel overcapacity in global markets, which experts say lowered steel prices and harmed jobs in the steel and other industrial sectors. (See Bridges Weekly, [7 December 2017](#))

In his comments, Li also addressed intellectual property (IP) rights enforcement concerns and allegations of forced technology transfers for overseas investors wishing to do business in China, which are points of friction between Brussels and Beijing.

“As long as you register in China, you will be treated the same as Chinese companies. And we forbid any forced transfer of intellectual property, and we will deal with IP violations with all seriousness,” he [said](#), directing his comments at foreign companies interested in investing in China.

The EU recently launched a WTO dispute on the subject, with China as a respondent ([DS549](#)). The US has already put forward a similar case ([DS542](#)). Both cases are at the initial stage in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, specifically at the consultations stage.

As part of the summit, the parties agreed to an [Action Plan](#) concerning China-EU Customs Cooperation on Intellectual Property Rights for the period 2018-2020, which updates an existing plan. The action plan, officials say, will be comprehensive in nature, aiming to boost intellectual property rights enforcement as goods cross borders.

Moving forward on the investment treaty

European and Chinese officials also continued talks on a bilateral Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, which have been underway since 2013. (See Bridges Weekly, [7 June 2018](#))

Negotiators exchanged market access offers, which leaders said will pave the way for a “new phase” in the high-profile talks. The EU and China say they hope to make advances soon on the textual aspects of the agreement as well.

At the summit press conference, Juncker discussed the reasons for the difference between European foreign direct investment (FDI) in China, €6 billion in 2017, and the over €30 billion China invested in Europe the same year.

“This gap reflects a concern amongst our investors on the regulatory and administrative burden that foreign companies sometimes have to face in China,” he said.

He emphasised the need for a “level playing field” and a “two-way,” open investment environment. Referring to the market access offers, he said that “this is an important step but only the first one; what we need is an Agreement that fulfils our common ambition and gives investors on both sides predictable and long-term access to our respective markets.”

Common goals on climate and oceans

Chinese and EU leaders also used the summit to build on past cooperation on both climate action and oceans conservation. In an annex to the joint statement, the parties agreed to enhance their cooperation on climate, as part of their preparations for the UN climate talks later this year. They expressed their shared hope that COP24 will yield a “successful and meaningful outcome under the agreed work programme to prepare for the implementation of the Paris Agreement.”

COP24 refers to this year's 24th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), set to take place in Katowice, Poland, in December.

The EU and China agreed to increase cooperation across a suite of climate and energy targets, including energy efficiency, clean energy, and low-carbon transport, among others. They also signed a [memorandum of understanding](#) (MOU) on emissions trading, agreeing to use their respective emissions trading systems (ETS) to combat climate change and explore prospects for broader carbon market collaboration.

China's nascent ETS began in December 2017, building on previous regional pilot schemes. In its initial period, the ETS will only cover the power sector. The MOU envisages an annual policy dialogue and joint cooperation initiative through research, seminars, and working groups. (See Bridges Weekly, [18 January 2018](#))

Additionally, China and the EU signed a [Partnership Agreement on Oceans](#), through which they plan to enhance oceans governance work, taking steps to eradicate illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, protect marine biodiversity, tackle marine pollution, and ensure “a sustainable blue economy.”

The statement comes as WTO negotiators work on an accord that would tackle harmful fisheries subsidies, including those directed towards IUU fishing, with the goal of endorsing a deal at the global trade club's next ministerial conference. Eliminating subsidies to IUU fishing entirely by 2020, along with banning subsidies that exacerbate overfishing and overcapacity, also make up one of the targets in UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 on life below water.

The EU touted the partnership agreement as the first of its kind, opening the door for further bilateral or multilateral ocean partnerships among key players, which could complement international efforts on oceans governance.

ICTSD reporting.

GLOBAL ECONOMY

US, African Officials Prepare for Post-AGOA Trade Future

African and US officials, private sector representatives, and members of civil society organisations gathered last week in Washington for the 17th African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Forum, with discussions addressing options for a “post-AGOA” model from 2025 onwards, including the possibility of crafting free trade deals.

This year's event was held under the theme “Forging New Strategies for US-Africa Trade and Investment.”

Referring to the future of US-Africa trade ties after the current version of AGOA expires in 2025, US Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer explained that any new vision should recognise that sub-Saharan Africa has evolved substantially in the nearly two decades since the AGOA system began.

The AGOA is a unilateral scheme of preferences dating back to 2000, and has served as the bedrock of trade relations between the US and sub-Saharan Africa. It grants eligible African countries duty-free access to the US markets for thousands of products.

The preference regime was renewed in 2015 for a full decade, which was welcomed by many trade observers across the African continent, given its potential developmental benefits and the additional certainty provided by a long renewal period. Some provisions in the updated legislation did draw particular scrutiny, however, such as shorter windows for addressing alleged violations of AGOA commitments. (See Bridges Africa, [3 September 2015](#))

On a separate note during the AGOA Forum, African trade ministers reportedly questioned their US counterparts over the possible adverse implications for their economies resulting from the recent Section 232 tariff measures on steel and aluminium, according to a [summary](#) issued by the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).

Towards a comprehensive US- Africa FTA?

Last week in Washington, Lighthizer described the United States' “desire” to pave the way for a free trade agreement between Washington and sub-Saharan African countries.

