Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Climate-changing World

Alec Crawford, Arthur Hanson and David Runnalls

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Executive Summary

In May of this year, about 200 kilometres north of the Arctic Circle, representatives from the five coastal states of the Arctic gathered in the small town of Ilulissat, Greenland to discuss the future of the North. The governments of Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States were brought together by the joint realization that the changing climate is making Arctic sovereignty a more pressing and consequential issue: receding ice is opening up access to new resources and shipping lanes; energy shortages have pushed countries to look for new sources of fuel; vulnerable ecosystems are increasingly at risk; and change is being imposed on the livelihoods and lifestyles of Northern communities across the region.

What came out of this meeting was the Ilulissat Declaration, a joint statement committing the five countries to observe the legal framework set up by the 1994 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Seeing no need to develop a new legal regime for the governance of the Arctic, the five states committed to “take steps in accordance with international law both nationally and in cooperation among the five states and other interested parties to ensure the protection and preservation of the fragile marine environment of the Arctic Ocean” (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). According to co-host Per Stig Møller, Denmark’s Foreign Minister, “The five nations have now declared that they will follow the rules. We have hopefully quelled all myths about a race for the North Pole once and for all” (Borger, 2008).

This commitment to Arctic cooperation and environmental protection stands in stark contrast to the increased saber-rattling that the Arctic has seen over the past few years, both before and since Ilulissat. (For an overview of the competing sovereignty claims of the five coastal Arctic states, see Annex). In August 2007, the Russian Arktika submarine expedition famously planted a flag on the seabed of the North Pole, a move derided by the U. S. State Department as a land-grab. All countries have initiated or completed mapping exercises of the seabed floor to cement their sovereignty claims. And in July of this year, the Russian government announced it would send warships to patrol Arctic waters for the first time since the Cold War. Navy spokesman Igor Dygalo claimed that Russia is doing so “in the interests of security” (Nowak, 2008).

The same reasoning was used by Prime Minister Harper this summer when speaking of his government’s planned investments in Arctic patrols, military bases and equipment, and his new ‘Canada First’ Defence Policy commits to augmenting the Canadian Forces’ capacity to “protect Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and security.”

1 On August 22 2008 the government scrapped plans to purchase 12 mid-shore patrol vessels for the Canadian coast guard, which were to be used for Arctic patrols.
This shift in government attention and military investment has put Canada “at the forefront of the muscle-flexing...even though this is a contest we cannot win,” according to former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy. Axworthy is referring to the woeful state of Canada’s military capacity in the Arctic: despite pledged investments, the country is—at the moment—in no position to assert its sovereignty in the North by conventional military means. Rob Huebert of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies provides a succinct rundown of these shortcomings:

“Our Coast Guard's icebreaking fleet is small and aging; our search-and-rescue capability is based in the south; our navy has a very limited ability to go north; we require industry to provide for their own rescue capability; and we maintain almost no oil-spill response equipment in the North” (Huebert, 2008).

The Canadian government has made progress on upgrading the country’s presence in the North in the past two years. The defence budget has increased, with a significant portion of the spending going to the Arctic. Operation Nunavut (“This Land is Ours”) is a now-yearly exercise whereby Canadian Forces rangers patrol the Arctic to assert our sovereignty in the region. A new CDN$720 million icebreaker, the Diefenbaker, will be built and operational within ten years. And plans are in place to build two military bases to bolster Canada’s claim to ownership in the Arctic: an army training centre for 100 troops at Resolute Bay, and a deep-water port at Nanisivik, Baffin Island.

That having been said, more progress on Arctic defence should be made. The government recently scrapped plans to invest CDN$3 billion to upgrade Canada's warships, including the purchase of 12 mid-shore patrol vessels for the Canadian Coast Guard to use in its Arctic operations (El Akkad, 2008); plans were put on hold with no domestic contractors able to meet Ottawa’s budget. As a result, no ships will arrive before 2013 (Chase, 2008). The country’s two existing supply ships, which are used in the region and which were to have been replaced under the deal, were launched in 1968-69, and are now so obsolete that replacement parts are often difficult to find.

