{"id":5597,"date":"2018-10-18T11:33:39","date_gmt":"2018-10-18T16:33:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/?p=5597"},"modified":"2024-08-09T18:29:09","modified_gmt":"2024-08-09T16:29:09","slug":"cme-v-czech-republic-lauder-v-czech-republic","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/2018\/10\/18\/cme-v-czech-republic-lauder-v-czech-republic\/","title":{"rendered":"CME v. Czech Republic, Lauder v. Czech Republic"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1>CME Czech Republic B.V. v.\u00a0Czech Republic, <span class='tooltipsall tooltipsincontent classtoolTips3'>UNCITRAL<\/span><\/h1>\n<h1>Ronald S. Lauder v.\u00a0Czech Republic, UNCITRAL<\/h1>\n<p>(Originally published in 2011 in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/library\/international-investment-law-and-sustainable-development-key-cases-2000-2010\"><em>International Investment Law and Sustainable Development: Key cases from 2000\u20132010<\/em><\/a>; republished on this website on October 18, 2018. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/isds-investment-arbitration-sustainable-development\/\">Read more here.<\/a>)<\/p>\n<p>Awards available at\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.italaw.com\/sites\/default\/files\/case-documents\/ita0180.pdf\">https:\/\/www.italaw.com\/sites\/default\/files\/case-documents\/ita0180.pdf<\/a> (<em>CME<\/em>),\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.italaw.com\/sites\/default\/files\/case-documents\/ita0451.pdf\">https:\/\/www.italaw.com\/sites\/default\/files\/case-documents\/ita0451.pdf<\/a> (<em>Lauder<\/em>)<\/p>\n<h3>Keywords<\/h3>\n<p>Abuse of process, actionable measures, arbitrary and discriminatory conduct, broad\u00a0dispute resolution provision, causation, expropriation, fair and equitable treatment,\u00a0jurisdiction, multiple\/parallel proceedings<\/p>\n<h3>Key dates<\/h3>\n<p><em>Lauder v. Czech Republic<br \/>\n<\/em>Request for Arbitration: 19 August 1999<a style=\"font-size: 18px;\" href=\"#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\">[1]\n<\/a>Constitution of Tribunal: 5 November 1991<br \/>\nAward: 3 September 2001<\/p>\n<p><em>CME v. Czech Republic<br \/>\n<\/em>Request for Arbitration: 22 February 2000<br \/>\nConstitution of Tribunal: 21 July 2000<br \/>\nPartial Award: 13 September 2001<a style=\"font-size: 18px;\" href=\"#_ftn2\" name=\"_ftnref2\">[2]<\/a><\/p>\n<h3>Arbitrators<\/h3>\n<p><em>Lauder v. Czech Republic<br \/>\n<\/em>Mr. Robert Briner (president)<br \/>\nMr. Lloyd N. Cutler (claimant appointee)<br \/>\nMr. Bohuslav Klein (respondent appointee)<\/p>\n<p><em>CME v. Czech Republic<br \/>\n<\/em>Dr. Wolfgang K\u00fchn (president)<br \/>\nMr. Stephen M. Schwebel (claimant appointee)<br \/>\nMr. Jaroslav H\u00e1ndel (respondent appointee)<\/p>\n<h3>Forum and applicable procedural rules<\/h3>\n<p>United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules<\/p>\n<p>International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of Evidence in Commercial Arbitration<\/p>\n<h3>Applicable treaties<\/h3>\n<p><em>Lauder v. Czech Republic<br \/>\n<\/em>United States\u2013Czech Republic Bilateral Investment Treaty (<span class='tooltipsall tooltipsincontent classtoolTips63'>BIT<\/span>)<em><br \/>\n<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>CME v. Czech Republic<br \/>\n<\/em>Netherlands\u2013Czech Republic BIT<\/p>\n<h3>Alleged treaty violations<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Expropriation (<em>Lauder<\/em> &amp; <em>CME<\/em>)<\/li>\n<li>Fair and equitable treatment (<em>Lauder<\/em> &amp; <em>CME<\/em>)<\/li>\n<li>Full protection and security (<em>Lauder<\/em> &amp; <em>CME<\/em>)<\/li>\n<li>Obligation to treat investments in accordance with international law (<em>Lauder<\/em> &amp; <em>CME<\/em>)<\/li>\n<li>Obligation to not impair investments through arbitrary and discriminatory measures\u00a0(<em>Lauder<\/em> &amp; <em>CME<\/em>)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Other legal issues raised<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Causation<\/li>\n<li>Degree of scrutiny<\/li>\n<li>Jurisdiction\u2014broad dispute resolution provision<\/li>\n<li>Jurisdiction\u2014multiple\/parallel proceedings<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>1.0 Case Summary<\/h2>\n<h3>1.1 Factual Background<\/h3>\n<p>In October 1991, the Czech Republic passed legislation allowing private parties\u2014domestic or foreign\u2014to broadcast radio and television programs in the country. The law also created a \u201cMedia Council\u201d to implement the law and issue broadcasting licences.