“We are excited about the prospect of entering into a successful free trade agreement with an African country. We believe that this will be good for the United States, the FTA partner, and ultimately Africa,” he said during the [opening plenary](#).

Lighthizer said that he is looking to “announce exploratory talks soon,” without confirming which countries might be first on the docket for such an initiative. He did, however, indicate that the Trump administration would look to craft a bilateral deal with a “willing partner” that could serve as a template for other accords with countries in the region, so long as the deal also supports economic integration across the African continent and in the particular regions implicated.

“One-way tariff preferences can only do so much to drive trade and investment. When corporations decide where to invest and do business, much more goes into the equation,” explained Lighthizer, who also stressed the potential future investment opportunities in

Africa for US companies. He referred to infrastructure and other development projects on the continent in particular.

Additionally, he pointed to the fact that many African countries have already signed free trade agreements with other major economies, including the EU and China, meaning that the US is actively looking to maintain and develop its own competitiveness in the region.

Sources explain that this observation partly refers to the reciprocal economic partnership agreements that the EU for example, has advanced or concluded with several African regional economic communities, namely the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and West Africa.

Bringing certainty for investments

During his intervention, Lighthizer explained that an FTA with the US would “lock in the benefits of AGOA,” highlighting in particular the value of having a long-term system that creates more predictable business conditions. Since US lawmakers must draft and endorse AGOA renewal legislation periodically, which the US president then must sign, the process has often sparked questions among trade observers and companies alike over how this may affect the investment climate, particularly given the need to make business decisions some months or years ahead of time.

“Establishing a more stable, permanent, and mutually-beneficial trade and investment framework with the United States could be transformative for Africa,” added Lighthizer.

According to administration sources [cited](#) by Covington's Global Policy Watch, a branch of a US law firm working on various policy issues, Kenya, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire could be early contenders for a trade accord with Washington.

Currently around 40 countries are eligible for AGOA benefits, though they are subject to various requirements covering topics beyond purely economic concerns, such as by ensuring rule of law, labour rights protections, and political pluralism, according to a [summary](#) of the accord published by the Trade Law Center (tralac).

Impact of AGOA

The impact of AGOA on Africa's exports to the US has generated some debate over the years. According to some trade experts, there are indications that AGOA exports of textile and clothing have spurred industrial growth in, and exports from, countries like Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Kenya, and Swaziland.

“The AfCFTA is a game changer for the Continent as it promotes structural transformation through development integration,” [said](#) South African Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies.

Some observers note, however, that AGOA could do more to facilitate the economic transformation of African economies, given its objective of doing so. [Research](#) published by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) suggests that AGOA has had a limited impact when it comes to spurring greater manufacturing in the beneficiary countries. The report cited the “structure of tariff preferences” as part of the challenge, noting that the scheme “excludes a number of products in which African countries are known to be competitive.” (*Editor's note: ICTSD is the publisher of Bridges.*)

According to a [factsheet](#) from the Office of the USTR, last year the top five sub-Saharan African exporters under AGOA were South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, and Botswana, though the range of exports varied significantly. South Africa and Nigeria topped the list at US\$7.8 billion and US\$7.1 billion, respectively, while Botswana sent US\$772 million worth of exports to its North American partner.

AfCFTA context, other regional developments

Meanwhile, this past March, African leaders launched the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), a trade accord that would slash tariffs on the vast bulk of products traded within the continent, among other provisions. (See Bridges Weekly, [22 March 2018](#))

Advocates say that the AfCFTA presents the advantage of having a potentially unified trade regime for the continent, while slashing business costs and tariffs, as well as creating economies of scale. The establishment of the AfCFTA could offer new ground for African leaders to press for a comprehensive accord with the US, one trade observer told Bridges.

Regarding the AfCFTA, while the signatories have begun the ratification process, they are also looking at the technical work needed to bring this free trade agreement into effect. Negotiators will reconvene next month to discuss competition, investment, and intellectual property rights. Preparations are underway to bring the deal into force soon, officials say, with the hope that it could be in effect next year, though experts note that achieving the accord's envisioned potential will still require much work ahead. (See Bridges Africa and Bridges Weekly, [24 May 2018](#))

ICTSD reporting.

GLOBAL ECONOMY

US Files Series of WTO Cases, Targeting Responses to Steel, Aluminium Tariffs

The Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) announced on Monday 16 July that it would be filing WTO cases against Canada, China, the EU, Mexico, and Turkey, after they imposed duties on various US imports following Washington's own tariffs on imported steel and aluminium.

The five new disputes mark the latest developments in the evolving trade skirmish that began in earnest after Washington imposed duties on the vast majority of its trading partners, specifically targeting imports of those metals with hefty tariffs.

At the time, US officials said, these tariffs were necessary given the findings of Commerce Department [investigations](#) under Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. The agency reports claimed that these imports were putting national security at risk. Specifically, they warned that these imports could make it harder for domestic industry to maintain the "economic viability" to meet critical national defence or infrastructure demands if needed.

That claim has drawn criticism for various reasons, with other WTO members questioning the implications of unilateral measures, particularly on national security grounds, on the multilateral system; the veracity of the national security claim, given that various US allies have been affected; and the expected economic harm both abroad and at home.