This is not to say that Canada is completely unable to assert its claims to sovereignty in the Arctic; there is still a lot the country can and should do—in addition to military investment—to position itself as a leader in the region. The limits of Canada’s hard military power are evident, and will not be overcome any time soon. However, Canada should be working much more effectively to mobilize its soft power: to become a leader in developing better environmental management of the Arctic, to involve the indigenous peoples in the Arctic in the negotiations on their future and to ensure that cooperation and international law guides the resolution of the territorial disputes in the Arctic region. Given the scale of what is at stake—environmentally, strategically and economically—and given the pace of change and the pace at which Russia and our other Arctic neighbours are acting on this change (see Annex), Canada urgently needs to reassess its approach to Arctic sovereignty.
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Arctic Canada: Policy Gaps and Recommendations

In 2003, Canada ratified the 1994 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a treaty that defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world’s oceans and establishes a process to decide maritime boundaries (and the sovereignty of natural resources within those borders). Countries have ten years from their ratification date to submit their claim; the Convention then weighs the claim to establish the right to a maritime border that encloses an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) up to 200 nautical miles from the shoreline low-water mark. UNCLOS also contains a provision to enable countries to apply to extend their maritime boundaries beyond the 200-mile limit if the edge of the continental shelf can be proven to extend further.²

This crucial provision has led to a flurry of mapping exercises across the Arctic by littoral countries keen to lay claim over the significant natural resources and shipping routes that lie throughout the region. The U. S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic is the largest source of untapped oil on the planet (McKenna and Scott, 2008). Lucrative fisheries will develop as the ice recedes and the cold-water fish move north. Mining exploration and development could increase as access improves to the Arctic’s gold, silver, iron and, importantly, diamonds: Arctic Canada is believed to contain 12 to 15 per cent of the world’s diamonds by value. But accessing these resources brings significant environmental challenges; traffic, construction and pollution will increase in the Arctic’s fragile ecosystem. There are already a record number of ships in the region (Chase, 2008), and the remoteness of the Arctic means that the impact of an environmental crisis, such as an oil spill, would be magnified; this lesson was learned by both the Exxon Valdez disaster off Alaska’s southern coast in 1989, and the March 2006 Prudhoe Bay spill off the same state’s North shore.

UNCLOS sets out the legal basis upon which countries can claim sovereignty in the North, but it is not the only way in which countries can assert their sovereignty in the Arctic, or their leadership in Arctic affairs. There are a number of important issues that Canada should be focusing on beyond those currently grabbing headlines (i.e. warship patrols, vast oil and gas reserves, etc.). These are discussed below.

Multi-stakeholder engagement

Ecological change in the Arctic arising from the combined effects of climate change and development will have very significant national and global consequences: from the potentially massive release of greenhouse gases from the Arctic’s melting permafrost, to threats to both terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity facing rapidly warming conditions, to the massive investments

² Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the continental shelf comprises “the submerged prolongation of the land territory of a Coastal state – the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea to the outer edge of the continental margin.” UNCLOS (1994) “Article 76”, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1994
required to update and maintain northern infrastructure (roads, ports, pipelines) as the ground thaws and wave action and storm surges increase. These challenges will likely be beyond the financial capacity of any single northern nation to mitigate adequately; cooperation is essential.

Denmark controversially did not invite Sweden, Iceland or Finland (the other three Arctic nations, none of which have Arctic coastlines) to the Ilulissat talks in May; environmental organizations, indigenous groups and other nations were similarly left out. However the future of the North will be shaped by the actions of the global community, not only those nations bordering the Arctic Ocean. The EU will play a key role in the Arctic's future, in terms of the commercial, shipping and scientific research interests of its member states. China is already active in the North; in late August 2008, it dispatched its third Arctic expedition to the region to collect data and samples on the impacts of climate change on the North Pole. Multinational resource companies, including BP and Gazprom, are investing billions of dollars in exploration and drilling rights, and have spent significant amounts developing pipelines to deliver natural gas to the markets. Civil society groups in the Arctic and international NGOs are increasingly vocal and active advocates for northern rights and Arctic environmental protection. Canada will need to strengthen both its standing and alliances with such interest groups, and push for their inclusion in decision-making, if it is to be successful in having its points of view on security, environmental management and sovereignty recognized and accepted.