<\/p>\n<p>In January 1993, the Media Council granted a broadcasting licence (the \u201cLicence\u201d) to CET 21, a Czech company that claimant Ron Lauder, an American citizen, had agreed to invest in and finance. The Media Council\u2019s decision, however, drew immediate political fire from those opposed to the significant and direct involvement by foreign capital in the Licence holder. To resolve the controversy, the Media Council, CET 21 and Mr. Lauder<a href=\"#_ftn3\" name=\"_ftnref3\">[3]\u00a0<\/a>worked to create an entirely new entity that would avoid Mr. Lauder\u2019s direct participation in the Licence holder, CET 21. Under the new arrangement, instead of Mr. Lauder investing directly in CET 21, Mr. Lauder and CET 21 agreed to form a new Czech company, CNTS. In exchange for their respective ownership interests in that new company, CET 21 provided CNTS with \u201cirrevocable and exclusive\u201d rights to use the Licence, and Mr. Lauder provided CNTS with financing.<\/p>\n<p>After the new company, CNTS, launched its television station using the CET 21 Licence, the station became extremely popular and profitable. Beginning in 1994, however, various government entities including the Czech Parliament, the police and ultimately the Media Council began to investigate and\/or express concerns that CNTS was improperly broadcasting television without a licence. To address those concerns, throughout 1996 and 1997 CNTS and CET 21 made various amendments to their contractual relationship to clarify that CET 21 held the Licence and operated the broadcasting, while CNTS merely arranged services for CET 21\u2019s broadcasting activities.<\/p>\n<p>In 1999, disputes began to arise between CET 21 (97.5 per cent owned by its five original Czech investors) and CNTS (99 per cent held by Mr. Lauder\u2019s company, CME) because CET 21 no longer wanted to contract exclusively with CNTS for broadcasting services relating to the Licence. In order to gain leverage and legal authority for its efforts to purchase services from third parties, in March 1999 CET 21 approached the Media Council and requested a letter from that body making clear that CNTS did not have exclusive rights to use or provide services related to the Licence. The Media Council supplied such a letter that same month, stating its belief that relationships between broadcasting operators and service providers are not exclusive.<\/p>\n<p>The tension between CNTS and CET 21 continued to escalate. On 4 August 1999 CNTS failed to submit to CET 21 the \u201cDaily Log,\u201d which listed the programming for broadcast the following day. Based on that breach, on 5 August CET 21 terminated the contract with CNTS. Because CNTS\u2019s services for CET 21 were essentially its only activities and source of income, CET 21\u2019s action effectively destroyed CNTS\u2019s once profitable business.<\/p>\n<h3>1.2 Summary of Legal Issues and Awards<\/h3>\n<p>Roughly two weeks after CET 21 terminated its contract with CNTS, Mr. Lauder initiated his arbitration action against the Czech Republic under the United States\u2013Czech Republic Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Six months later, CME (the Dutch company held by Mr. Lauder that owned 99 per cent of the interest in CNTS) initiated a separate arbitration action against the Czech Republic under the Netherlands\u2013Czech Republic BIT. In each case, the claimant alleged the Czech Republic violated its obligations under the relevant treaty to (1) not expropriate investments without paying compensation, (2) accord investments fair and equitable treatment, (3) provide investments full protection and security, (4) treat investments in accordance with international law and (5) refrain from impairing investments through arbitrary and discriminatory measures. And in each case, the Czech Republic raised, among other defences, a jurisdictional defence that the tribunals lacked the power to hear the claims because Mr. Lauder\u2019s attempt to seek the same relief from the two separate tribunals was improper and an abuse of process. Both tribunals rejected those jurisdictional arguments. Turning to the merits, the <em>Lauder <\/em>Tribunal rejected all of the claimant\u2019s requests for relief; the <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal, however, found for the claimant on each of its causes of action.