Steel imports now face a 25 percent tariff while aluminium imports face a 10 percent tariff, with the exception of those few countries who have negotiated other arrangements with the US, or those companies which have been granted product-specific exclusions.

Since then, some WTO members have filed trade disputes challenging the US duties. The members who have filed requests for consultations so far include Canada, China, the EU, India, Mexico, Norway, Russia, and Switzerland. These complaints have argued that the US Section 232 tariffs violate select provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as well as the Agreement on Safeguards, with some also citing the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, Article XVI:4 on making sure domestic laws and policies align with global trade rules. (See Bridges Weekly, [5 July 2018](#))

Lighthizer: US tariffs "wholly legitimate and fully justified"

US trade officials have repeatedly argued, both in press statements and at WTO committee meetings, that the Section 232 measures should not be treated as safeguards, but rather as justified measures taken for national security purposes, which would qualify for an exception from global trade rules. (See Bridges Weekly, [5 July 2018](#))

Canada, China, the EU, Mexico, and Turkey, however, have all said that the US measure appears to be a safeguard – in trade jargon, a temporary import curb in response to an actual or threatened import surge – and that they are imposing duties on various goods imported from the US essentially as a way of claiming compensation for the economic harm they have suffered.

The US' consultations requests were not yet publicly available at press time, though a Geneva trade official confirmed that they should be released at some point this week. The

USTR announcement, however, indicated that the US considers the duties imposed by these various trade partners to be “retaliatory tariffs,” suggesting that Washington will argue that the EU, China, and others have erred in notifying and applying these as so-called re-balancing measures in response to a safeguard measure.

“These tariffs appear to breach each WTO member's commitments under the WTO Agreement. The United States will take all necessary actions to protect our interests, and we urge our trading partners to work constructively with us on the problems created by massive and persistent excess capacity in the steel and aluminium sectors,” [said](#) USTR Robert Lighthizer on Monday in announcing the new cases.

Some trading partners have already issued public responses to the US consultations requests. The Mexican Economy Secretary's office, for example, circulated a [statement](#) arguing that the Mexican duties were “in response to the tariffs that the US government imposed in an unjustified way, on national security grounds, on imported steel and aluminium from Mexico.”

“The US purchases of steel and aluminium from Mexico are not a national security risk to the former. Rather, the solid trading relationship between Mexico and the US has led to an integrated regional market where steel and aluminium products support the region's competitiveness in various diverse strategic sectors, such as automotive, aerospace, electric, and electronic,” the statement continued.

Should the US complaints, and the previously filed disputes from other trading partners on the Section 232 duties, all advance to the panel stage, it is unclear how differing panels will juggle these various complaints, given that they deal with different, but intrinsically related, aspects of the same trade situation.

Pence: American steel “coming back”

Back in Washington, US Vice President Mike Pence [said](#) on Monday 16 July at the US Department of Commerce that the Section 232 measures were having a positive effect on US steel sector jobs, suggesting that “American steel is coming back” as a result.

“As the President likes to say, ‘If you don't have steel, you don't have a country.’ And this action by this Department of Commerce and the President of the United States have put American steel, American aluminium, and American national security first,” said Pence.

The US Section 232 tariffs remain controversial domestically, however, drawing condemnation from various manufacturing groups, agricultural exporters, and lawmakers alike. Just last week, the US Senate passing a non-binding motion calling for language to be adopted in “conference” between negotiators from both legislative chambers on a separate bill that would “[provide] a role for Congress in making a determination under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.”

The three Republican senators co-sponsoring the bill were Jeff Flake of Arizona, Bob Corker of Tennessee, and Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania, who have all called on their fellow lawmakers to consider a binding version of that measure. Flake and Corker are retiring from the Senate in January 2019, though Toomey will continue to serve in that chamber.

“I will continue to push for binding legislation that requires congressional approval of national security-designated tariffs. We have to rein in abuse of presidential authority and restore Congress' constitutional authority in this regard,” [said](#) Flake.

The non-binding motion passed by an overwhelming majority, with 88 votes in favour and 11 against. However, whether a binding version would be approved by both chambers and become law – something that requires presidential signature, unless there are enough votes to override a presidential veto – is not clear.

Separately, Senate Finance Committee Chair Orrin Hatch, a Republican from Utah, [warned](#) the Trump administration that the continued use of new tariffs to tackle trade policy concerns would lead him to back legislation curbing the executive branch's authority on trade-related matters.

"This roaring economy that we worked together to build for American workers and businesses is at risk because of the president's trade policies. Tariffs against our allies and partners in Europe, Canada, Mexico, and around the world are already harming American farmers and manufacturers, and raising costs for the nation's families. If this continues, our economy will suffer," he said on the Senate floor on Tuesday 17 July.

Meanwhile, the US House Ways and Means Trade Sub-Committee held a [hearing](#) on Wednesday 18 July looking at how the Section 232 measures, the separate Section 301 measures targeting Chinese imports, and the duties imposed by various countries as a result of the US tariffs, are affecting American farm and rural communities, given that many agricultural products have been targeted by US trading partners.

ICTSD reporting.

MIGRATION

UN Endorses Final Migration Compact, Pledging to Ensure Safer Climate and Contribute to Sustainability

Negotiators have agreed on a final version of a global “migration compact,” capping several rounds of UN talks that were designed to respond to a burgeoning migrant crisis both within and across national borders. The text outlines a series of objectives that together could help make migration safer, including for children and women, while ensuring that migrants are enabled to contribute more to the economy, trade, and sustainable development.