Access to rich natural resources has already contributed to the economic growth of the Northwest Territories. Increased mining (particularly for diamonds) has meant that the territory’s GDP per capita in 2005 was the highest in the country, at CDNS$97,923. This ranks NWT much higher than Luxembourg, home to the world’s richest citizens. The economic development from natural resource exploitation can prove a boon for adjacent northern communities, and helps Canada maintain and augment its presence in the North. However the environmental costs of mining in a fragile ecosystem like that of the Arctic, including the risk of a toxic spill from a tailing pond, must be minimized. The government must be prepared to deal with more mines in the North; working with natural resource companies as it pushes for tight environment control, transparency, accountability and an adequate sharing of benefits with local communities.

Canada’s indigenous and northern communities were not represented at the meeting in Ilulissat. Canadians have been using these lands and waters for centuries; indeed, our claim to the Northwest Passage, among other lands and waterways, is based on the continued presence of our northern communities in the region.

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3 The EU is funding a transatlantic policy research effort entitled _Arctic Transform_ involving the Heinz Center in the U. S. and three European partners in a detailed examination of adaptation in the marine arctic environment and region. Although several Canadians are taking part as experts, there is no link with Canadian research bodies. [http://www.arctic-transform.org/index.html](http://www.arctic-transform.org/index.html)
But change is being thrust onto these communities by the warming climate. Countries, corporations and cruise liners are flocking to the area to take advantage of the melting sea ice. With concern in her voice, Inuit activist Sheila Watt-Cloutier neatly sums up the dilemma, “As long as it’s ice, nobody cares except us, because we hunt and fish and travel on that ice. However, the minute it starts to thaw and becomes water, then the whole world is interested” (Krauss et al., 2005). For Canada’s northern population, there is a danger that as interested groups rush in to claim vast northern resources, the social and economic development that is required for their communities could be further neglected (Collins, 2008).

Our northern and indigenous communities must therefore be allowed to play a more central and active role in decision-making with regards to the Canadian Arctic. The establishment of Nunavut in 1999 was a major step towards political inclusion and representation for these groups, and land claim settlements, including the 1984 Inuvialuit Agreement and the 1992 Gwich’in Land Claim Settlement Act, have given substantial rights in the Arctic territories over northern resources to Inuit and some First Nations communities. This ownership shows that more needs to be done to ensure their participation in decision-making processes such as those at Ilulissat.

The co-management of Arctic resources between indigenous groups and the federal government gives Canada unique experience in multistakeholder management, which could be shared with our Northern neighbours. In 2001, the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy released a report outlining how non-renewable resources can be developed in the North in a sustainable and equitable way. The recommendations drawn from this research (including the importance of managing the cumulative effects of resource development in the North; creating a positive investment environment for resource development; Arctic capacity building; and thorough consultations with Northern communities) provide good guidance on reconciling environment, development and native interests, and could be similarly shared with other Arctic nations struggling with the same challenges.

Sustainable development leadership

In September 1996 the eight Arctic nations\(^4\) founded the Arctic Council, a “high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States” (Arctic Council, 2007a). Working groups under the Council focus on scientific research in a number of areas, including monitoring, assessing and controlling pollution in the Arctic, climate change, biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, emergency preparedness, prevention and response, and the living conditions of Arctic residents (Arctic Council, 2007b). Canada was the Council’s founding chair, and from its inception the group has sought to involve northern communities and indigenous groups in its work.

\(^4\) Arctic Council member countries are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States.
There is little disagreement on the part of Arctic Council nations that the way forward needs to be based on improved environmental stewardship and sustainable development; these two tenets feature prominently in the Council's founding Declaration (Arctic Council, 1996). So far, however, there is no clear leadership on environmental stewardship, and the prospects are alarming based on the slow action of countries and the international community.

Canada and Russia represent the greatest land claims on the Arctic. With the most to gain and lose from environmental stewardship, or a lack thereof, the two countries could be viewed as natural leaders in the region. Of the two, Canada's far superior record on environmental stewardship (according to the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy) points to the leadership position the country should adopt; doing so will allow Canada to secure its sovereignty claims “not only in the courts of law, but in the court of world public opinion, where evidence of exemplary environmental stewardship will be most persuasive,” according to former Leader of the Opposition Preston Manning (2008).

Canada can lead the Arctic nations on the environment through its example at home. To begin with, it can set aside more protected areas in the North. There has been good progress on terrestrial parks in the past decade: there are now seven national parks in the Canadian Arctic, with large areas of land being set aside for future protection and park expansion (proposed in Nahanni NP and considered for Toktut Nogait NP, for example). The size of these existing parks is significant; Quttinirpaaq National Park on Ellesmere Island, for example, is roughly the same size as Switzerland. But more Arctic habitats should be protected, particularly in the Western High Arctic Islands, to ensure the conservation of Arctic biodiversity.