<\/p>\n<h2>2.0 Select Legal Issues<\/h2>\n<p>The facts set forth above gave rise to two separate investor\u2013state arbitrations, <em>Lauder <\/em>and\u00a0<em>CME<\/em>, as well as several domestic civil and criminal proceedings. This procedural aspect of <em>Lauder <\/em>and <em>CME <\/em>thus illustrates how, under international investment law as currently interpreted and applied, the same conduct by a single host state toward a <em>single <\/em>investment may cause the host state to have to concurrently defend itself in a number of different forums\u2014a burden that could be especially weighty and yet one that host states might frequently have to bear.<\/p>\n<p>The substantive aspects of the <em>Lauder <\/em>and <em>CME <\/em>cases are also significant for a number of reasons. Most obviously, these cases are notable because the two tribunals came to opposite conclusions regarding whether the Czech Republic should be held liable under the governing BITs. With respect to their interpretations of the facts, the <em>Lauder <\/em>Tribunal demonstrated deference to the governmental Media Council\u2019s actions that stands in stark contrast to the <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal\u2019s skepticism of the Media Council\u2019s motives. And with respect to the law, although both tribunals often recited similar general statements regarding the meaning of the relevant treaty provisions, they diverged in certain key areas such as when setting forth and applying the elements of expropriation claims, examining whether there was an offending \u201cmeasure,\u201d and requiring proof of causation. Each of those issues has implications for governments\u2019 abilities to implement and enforce their domestic rules and policies without exposing them to liability under international law; each is explained in more detail below.<\/p>\n<h3>2.1 Allowing investors to pursue actions based on the same conduct in multiple forums<\/h3>\n<p>In both <em>Lauder <\/em>and<em>CME<\/em>, the Czech Republic argued that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the claimant was seeking resolution of the <em>same <\/em>investor\u2013state dispute involving the <em>same <\/em>parties before another arbitral tribunal. In each case, however, the tribunal rejected those arguments based on formalistic interpretations of what constitutes the same \u201cdispute\u201d and who are the relevant \u201cparties\u201d (<em>Lauder <\/em>160\u2013180; <em>CME <\/em>412). More specifically, the tribunals held that the disputes were different from each other because, notwithstanding the same facts and \u201cvirtually identical claims\u201d (<em>CME <\/em>412), each dispute was covered by a different BIT (<em>Lauder\u00a0<\/em>160\u2013180; <em>CME <\/em>412). They also stated that the parties were different because Mr. Lauder was the claimant in one case, while CME was the claimant in the other (<em>Lauder <\/em>165, 171; <em>CME <\/em>412). Neither tribunal deemed it legally significant for purposes of jurisdiction that Mr. Lauder exercised control over CME (<em>Lauder\u00a0<\/em>77, 165; <em>CME <\/em>412). Both tribunals, however, noted that the Czech Republic did not agree to consolidate the proceedings as requested by the claimants, a fact that might have influenced the tribunals\u2019 receptiveness to the Czech Republic\u2019s arguments on the jurisdiction issue (<em>Lauder <\/em>173; <em>CME <\/em>412).<\/p>\n<p>If followed, the approach taken in <em>CME <\/em>and <em>Lauder <\/em>toward jurisdiction may similarly require other host states to have to defend the same acts in a number of different forums, causing them to incur what may be substantial defence costs while allowing investors to take multiple \u201cbites at the apple.\u201d<\/p>\n<h3>2.2 The scope of expropriation provisions: CME finds the Czech Republic liable, while Lauder rejects liability<\/h3>\n<p>The <em>Lauder <\/em>and <em>CME <\/em>cases also are significant due to their diverging interpretations of governments\u2019 obligations not to unlawfully expropriate or deprive investors of their property. Beginning with <em>Lauder<\/em>, when assessing the claimant\u2019s expropriation allegations, the Tribunal explained that three elements must be satisfied for such a claim to succeed: (1) there must be an action or measure taken by the state, (2) for the benefit of the state, (3) that seriously interfered with the investor\u2019s property rights (<em>Lauder\u00a0<\/em>202). The <em>Lauder <\/em>Tribunal then found that the facts of the case did not establish any of those elements. The first and the third elements failed because, according to the Tribunal, it was the private company with which CNTS had contracted, CET 21, not the Czech Republic that seriously interfered with Mr. Lauder\u2019s property rights when it terminated the contract. Any prior interference by the Media Council or other government officials was not severe enough to constitute a taking (<em>id. <\/em>at 202). Moreover, according to the <em>Lauder <\/em>Tribunal, even if it could be said the Media Council\u2019s actions were the cause of Mr. Lauder\u2019s losses, those actions would not support an expropriation claim because they \u201cdid not benefit the Czech Republic or any person or entity related thereto, and [were] not taken for any public purpose\u201d (<em>id. <\/em>at 203).