The [final compact text](#) will be officially adopted this coming December at an intergovernmental conference in Marrakesh, Morocco, and aims to strike a balance between fostering international cooperation and respecting national sovereignty.

The document is known officially as the “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration.” It numbers at 34 pages in total, divided into a preamble, vision and guiding principles, cooperative framework, objectives and commitments, and follow-up and review.

“It does not encourage migration, nor does it aim to stop it. It is not legally binding. It does not dictate. It will not impose. And it fully respects the sovereignty of states. And its potential is huge,” [said](#) Miroslav Lajčák, the Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs who currently serves as the President of the UN General Assembly.

He also noted that the compact is just one step in what must be a much longer process, given the extremely dangerous climate for migrants.

“Two thousand ninety-eight migrant deaths have been recorded since we began negotiations. Children made up about 400 of them. Many, not reported, have been lost in the desert or on other dangerous journeys. Others – including countless women and girls – have fallen victim to human trafficking. And, as we speak, thousands of migrant workers worry about their health, their security, and the welfare of their families,” he said last week.

Other high-level officials similarly warned that the international response to the challenges facing migrants must improve – with some also noting that the rhetoric used by many actors in discussing the migration crisis is severely detrimental.

“The discourse around migration is increasingly hostile. Too often, the reality of migrants’ lives — irregular and regular — is made even more difficult by prejudice and hardship. This is not only dangerous. It flies in the face of the overwhelmingly positive impact of migration,” [said](#) UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed on 13 July.

Evolution of compact text

The negotiations to craft this compact have been an iterative process, bringing together contributions from national governments, intergovernmental organisations, migrants, sub-national government representatives, policy experts, academics, and civil society. Formal negotiations began in February 2018, following over a year of consultations and other preparations to lay the groundwork for these discussions.

There were six negotiating rounds, starting in February and culminating in July. The co-facilitators of the process were Ambassadors Juan José Gómez Camacho and Jürg Lauber, who represent Mexico and Switzerland at the UN in New York, respectively. (See Bridges Weekly, [15 February 2018](#))

William Lacy Swing, the current Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), welcomed the compact, while also calling for the momentum in this area to continue.

"This is not the end of the undertaking but the beginning of a new historic effort to shape the global agenda on migration for decades to come," [said](#) Swing last week, praising in particular the multi-stakeholder process that led to the compact.

Swing is due to complete his second and final five-year term at the helm of the UN migration agency this year, with António Manuel de Carvalho Ferreira Vitorino due to take his place in October.

Objectives, approach

There are 23 objectives included in the global compact. These cover goals such as ensuring the necessary data is available for crafting appropriate policies, tackling discrimination, protecting migrant labour rights, and facilitating and improving international collaboration in this policy area.

Of these 23 objectives, a handful make specific references to the role of trade, such as by lowering the need for potential migrants to leave their countries of origin, or by facilitating the acquisition or recognition of migrants' skills and training abroad.

Objective 2, for example, is entitled "Minimise the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin." Within that, it calls for greater investment in schemes and policies that would help meet the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and associated Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These include, for example, working to eradicate poverty, improve food security, tackle gender inequalities, address climate change effects and risks, and support more inclusive economic growth models.

A separate sub-paragraph notes that trade preferences, as well as investment from overseas and private sector sources, could play a valuable role in creating the above-mentioned inclusive growth, and thus "[allow] all people to improve their lives and meet their aspirations."

Additionally, that objective also has a sub-paragraph devoted to skills development and training, along with another sub-paragraph focusing on donor collaboration among development and humanitarian agencies. It also includes a full section devoted specifically to the role of a changing climate, as well as the impact of natural disasters and other environmental concerns, in influencing migrant movements and leading to the displacement of populations most vulnerable to these pressures. The section also refers to possible steps governments and other stakeholders can take to address these risks.

Earlier this year, the [World Bank](#) warned that climate change, if left unabated, could create a massive escalation of internal migration within countries, hitting up to 140 million migrants by mid-century.

Objective 6, meanwhile, deals with decent work, including the adoption and implementation of labour rights policies and laws. This includes, for example, taking steps to improve "supply chain transparency" to ensure that violations of labour laws are tackled appropriately. This has been an area of growing international concern in recent years, including in the context of trade accords, as well as in other agreements focusing on the role

of the private sector and national governments in fostering safer working environments abroad. Other references to labour policies or laws throughout the text include ensuring migrants can participate in trade unions, along with ensuring that labour mobility policies are “gender-responsive.”

Objective 18 also focuses on the contribution of migrants to the economy, with this section focusing both on facilitating skills development and ensuring that migrant skills are recognised outside their countries of origin. The text includes multiple references to the importance of mutual recognition of skills and training, including in the context of trade agreements.

Other aspects of the compact's overall text deal with issues such as facilitating and cutting costs in transferring remittances abroad, which involve money transfers from people overseas to those back home, often for supporting family members. The text also calls for making it easier “for migrants and diasporas [to] fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries.” Tackling discrimination, ensuring basic access to public services, fighting human trafficking, and facilitating social cohesion and inclusion are among the various other dimensions of the compact.