The country must also do more to protect its Arctic marine environment. Currently, National Marine Conservation Areas exist only in Ontario and Quebec, despite the high diversity and complexity of the Arctic marine ecosystems and the limited knowledge we have of our Arctic waters and the life contained within them. The need is urgent, given the pace of climate change; Canada has many of the largest herds, flocks of birds and marine mammal concentrations found on the planet, and by protecting these ecosystems, the country can demonstrate its concern as a steward of the planet. In addition, establishing land and marine parks serves as a powerful means of reinforcing Canada’s sovereignty.

Canada cannot afford to be a laggard in addressing sensitive resource and environmental matters such as the changing dynamics of fish populations. The U. S. North Pacific Fisheries Management Council is already examining the need for a moratorium on fisheries in the portions of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas under U. S. control and in the Bering Sea. Canada needs to have a management strategy and monitor the rapidly changing situation in its own Arctic waters and in the many
northern rivers that are now being invaded by southern fish species.

The valuable function of the Arctic Council in bringing the region’s nations together has not yet led to a regional sustainable development strategy, and its members remain divided on key issues: competition for vast potential resource wealth; divergent soft and hard power; very different regimes; contrasting seabed mapping results and claims; the need for energy security; and the U. S.’s decision not to ratify UNCLOS.

With the possible exception of U. S. UNCLOS ratification by the Senate—which has been approved by both the President and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—these sources of division are likely to continue in the coming years. Thus other action is needed around specific topics and coalitions that naturally bind the Arctic nations: a shared Arctic environment; a declared commitment to abide by UNCLOS; the Ilulissat Declaration and the Arctic Council; threatened indigenous and northern populations; and the fact that a lot is at stake, environmentally, socially and economically. A common thread for these connectors is the need to promote sustainable development in the region. The central focus for Canada should be to demonstrate through its actions that it intends to be a world leader in northern sustainable development stewardship no matter how difficult the challenges of transition created by climate change.

Arctic Knowledge

Expanding knowledge about environmental change in the Arctic and its effect on development and security (in a broad sense) is essential to gauge what is at stake in the region and how policy-makers should respond. There needs to be greater continuity in funding and in the synthesis of information into useful knowledge. Canada has moved from laggard to very active participant in this process; its CDN$150 million investment in the International Polar Year (IPY, 2007–2009) is a very significant improvement over past research support. But it is not yet a consistent leader operating at a level that would be expected of a rich nation controlling such a large area of Arctic terrestrial and ocean space.

Canada could, for example, take the leadership in monitoring and interpreting Arctic change; we have the capacity via technology such as the RADARSAT system to do so. Coordination among research initiatives throughout the region should improve, to avoid repetition and overlap, while the information gathered should be made available to as broad an audience as possible (Kraft Sloan and Hik, 2008). More specifically, Canada should support improved understanding and management of the 12 large marine ecosystems found in the Arctic. Canada’s approach has been to set out Large Ocean Management Areas, with the main Arctic test case being the Beaufort Sea. Progress, however, has been very slow beyond this, and important areas like Lancaster Sound and Hudson Bay do not

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5 Twelve of the world’s 64 large marine ecosystems are found in the Arctic: the West Greenland Shelf, the East Greenland Shelf, the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Shelf, the West Bering Sea, the Chukchi Sea, the Beaufort Sea, the East Siberian Sea, the Laptev Sea, the Kara Sea, Hudson Bay and the Arctic Ocean.
have any real process underway. Canada should excel in this area; by getting its approach right, and sharing it with the global community, our country can help ensure the health of these important—and poorly understood—Arctic ecosystems.

To be most effective, the explosion of knowledge about the North in the coming decade must be matched by a capacity to quickly turn this knowledge into policy advice, sustainable technologies and persuasive cases to be made to the international community for matters requiring international action, like the transport of atmospheric contaminants into the North, or the potentially large release of greenhouse gases from the melting permafrost.