<\/p>\n<p>The <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal likewise stated the general rule that an expropriation will only be found if the state has substantially interfered with or deprived the investor of the value of its investment (<em>CME <\/em>150). As compared to <em>Lauder<\/em>, however, the <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal interpreted what constitutes a substantial interference or deprivation much more broadly, holding that the requisite level of interference was satisfied when the Czech Republic \u201ccoerced\u201d CNTS to give up its <em>contractual protections and legal certainty <\/em>and thereby caused a \u201csubstantial devaluation of the Claimant\u2019s investment\u201d (<em>CME\u00a0<\/em>599).The <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal also differed from <em>Lauder <\/em>by stating that, when determining whether an expropriation has occurred, it is \u201cimmaterial whether the State itself\u2026economically benefits from its actions\u201d (<em>CME <\/em>150).<\/p>\n<p>It is important to note, however, that the <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal\u2019s broad interpretation of the expropriation provision\u2014an interpretation that could expose a wide range of government actions to investor challenges\u2014may have only limited application in future investor\u2013state disputes. This is because the <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal based its reading of the scope of the obligation on the specific language of the governing Dutch\u2013Czech BIT, which \u201c<em>track[ed] the broadest expropriation provisions <\/em>in bilateral investment treaties, specifically, and in international law, generally\u201d (<em>CME <\/em>150) (emphasis added). The <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal noted that the BIT did not even use the term \u201cexpropriation,\u201d but instead stated that neither \u201c\u2026Contracting Party shall take any measures <em>depriving<\/em>, directly or indirectly, investors of the other Contracting Party of their investments\u201d (<em>CME\u00a0<\/em>149) (emphasis added).<\/p>\n<h3>2.3 The causation requirement: A barrier to liability in Lauder but not in CME<\/h3>\n<p>Another issue that impacts the extent to which host states may be liable for actions impacting foreign investors, and on which the <em>CME <\/em>and <em>Lauder <\/em>tribunals again diverged, is the issue of causation. As a general rule, before holding a host state accountable for damages suffered by an investor, the investor must not only show that the state breached its obligations under the treaty, but also prove that the state\u2019s actions actually <em>caused <\/em>the investor harm. <em>Lauder <\/em>illustrates the role this requirement can play in narrowing host\u2013state liability. In that case, the Tribunal held that the Czech Republic acted discriminatorily and arbitrarily toward the claimant when, in response to political opposition, it required Mr. Lauder to invest in broadcasting activities by forming a new entity with CET 21 rather than investing directly in CET 21 as Mr. Lauder had originally intended (<em>Lauder\u00a0<\/em>222\u2013232). The <em>Lauder <\/em>Tribunal then explained that in order to hold the Czech Republic liable for damages based on that breach of the BIT, Mr. Lauder was required to prove that the Czech Republic\u2019s arbitrary and discriminatory conduct caused the harm he ultimately suffered (<em>Lauder\u00a0<\/em>234). According to the Tribunal, in order to establish the necessary causal link, Mr. Lauder had to show not only that the Czech Republic\u2019s conduct was a \u201cbut for\u201d cause of his harm (i.e., the harm would not have occurred \u201cbut for\u201d the government\u2019s conduct), but also that the wrongful conduct was a legal or proximate cause of the harm (i.e., the harm was foreseeable) (<em>Lauder <\/em>234). Applying those tests of causation, the Tribunal held that, although the Czech Republic\u2019s efforts to change the nature of Mr. Lauder\u2019s investment were a \u201cbut for\u201d cause of CET 21\u2019s termination of the contract and Mr. Lauder\u2019s resulting damages, they were \u201ctoo remote\u201d from the harm Mr. Lauder eventually suffered to qualify as the legal or proximate cause (<em>Lauder\u00a0<\/em>235). Accordingly, the <em>Lauder <\/em>Tribunal concluded that the Czech Republic was not liable for any damages based on its breach. The\u00a0<em>Lauder <\/em>Tribunal then similarly cited the lack of causation as one of the factors supporting its rejection of Mr. Lauder\u2019s other claims (<em>Lauder<\/em>243, 274, 288, 304, 313).