Evaluating progress

The text concludes with a section outlining how UN members intend to review the compact's effects, including using an existing forum within the UN General Assembly and revamping it as an “International Migration Review Forum” that will meet on a quadrennial basis and issue “declarations” on advances to date. More details on how this forum will work are pending, and will be determined following consultations among governments, which are planned for next year.

The first such meeting of this new forum will be in 2022, and will look at steps being taken at multiple levels, ranging from national and sub-national to worldwide, to implement the compact. The forum will also look at how this work relates to the achievement of the UN's 2030 Agenda and SDGs. This final section also highlights the role that other forums and stakeholder groups, national, international, or otherwise, can play in supporting this review process.

ICTSD reporting.

BREXIT

UK, US Officials Confirm Plans for Trade Pact in Post-Brexit Era

Officials from the UK and US held a series of both technical and high-level political meetings last week on trade relations post-Brexit, including the fourth session of a bilateral "Trade and Investment Working Group," as well as leaders' level discussions between US President Donald Trump and UK Prime Minister Theresa May.

Trump and May both expressed interest last week in striking a trade accord following Brexit, though the early days of Trump's visit to the UK saw the US leader issue mixed messages over May's proposed approach to Brexit negotiations with the EU and what this might mean for trade deal prospects.

The series of meetings came as the British government published a highly-anticipated "[white paper](#)" on the future UK relationship with the European Union. The document, numbering at over 100 pages, was endorsed by May's cabinet following a meeting at the prime minister's country residence at Chequers, and is described in a foreword by the UK leader as an approach that "strikes the balance we need – between rights and obligations." (See Bridges Weekly, [12 July 2018](#))

The chapters cover topics such as economic and security partnerships with the EU, along with other forms of cooperation, as well as institutional arrangements for putting such an approach into practice. It also highlights trade deals with Australia, New Zealand, and the US as goals for the post-Brexit era as the UK seeks to establish "an ambitious bilateral trade agenda."

Trade between the US and UK is worth over US\$230 billion per year, and bilateral investment flows add up to over US\$1.2 trillion, [according](#) to US government statistics.

UK-US working group

Trade officials from the UK Department for International Trade and the US Trade Representative's office, among others, held a two-day meeting last week to advance technical talks on the UK-US trading relationship.

The group's [focus](#) is on "providing commercial continuity" for producers and consumers on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly during the Brexit negotiating process and in its wake. It was set up one year ago by the trade chiefs of both countries, and officials say that these talks, while not formal negotiations, could also "lay the groundwork for a potential, future free trade agreement."

Last week's talks had a hefty agenda, officials said, covering farm trade and manufacturing, services and investment, as well as intellectual property and digital trade, according to a brief [summary](#) circulated by the UK government afterward.

The officials also held the second small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) dialogue ahead of the working group meetings, bringing together company representatives and government officials to focus on opportunities and challenges for these smaller companies in the trade space. These include, for example, addressing regulatory issues or limitations on finance.

Leaders highlight trade deal's potential

Speaking to reporters after their discussions, May [confirmed](#) that the two countries would pursue an "ambitious US-UK free trade agreement" once the UK leaves the EU. May and Trump also discussed at length issues related to governance, security, and economic cooperation.

"The Chequers Agreement reached last week provides the platform for Donald and me to agree an ambitious deal that works for both countries right across our economies, a deal that builds on the UK's independent trade policy, reducing tariffs; delivering a gold standard in financial services cooperation; and, as two of the world's most advanced economies, seizing the opportunity of new technology," she [said](#).

Trump similarly welcomed the prospects of a UK-US trade pact, saying that "the United States looks forward to finalising a great bilateral trade agreement with the United Kingdom. This is an incredible opportunity for our two countries, and we will seize it fully."

The UK cannot negotiate trade deals independently before it exits the EU next year. It will, however, be able to begin formal talks during the "transition" period that begins at the end of March 2019 and concludes in December the following year, so long as these new accords do not take effect until after the transition period ends.

Trump, meanwhile, indicated that Washington would welcome whatever Brexit deal that the UK and EU reach, saying that "whatever you do is okay with me."

"That's your decision. Whatever you're going to do is okay with us. Just make sure we can trade together; that's all that matters," he said.

Setting up an "independent trade policy"

The "[white paper](#)" issued last week by the UK government sets out the concrete proposals for the future British trade relationship with the European Union, though it has been greeted with a mixed reaction by different EU stakeholders. The UK has confirmed previously stated plans to leave the EU's single market and the customs union, along with ending the free movement of persons across borders with the bloc.

A new "deep and comprehensive economic partnership" proposed in the document has a free trade area for goods at its core, alongside new arrangements for services and digital domains. The proposed cooperation framework would allow the UK to negotiate new international trade deals with non-EU partners whose scope would include goods and services trade, investment and public procurement, data, and more.

"Under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement with the EU, the UK would be free to negotiate, sign, and ratify FTAs during the implementation period, and to bring them into force from January 2021. When concluded, these would be the first FTAs signed by the UK in its own right since the European Free Trade Association in 1960," the document reads.

While noting that trade deals with the US, Australia and New Zealand are top on this UK trade agenda, the document confirms that London is weighing whether to ask to join a Pacific Rim trade deal known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The CPTPP is a trade grouping of 11 economies, who have all signed the deal and are currently at different stages of ratifying it domestically.