**Go Beyond Ilulissat**

In 1959 a number of governments came together to sign the Antarctic Treaty, a document in which the signatories agreed to use the Antarctic exclusively for peaceful purposes; to promote international scientific cooperation in the region; and to create a firm foundation for the continuation and development of such cooperation (Kraft Sloan and Hik, 2008). While it is likely impossible to translate this model into an Arctic framework, the countries of the region should nonetheless further cement cooperation beyond that which is laid out in the somewhat limited Ilulissat Declaration.

Canada should take a greater leadership role in the existing international environmental agreements affecting the North. It has done so in the past; Canada was the first signatory to, and a key driver of, the Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, with the primary concern being the alarming rise in these pollutants in northern ecosystems, and their effect on the region’s population. Similarly, Canada has a vested interest in promoting the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities, given the substantial pollution released from northern rivers in Asia and the Russian Arctic, not to mention Canadian rivers such as the Mackenzie and those flowing into Hudson Bay.

There is a need for strong agreements among Arctic countries on the monitoring and control of Arctic transportation, on resource development and on promoting the well-being of the region’s nearly 4 million inhabitants. Monitoring, regulations and emergency response capabilities must be improved and better coordinated to protect against environmental catastrophe; unusually strong Arctic currents mean that a problem in one country could quickly spread to the aquatic resources and food supply of its neighbours.

In addition, the prospect of cooperation in creating well-governed sea routes (such as the Northwest Passage and the Arctic Bridge from Murmansk to Churchill, Manitoba) could open new trade opportunities, with an ice-free Arctic passage opening up the shortest link between North America
and the increasingly important Eurasian markets. Successive Canadian governments have argued that the Northwest Passage is Canadian territory, and in the interest of North American security (and the environment) Canada should control traffic in the passage, as opposed to allowing unfettered access. The government's position stands in contrast to that of other maritime countries. The United States, for example, believes the Northwest Passage should be open to international traffic, and that vessels need not obtain consent from Canada before travelling through the strait; acceptance of Canadian sovereignty over the strait could set a dangerous precedent for other, equally strategic waterways such as those in the South China Sea. These differences will have to be resolved soon to ensure that sovereignty disputes do not block potential trade routes, and that countries agree on environmental compliance before traffic increases substantially.

**Update Northern Foreign Policy**

Canada’s future will be shaped by events in the North much more than has been the case in the past; it will truly become a northern nation. If the country sincerely believes that its success in managing northern transitions will be based on a combination of sovereignty, regional cooperation and sustainable development, it will require a sophisticated strategic and policy approach. Such an approach is only beginning to emerge.

In 2000, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) released *The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy*, a report that aimed to establish a framework to protect Canadian interests in the Arctic region as well as to promote cooperation with Canada’s northern neighbours (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2000). The review of the report was commissioned in 2005, and found that more can be done by the government on the questions of sovereignty, Arctic sustainable development and cooperation between Canada and Russia, the EU and other circumpolar countries. In addition, the review heavily criticized communications and engagement, finding “little evidence of effective engagement of Canadians, especially northerners and indigenous groups, in ongoing policy dialogue of a circumpolar nature” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2005).

This policy document should be revisited once again given all that has changed in three short years: Arctic investments, both planned and implemented, have increased; the position of Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs has been eliminated; seabed mapping exercises have been ramped up, and claims made to the UNCLOS Committee by two of the five Arctic coastal states; the Ilulissat Declaration has been issued; military and commercial traffic in the area has increased; and the northern route of the Northwest Passage has been declared navigable for the first time, among other things. Integrated into the policy should be the recommendations contained in this commentary: increased support for engaging a variety of stakeholders; assuming a leadership role in the region; supporting more Arctic research; and cementing Arctic cooperation with other regional
stakeholders.

Furthermore, the Canadian government should re-instate the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs. This position, created in 1994 to negotiate the creation of the Arctic Council, acted as Canada’s senior official on the Council, and consulted with northern communities to translate their needs into the country’s circumpolar policies. The position was eliminated by the federal government in 2006 to save money. But as Arctic issues climb the federal agenda and garner more international attention, and as Canada meets with other nations, communities and interest groups to discuss the future of the region, having an appropriate level of representation at such meetings sends a signal to the world: namely, that we take our northern responsibilities very seriously.