<\/p>\n<p>In contrast, the <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal concluded that the Media Council caused \u201cthe collapse of CME\u2019s investment\u201d by \u201ccoercing\u201d CNTS to amend its legal agreement with CET 21 and by issuing the March 1999 letter (<em>CME <\/em>575). Although it did not explicitly require that both \u201cbut for\u201d and proximate causation be established, the <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal stated its belief that the Media Council \u201cmust have foreseen\u201d that its actions would lead to CET 21\u2019s termination of the contract and CME\u2019s losses (<em>CME <\/em>585). With respect to the issue of damages, the <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal looked to principles in tort law and decided that the Czech Republic would be \u201cliable to pay for <em>all <\/em>of the harm\u2026caused, notwithstanding that there was a concurrent cause of that harm and that another is responsible for that cause\u201d (<em>CME <\/em>581\u2013582) (emphasis added).<\/p>\n<h3><strong>2.4 The tribunals\u2019 different awards and approaches: Exacerbating uncertainty for host states and investors<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p>In addition to their respective interpretations of the causation requirement and holdings on each of the claimants\u2019 five claims, <em>CME <\/em>and <em>Lauder <\/em>differ from each other in key areas and approaches, including:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>The degree of deference accorded to host states\u2019 justifications:<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>When evaluating the claimants\u2019 allegations that the Czech Republic expropriated property, breached the fair and equitable treatment standard, and acted arbitrarily and discriminatorily, the two tribunals both stated that there is a difference between measures that violate those international law obligations and permissible \u201cordinary measures of the State and its agencies in proper execution of the law\u201d (<em>CME <\/em>503). Yet each tribunal came to significantly different conclusions regarding into which category the Czech Republic\u2019s actions fell. The <em>Lauder <\/em>Tribunal accepted the Czech Republic\u2019s characterization of the government\u2019s actions as legitimate regulatory efforts to ensure compliance with the law (<em>Lauder <\/em>253, 255, 264, 291, 296\u201399, 310\u201314). In contrast, the <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal conducted its own review of the documents and witness statements and concluded that the government did not have any legitimate concerns and was acting unlawfully in an attempt to pressure CNTS to give up its legal rights (<em>CME\u00a0<\/em>514, 515, 520, 534, 603, 611\u2013614).<\/p>\n<p>These divergent outcomes illustrate the different levels of deference the tribunals were willing to grant the Czech Republic\u2019s justification of the government\u2019s challenged actions.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>What constitutes an actionable \u201cmeasure\u201d:<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In <em>Lauder<\/em>, the claimant argued that the Czech Republic impaired its investment through various \u201carbitrary and discriminatory measures\u201d including statements, reports and the March 1999 letter by the Media Council that questioned or were critical of CNTS\u2019s activities (<em>Lauder <\/em>216, 237). The <em>Lauder <\/em>Tribunal, however, held that none of those communications qualified as \u201cmeasures\u201d actionable under the BIT (<em>Lauder <\/em>244\u2013247, 275\u2013288). In contrast, the <em>CME <\/em>Tribunal grouped all of the challenged actions and communications into one \u201ccourse of dealing\u201d that, together, supported liability (<em>CME <\/em>170).