Australian trade minister Steven Ciobo welcomed the Chequers "white paper" ahead of his visit to the UK, which is also due to see discussions on the planned UK-Australia accord.

"The Turnbull Government welcomes the Brexit White Paper that confirms a free trade agreement with Australia remains a priority for the UK. Australia has been preparing for

negotiations through the Trade Working Group established in September 2016," [said](#) Ciobo in a press release.

Australia and the EU are already negotiating a trade accord of their own, having formally launched negotiations last month. (See Bridges Weekly, [21 June 2018](#))

ICTSD reporting; "Donald Trump told Theresa May how to do Brexit 'but she wrecked it' – and says the US trade deal is off," THE SUN, 13 July 2018.

GLOBAL ECONOMY

China Trade Policy Review Concludes, Highlighting IPRs, Industrial Policy, and Transparency

Trade officials at WTO headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, wrapped up their review of China's trade policies and macroeconomic environment on Friday 13 July, capping two days of discussions that touched on topics such as industrial overcapacity, national industrial strategy, and intellectual property rights practices and enforcement.

The first day of Trade Policy Review (TPR) meetings, held on Wednesday 11 July, allowed Chinese officials the chance to present their view of Beijing's achievements to date and plans for the future. It also gave various other delegations the chance to take the floor and highlight which areas of Beijing's policy had evolved since the last review, and which areas they would like to see change in the future. (See Bridges Weekly, [12 July 2018](#))

The chairperson of the WTO's Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB), Ambassador Eloi Laouru of Benin, summed up the discussions on Friday as a valuable opportunity to discuss the economic situation of a significant trader and "major player in the multilateral trading system" such as China.

He noted, for example, that many delegations took the floor to praise the significant strides Beijing has made towards "broadening market access and investment opportunities, the greater involvement of the private sector in the economy, and its commitment to fossil fuel subsidy reform," according to a [transcript](#) of his remarks released by the global trade club.

There were also calls from various members, however, for China to improve its subsidy notification records and other transparency efforts related to trade, and to move towards a "more market-oriented approach to investment and resource allocation." The TPRB chair also referred to members' questions or concerns over the "Made in China 2025" industrial plan and the domestic measures in place to bring it into being, as well as the role of state-owned enterprises and other state interventions in the overall Chinese economy.

Various delegations had particularly highlighted the latter concern, with some arguing that the state's strong role in the economy, or in some cases insufficient involvement, were complicating efforts from businesses based abroad in developing deeper ties with Beijing, according to a Geneva trade official familiar with the meeting.

China received over 1900 written questions regarding its policies, and around 70 delegations took the floor over the two-day event. As one of the world's four largest traders, Beijing's next TPR will be in three years, under new WTO timeframes for these trade monitoring exercises.

The secretariat report, one of two major reports prepared for the TPR, noted China's significant role in stimulating the global economy, while stating that China's "real GDP growth has been moderating as the economy adjusts to the 'new normal', which implies more stable, albeit lower growth rates."

The report found that e-commerce and tourism are playing significant roles in services trade, while goods trade is having a smaller role in overall Chinese foreign trade, along with noting progress in tackling income inequality and poverty concerns at home. It also highlights Beijing's efforts to make coal a lesser part of its overall energy mix, along with reducing the role of fossil fuels overall, though coal still provides over 60 percent of China's energy.

The secretariat analysis also cited growth in both outbound and incoming foreign direct investment (FDI), along with significant WTO developments that Beijing has been involved in. These included, for example, trade disputes, talks to join the plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), and updates to China's WTO notifications of different subsidies and other relevant trade policy developments.

Chinese vice minister responds to members' questions

"Each time I came here, I have received more questions – a record number of questions," said Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Wang Shouwen in [a video statement](#) about the latest China TPR, relative to the past ones. He said that this was a positive sign of members' interest in doing business with Beijing and the WTO's role in underpinning the overall multilateral trading system, including through its trade monitoring function.

According to a Geneva trade official, Wang gave a detailed statement on Friday in response to many of the questions and concerns raised by delegations during either Wednesday's discussions or the submission of written questions beforehand.

For example, Wang addressed topics such as industrial overcapacity, Beijing's "Made in China 2025" industrial policy projects; the country's efforts to become a more market-oriented economy; and intellectual property rights policy and enforcement.

Wang argued that in all areas, China is looking to ensure that progress is being made and WTO rules being followed. In the area of intellectual property rights, for instance, he suggested that questions over alleged forced technology transfers imposed on foreign companies wishing to do business in China are not government policy, but that "technical cooperation" results from voluntary deals in setting up these business arrangements.

Industrial capacity, he said, was a collective problem, while also highlighting the difference between being a major steel producer, like China, and a major steel exporter, like others.

He also welcomed the vast bulk of comments made by members to date during the TPR, while reportedly suggesting that a few had been "unacceptable."

The US, Canada, and the EU, all of whom had spoken during the first day of the TPR, reportedly took the floor again, among a half-dozen others. According to a Geneva trade official, the US disagreed with Wang's claims of compliance with adverse dispute settlement rulings, as well as the Chinese official's description of improved domestic enforcement of intellectual property rights. The US official said that it was "unusual" how many concerns were put forward by members during the TPR.