**Conclusion**

Arctic sovereignty is a complicated business. Promises of vast resources and fabled shipping lanes set free by a melting ice pack have triggered a competition for land and influence across the region. As a result, “The Arctic is in danger of becoming a source of serious conflict among Canadians, Americans, Europeans and Russians,” according to Lloyd Axworthy. Climate change has made it clear that the Arctic environmental transformation poses some very real security concerns for Canada. There is a danger, however, that these perceived security threats, the shared expectations of what lies beneath the Arctic ice, and the race to define our northern sovereignty could overshadow the some of the current and expected environmental challenges to be faced by the Arctic ecosystem and the communities that depend upon it.

In addition to increasing its defence spending in the North, Canada, to guarantee its Arctic sovereignty and the health of its northern ecosystem, must:

- Engage indigenous and northern communities, NGOs, international organizations and countries outside of the Arctic Council in the debate and decision-making on Arctic sovereignty and security;
- Take the lead on environmental stewardship in the North;
- Invest more money in Arctic research and the capacity to turn research into meaningful policy;
- Go beyond the Ilulissat Declaration to cement cooperation on a number of issues with the other Arctic stakeholders; and
- Update its Northern Foreign Policy.

“These measures will send a clear message to the world: Canada takes responsibility for environmental protection and enforcement in our Arctic waters” (Chase, 2008). Stephen Harper
recently spoke these words when referring to an expansion of what the government considers sovereign Canadian territory, a declaration meant to help Canada better police pollution violators in the area. However they can be just as easily applied to any of the recommendations above. By undertaking these strategies, Canada can move beyond military investments and the UNCLOS submission to cement its Arctic sovereignty through leadership and environmental stewardship.
Reference List


### Annex 1: Arctic sovereignty claims among the five littoral states

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>USA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNCLOS ratification</strong></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Has not ratified; approved by President Bush and Senate Foreign Relations Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNCLOS submission</strong></td>
<td>By 2013 Canada will make a “very strong claim,” according to NR Minister Gary Lunn</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>By 2014</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>No submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial claim</strong></td>
<td>- Submission pending; will be roughly 1,000,000 km²</td>
<td>- Largest Arctic claim: includes North Pole, extensions into the Central Arctic Ocean, the Bering Sea, the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk - Arctic states and UN call for more data</td>
<td>- Submission pending</td>
<td>- Extensions in three parts of the Arctic and northeast Atlantic: the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea; the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean; and the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea - Further submissions to be made</td>
<td>- No official UNCLOS claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Existing disputes</strong></td>
<td>- Hans Island, Lincoln Sea (with Denmark) - Beaufort Sea (with U.S.) - Northwest Passage (with int’l community) - Lomonosov Ridge (with Russia, Denmark)</td>
<td>- Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev Ridge (with Canada, Denmark) - Spitsbergen EEZ (with Norway) - Barents Sea (with Norway)</td>
<td>- Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev Ridge (with Canada, Russia) - Hans Islands</td>
<td>- Spitsbergen EEZ (with Russia) - Barents Sea claim (with Russia)</td>
<td>- Beaufort Sea (with Canada) - Northwest Passage (with Canada) - Finds “major flaws” in Russian submission, claims Lomonosov Ridge outside of area state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diplomatic action</td>
<td>Military action</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ilulissat Declaration</td>
<td>- Plans to build two military bases: army training centre in Resolute Bay and deep-sea port in Nanisivik</td>
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<td>- Mapping partnership with U.S. (2008)</td>
<td>- Operation Nunaliivut: yearly ranger patrols across the Arctic</td>
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<td>- Mapping partnership with Denmark</td>
<td>- $720 million icebreaker</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs (1994, since discontinued)</td>
<td>- $3 billion upgrade for warships and coastal patrol vessels</td>
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<td>- Founding chair, Arctic Council</td>
<td>- Arktika mission, 2007: flag-planting on North Pole</td>
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<td>- Supporting munitions clean-up in northern Russia</td>
<td>- Warship patrols in Arctic, first since Cold War</td>
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<td>- Hans Island weather monitoring (with Denmark)</td>
<td>- Increased Russian air traffic in Canada’s Arctic airspace</td>
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<td>- Cooperation with Norway on Barents Sea oil and gas</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers in Arctic (2007) to map Alaska’s sea floor</td>
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<td>- Current chair, Arctic Council</td>
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<td>- Cooperation with Russia on Barents Sea oil and gas</td>
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<td>- Support, Arctic Council</td>
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<td>- Membership, Arctic Council</td>
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