{"id":8526,"date":"2021-10-07T08:58:07","date_gmt":"2021-10-07T13:58:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cf.iisd.net\/itn\/?p=8526"},"modified":"2024-08-09T18:32:00","modified_gmt":"2024-08-09T16:32:00","slug":"the-end-of-tax-incentives-how-will-a-global-minimum-tax-affect-tax-incentives-regimes-in-developing-countries-alexandra-readhead-thomas-lassourd-howard-mann","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/2021\/10\/07\/the-end-of-tax-incentives-how-will-a-global-minimum-tax-affect-tax-incentives-regimes-in-developing-countries-alexandra-readhead-thomas-lassourd-howard-mann\/","title":{"rendered":"The end of tax incentives: How will a global minimum tax affect tax incentives regimes in developing countries?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Introduction<\/h1>\n

In early June, the G7 reached a deal\u00a0to make multinational companies pay more tax.[1]<\/sup><\/a> They agreed in principle to introduce an overall global minimum corporate tax rate of at least 15% with the aim of preventing tax competition. Some G7 countries view this rate as too low, with the United States advocating for 21%. However, agreement must now be sought at a meeting of the G20 at the end of the month and among the 139 countries involved in the OECD<\/span>\/G20 Inclusive Framework.<\/p>\n

If adopted, a global minimum tax will apply to all sectors of the economy. Countries will have to repeal tax incentives in domestic law and investment agreements in order to bring the effective tax rate in line with the global tax rate. While tax incentives in the law can be undone unilaterally by amendment of the legislation, some are subject to stabilization provisions in law or contracts which may prevent the full implementation of a global minimum tax. This briefing investigates the impact of a global minimum tax on the use of tax incentives in developing countries, and what transitional arrangements are needed to protect countries from a transfer of tax revenue. It reflects the authors\u2019 experience in the extractive industries but applies to other types of investments in large-scale, capital-intensive projects in developing countries, such as energy and transport infrastructure.<\/p>\n

How a Global Minimum Tax Would Affect Tax Incentives<\/h1>\n

A global minimum tax aims to reduce tax competition and profit shifting in all economic sectors. It does this through rules that, if adopted, would ensure all global profits of multinational enterprises are taxed at least at a minimum effective tax rate (ETR).<\/p>\n

Under the current proposal, a global minimum tax would apply to multinational companies with gross revenues above EUR 750 million. The ETR is calculated annually on a country-by-country basis. It is the total taxes on corporate profits paid to government authorities, or \u201ccash tax\u201d (the numerator), as a proportion of the tax base, which is based on accounting profits (the denominator) expressed as a fraction (see the equation below).<\/p>\n

ETR = Covered taxes (current year cash tax paid)
\n__________________________________<\/p>\n

Tax base (accounting profits)<\/p>\n

In each income year, if a subsidiary\u2019s ETR is below the minimum globally agreed rate, its parent company must pay a \u201ctop-up tax\u201d on its proportionate share of the income of the low-taxed subsidiary to the country where it is located (usually referred to as the home or residence country).\u00a0 Under certain circumstances, the liability for the top-up tax shifts to one or more other members of the multinational group. As a result, the primary beneficiaries of a global minimum tax would be capital-exporting countries, where multinational companies are typically headquartered, who are given first priority to tax undertaxed profits.\u00a0 The proposal includes three other rules, two of which could benefit developing countries, but they are unlikely to generate substantial revenue.[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Practically, what would this mean for a corporation located in three jurisdictions, with subsidiary 1 in Country A, subsidiary 2 in Country B, and the parent company in Country C? In all three jurisdictions, the corporation pays taxes according to each country\u2019s tax rules. However, if subsidiaries 1 and 2 do not pay tax at the level of the global minimum rate, then the top-up tax\u2014the difference between the ETR and the global minimum rate\u2014is collected by Country C under the income inclusion rule.<\/p>\n

Once the reform is enacted, any subsidiary of a multinational company will therefore be expected to pay a corporate income tax of at least the minimum tax rate\u201415%, according to the G7 proposal. In principle, this should be easy to reach, as most developing countries have much higher statutory corporate tax rates, ranging from 20% to 40%. However, companies may pay less than the minimum tax rate when they benefit from tax incentives. There are two categories of tax incentives that developing countries often grant to foreign investors.<\/p>\n

The first one is incentives that create temporary, or timing, differences between companies\u2019 financial statements, which declare profits according to international accounting standards (\u201caccounting profits\u201d), and their taxable income, calculated based on domestic tax rules\u2014e.g., accelerated depreciation of capital assets. These incentives do not reduce the total amount of taxes owed; they merely postpone them. They tend to be efficient in attracting investment: they lower the cost of capital and so make less-profitable investments viable. The Inclusive Framework is committed to finding a workable solution to prevent these types of incentives from triggering a top-up tax, although the details are yet to be determined (see IGF-ATAF report).[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The second category of tax incentives plainly reduces or eliminates taxes paid on profits, often for a set period of time\u2014e.g., tax holidays, preferential tax rates, tax credits, investment allowances, or income exemptions.[4]<\/sup><\/a> These incentives are considered less efficient than the first category of tax incentives and more likely to result in profit shifting.[5]<\/sup><\/a> They are the types of incentives targeted by the reform. The minimum tax will make many of them ineffective because any multinational company that benefits from an incentive such that its tax rate is less than the minimum rate will simply have to pay the balance to a foreign jurisdiction (often the residence country of the company that receives the incentive). The example below shows the impact of a 10-year tax holiday under the global minimum tax.<\/p>\n