The EU, meanwhile, highlighted transparency and the role of state-owned enterprises as key areas of concern in its second intervention on Friday, having previously made a statement on Wednesday referring to the same issues as well as calling for greater efforts towards opening up the Chinese economy to investments from overseas companies. The EU had also welcomed, however, the constructive role that China can play in supporting the multilateral trading system, particularly during a time of significant strain.

The TPR came just days before an EU-China leaders' summit that tackled various areas of possible trade and investment cooperation, and during a time of heightened tensions between Washington and Beijing over a series of trade irritants. Discussions over the state of the multilateral trading system are slated to continue in various international forums, such as the WTO, in the weeks and months to come, including at a meeting of the latter organisation's General Council at the end of July. Ahead of that event, the US has submitted a paper laying out its own questions and concerns over China's trade regime in further detail.

ICTSD reporting.

EVENTS & RESOURCES

Events

Coming Soon

23 July, Washington, US. THE MARKET ENABLERS: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES IN COMPETITIVE ENERGY ENVIRONMENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA. This webinar is hosted by US Agency for International Development's (USAID) Clean Energy Finance Facility – Central America and the Caribbean (CEFF-CCA). It will explore how USAID CEFF-CCA is working with various stakeholders to enhance clean energy markets in 20 countries in the Caribbean and Central America. The webinar will discuss how regional "market-makers" are expanding private sector investment in sustainable and secure energy solutions in low-income countries. To learn more, visit the webinar registration [page](#).

24-25 July, Tokyo, Japan. WORKSHOP ON NATIONAL ADAPTATION GOALS/INDICATORS. This workshop focuses on national climate adaptation goals and indicators and their interaction with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. At the workshop, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Adaptation Committee aims to provide technical guidance on monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of adaptation activities. The UNFCCC, the UN University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability (UNU-IAS), and various governments are organising or supporting the organisation of the event. It also seeks to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and experience with respect to M&E, national adaptation goals, data collection, and reporting frameworks. The Committee also aims to discuss how national adaptation goals and indicators relate to the global goal of adaptation. For more information, visit the event [website](#).

26 July, Washington, US. THE FUTURE OF ONLINE POLICY: TO LEGISLATE OR NOT. The Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution will host this event to discuss US data privacy policy in the context of consumer protection. Panellists will address opportunities and challenges of potential privacy legislation and look to the California Consumer Privacy Act and the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as possible models. Discussion will also address the appropriate scope of potential legislation, whether regulations should be different for different types of companies, and which governmental entity should be tasked with enforcement of online privacy rules. For more information, visit the event [website](#).

WTO Events

An updated list of forthcoming WTO meetings is posted [here](#). Please bear in mind that dates and times of WTO meetings are often changed, and that the WTO does not always announce the important informal meetings of the different bodies. Unless otherwise indicated, all meetings are held at the WTO, Centre William Rappard, rue de Lausanne 154, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland, and are open to WTO members and accredited observers only.

20 July: Dispute Settlement Body

20 July: Geneva Week (Non-resident Members and Observers)

23 + 25 July: Informal Open-ended Negotiating Group on Rules (Fisheries Subsidies)

24 July: Informal TNC and Heads of Delegation Meeting

25 July: Informal Trade Policy Review Body

25 July: Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration

26-27 July: General Council

27 July: Dispute Settlement Body

Other Upcoming Events

3-4 September, Cape Town, South Africa. GREEN ECONOMY COALITION (GEC) GLOBAL MEETING 2018. The theme of this meeting is "Giving everyone a stake in the green economy." It will focus on ways to ensure that a transition to a green economy is also equitable, inclusive, people-focused, improving the lives of all. GEC is co-hosting the event with the African Centre and Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies. The event will be held immediately before the UN Partnership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE) Ministerial Conference. For more information, visit the event [website](#).

4-5 September, Paris, France. OECD BLOCKCHAIN POLICY FORUM. This forum, organised by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) will explore the potential benefits and challenges associated with blockchain technology. The conference will have as its theme "Distributed Ledgers: Opportunities and Challenges," and will aim to provide a platform for governments and other stakeholders to discuss blockchain regulatory policy. Experts from business and academia will present on various topics, including the potential economic impact of blockchain and its ability to enhance inclusiveness and promote sustainability. For more information, visit the event [website](#).

6-7 September, Cape Town, South Africa. PARTNERSHIP FOR ACTION ON GREEN ECONOMY (PAGE) 2018 MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE. The third UN PAGE Ministerial Conference will focus on "Advancing Inclusive and Sustainable Economies," and is hosted by the Department of Environmental Affairs of South Africa. PAGE brings together experts from UN agencies, civil society, and government to collaborate and work towards meeting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This year's conference will showcase the role of innovation, entrepreneurship, and inclusivity in driving green growth. Other thematic areas include green finance, economic and social inclusion, and the circular economy. For more information, visit the event [website](#).

2-4 October, Geneva, Switzerland. WTO PUBLIC FORUM. This annual WTO outreach event will have as its theme "Trade 2030." More specifically, the three-day meeting will consider "sustainable trade" between now and 2030, addressing topics such as technology-enabled trade and making the trading system more inclusive. More information is available at the WTO's dedicated site for the Public Forum [here](#).