<\/p>\n<p>Due to these differences in reasoning and findings, <em>CME <\/em>and <em>Lauder <\/em>exacerbate uncertainty regarding what acts and measures host states can legitimately take without incurring liability under international investment law. This uncertainty also arguably tilts the investor\u2013state dispute system in favour of investors, incentivizing them to file even questionable claims, especially given that there is no formal penalty for pursuing unsound or frivolous actions.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h3>Notes<\/h3>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\">[1]<\/a>\u00a0For purposes of simplicity, \u201cMr. Lauder\u201d refers both to Mr. Lauder, the individual, and CEDC, a German company over which Mr. Lauder had voting control.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref2\" name=\"_ftn2\">[2]<\/a>\u00a0The award does not state the date on which the Lauder Tribunal was constituted. 5 November 1999 is\u00a0the date that the Tribunal issued its first procedural order provisionally fixing the place of arbitration.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref3\" name=\"_ftn3\">[3]<\/a>\u00a0Jaroslav H\u00e1ndl filed a dissenting opinion criticizing various aspects of the Partial Award.<\/p>\n<script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips3','United Nations Commission on International Trade Law'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips32','International Institute for Sustainable Development<!--more-->'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips33','Institut international du d\u00e9veloppement durable'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips34','Instituto Internacional para el Desarrollo Sostenible'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips43','investor\u2013state dispute settlement'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips58','soluci\u00f3n de controversias inversionista-Estado'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips60','Investment Treaty News'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips63','Bilateral investment treaty'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips65','East African community'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips67','Energy Charter Treaty'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips76','multilateral investment court'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips100','investissement direct \u00e9tranger'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips104','responsabilit\u00e9 sociale des entreprises'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips104','responsabilit\u00e9 sociale des entreprises'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips106','asociaci\u00f3n p\u00fablica-privada'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips110','inversi\u00f3n extranjera directa'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips114','Sistema de Tribunales de Inversiones'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips116','European Commission'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips118','Union europ\u00e9enne'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips119','Uni\u00f3n Europea'); <\/script>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>CME Czech Republic B.V. v.\u00a0Czech Republic, <span class='tooltipsall tooltipsincontent classtoolTips3'>UNCITRAL<\/span> Ronald S. Lauder v.\u00a0Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (Originally published in 2011 in International Investment Law and Sustainable Development: Key cases from 2000\u20132010; republished on [&hellip;]<script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips3','United Nations Commission on International Trade Law'); <\/script><script type=\"text\/javascript\"> toolTips('.classtoolTips116','European Commission'); <\/script><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":15869,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[2057,2014,1989,1984,1992],"class_list":["post-5597","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-itn","tag-czech-republic","tag-discriminatory-treatment","tag-expropriation","tag-fair-and-equitable-treatment-fet","tag-jurisdiction"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5597","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5597"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5597\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/15869"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5597"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5597"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5597"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}