Illustration: Impact of a 10-year tax holiday under the global minimum tax<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Source: Authors\u2019 calculations, based on a simplified 15-year investment described in Appendix A of IGF and ATAF, 2021.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

The global minimum tax will only affect taxes calculated on the profit of multinational companies. This would include corporate income taxes, withholding taxes on cross-border payments of dividends or interest, and any profit-based levy such as a profit-based mineral royalty or tax on economic rent. It will have no impact on taxes and charges not based on corporate income such as VAT, customs duties, payroll taxes, revenue-based taxes such as mineral royalties, production sharing arrangements, and no impact on any incentives granted by governments on these revenue streams. This prompts the question of whether countries will compete for investment by lowering these types of taxes in the future. It would be advisable not to, especially considering that these taxes are more reliable and easier to collect than taxes on income.<\/p>\n

How Should Developing Countries Amend Their Tax Incentives Regimes to Benefit Rather Than Lose From the Global Minimum Tax?<\/h1>\n

The objective of the global minimum tax is to combat the race to the bottom. All countries are encouraged to take action to benefit from less tax competition and to avoid tax revenues to be collected elsewhere under the global minimum tax.<\/p>\n

First, countries will have to ensure their headline corporate income tax rate is higher than the globally agreed minimum rate. The United States, for instance, proposed a corporate income tax rate of 28% and a global minimum tax rate of 21%.[6]<\/sup><\/a> The reason is that the global minimum tax is based on the ETR, which is the total (covered) taxes paid to the government divided by accounting profits.[7]<\/sup><\/a> The ETR in some years may be lower than the headline tax rate. Even a relatively high corporate tax rate of 30% may lead to an ETR below the global minimum in some years.<\/p>\n

Second, source countries should remove from their tax codes and investment laws all tax incentives from the second category described in Section 2 that reduce or eliminate taxes paid on profits. Not only have these types of incentives been shown to have limited effectiveness at attracting investment in developing countries,[8]<\/sup><\/a> but with a global minimum tax, they would not even reach their intended objective, only leading to a transfer of tax from source states to the residence states of multinational companies.<\/p>\n

An alternative would be for countries to introduce a domestic minimum tax, either on gross revenues or modified profits, to ensure that no company pays less than the new global minimum rate in their jurisdiction. Domestic minimum taxes are increasingly common, with one IMF study finding that in 2018, 52 countries levied this type of tax.[9]<\/sup><\/a> Rather than relying on corporate income tax to achieve the global minimum rate, countries would apply a minimum tax on gross revenue instead, or in addition to the corporate tax rate. This option would likely be easier for developing countries to design and legislate than to wind down each tax incentive in law and contracts.<\/p>\n

What Can Developing Countries Do if Some Tax Incentives Are Locked in Stabilization Clauses Under Investment Agreements or Laws?<\/h1>\n

In most cases, tax incentives are found in investment and tax laws and can be lawfully unwound or phased out unilaterally by governments. However, many developing countries have entered into modified tax agreements for large investment projects, either through special provisions in the applicable domestic law or in investment contracts with foreign investors. They are particularly common in the extractive industries.[10]<\/sup><\/a> These agreements often contain tax incentives that are locked in by fiscal stabilization clauses. While stabilization provisions vary, they typically freeze the fiscal terms in the law or contract at the time a project begins so that changes in tax law may not be applicable to existing investment projects, at least for a defined period of time.<\/p>\n

To align with the new global minimum tax, countries will need to amend such laws and renegotiate contracts, whether stabilized or not. Otherwise, these tax incentives may create untaxed income and a potential transfer of tax to the residence countries of foreign investors. Where the incentives are subject to a stabilization agreement, countries that choose to address this challenge unilaterally could end up in arbitration with companies, which is costly and uncertain.<\/p>\n

Some bilateral investment treaties include provisions that analogize FET<\/span> to stabilization clauses. These could be interpreted by some arbitral tribunals as requiring the stability of the legal framework and therefore potentially broaden the number of tax incentives that cannot be changed unilaterally by host governments. Countries may also need to review their treaties for overly broad FET clauses.<\/p>\n

Countries must call on the Inclusive Framework to find a global solution. If not, the outcome will be politically unsustainable for governments and put at risk investors\u2019 social licence to operate.<\/p>\n

The solution should address the following objectives:<\/p>\n