2-4 October, Manila, Philippines. ASIA WATER FORUM 2018: INFORMATION, INNOVATION, AND TECHNOLOGY. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) will host the Asia Water Forum, focusing on the theme, "Information, Innovation, and Technology." The conference aims to facilitate discussion of a variety of water issues, including issues of supply, water use for food and energy, sanitation, and water resources management. It will also explore themes that affect these issues, such as resilience, inclusiveness, finance, and sustainability. The conference will examine how increased knowledge and advanced technology can aid member countries and improve development projects in the region. All sessions will be conducted in English. For more information, visit the event [website](#).

22-26 October, Geneva, Switzerland. WORLD INVESTMENT FORUM 2018. Over the course of 50 events including roundtables, summits, and private sector-led sessions, this annual forum, hosted by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) will address global challenges for international investment in the era of globalisation and industrialisation. Stakeholders from governments, investment treaty negotiation teams,

global companies, and other significant areas will come together to discuss investment-related policymaking, particularly in relation to sustainable development. For more information and to register, visit the event [website](#).

27-29 November, Paris, France. SIXTH GREEN GROWTH KNOWLEDGE PLATFORM (GGKP) ANNUAL CONFERENCE. The GGKP annual conference will take place in conjunction with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Green Growth and Sustainable Development Forum. The focus of the GGKP conference is "Inclusive solutions for the green transition: Competitiveness, jobs/skills and social dimensions." The conference seeks to address distributional impacts of green and low-carbon policy reforms, analysing inclusive solutions for stakeholders who might be harmed by such a transition. The conference will include panel discussions among a variety of stakeholders, including policymakers, academia, civil society, business, and labour. To learn more, visit the event [website](#). GGKP is also calling for papers for the conference, with a deadline of 30 July. For more information on relevant themes for submissions, visit the GGKP [website](#).

27-30 November, Iloilo City, Philippines. EAST ASIAN SEAS (EAS) CONGRESS. This event, hosted by the government of the Philippines and Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), will bring together a wide cross-section of stakeholders to examine the latest regional developments in ocean governance and policy reform, climate change, the blue economy, the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and other related topics. To learn more about the event, please visit the PEMSEA [website](#).

14-15 February 2019, New Delhi, India. CARBON PRICING LEADERSHIP COALITION (CPLC) RESEARCH CONFERENCE. This event will be the first international research conference on carbon pricing, hosted by CPLC. It will bring together researchers, policy makers, and practitioners in this field, aiming for an exchange of ideas and information that can help resolve the gaps that exist between theory and existing practice. CPLC seeks to foster leadership across the public and private sectors, academic, and NGO communities in order to implement carbon pricing policies more effectively and reduce global emissions. Conference organisers selected 45 abstracts to deliver full papers at the conference, organised in the following categories: learning from experience; carbon pricing design; concepts and methods; political economy; decarbonising the economy; and emerging frontiers. To learn more, visit the CPLC [website](#).

Resources

ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 2: WHICH POLICIES FOR TRADE AND MARKETS? Published by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) (July 2018). This new publication features contributions from various experts that explore the different linkages between trade, markets, and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 to end hunger and malnutrition by 2030. It provides an overview, as well as papers specific to SDG targets 2.1, 2.2., 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. To learn more and to download the compilation, visit the ICTSD [website](#).

EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY REGIONAL INTEGRATION: TRADE AND GENDER IMPLICATIONS. Published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2018). This report from UNCTAD analyses the effects of East African Community (EAC) regional integration on women's employment and well-being. It included country profiles that detail economic and social changes that have occurred in EAC member states through regional integration, focusing specifically on trade-gender interactions. The report quantitatively analyses the impact of regional integration and trade openness on women's employment, as well as the potential impacts of tariff liberalisation among EAC members and with other trading partners. Based on the analysis, the report includes policy recommendations in its final chapter. To download the report, visit the UNCTAD [website](#).

PACIFIC ENERGY UPDATE 2018. Published by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (June 2018). This report describes ADB's work related to the energy sector in the Pacific, focusing on projects that aim to build resilient, low-carbon economies and increase access to clean, reliable power. The report details ADB's renewable energy investment projects, as well as regional initiatives, including a US\$750 million Renewable Energy Investment Facility to expedite projects in 11 ADB Pacific developing member countries. It also highlights the bank's energy portfolio and project pipeline, as well as its work with public and private sector actors to improve access to sustainable power. To download the report, visit the ADB [website](#).

RESHAPING DECENTRALISED DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION: THE KEY ROLE OF CITIES AND REGIONS FOR THE 2030 AGENDA. Published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (June 2018). This report analyses the role of cities and regions in implementing global agendas such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through decentralised development cooperation (DDC) activities. The report discusses cooperation between developed and developing partner regions and cities, analysing evolutions and changes in the 2005 to 2015 period. It tracks financial flows and other trends related to development cooperation, and provides policy recommendations to maximise the benefits of DDC for all stakeholders. To download the report, visit the OECD [website](#).

GLOBAL EV OUTLOOK 2018: TOWARDS A CROSS-MODAL ELECTRIFICATION. Published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) (June 2018). This annual publication from the IEA discusses global developments in electric mobility. It provides projections to 2030, analysing costs, energy use, electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure deployment, carbon dioxide emissions, and battery materials markets. The report draws from leaders in EV markets to make policy recommendations for policymakers and other stakeholders who seek to encourage EV adoption. To download the report, visit the IEA [website](#).

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