{"id":17082,"date":"2026-04-21T18:49:34","date_gmt":"2026-04-21T16:49:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/?p=17082"},"modified":"2026-04-21T18:49:34","modified_gmt":"2026-04-21T16:49:34","slug":"committees-international-investment-agreements-joshua-paine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.iisd.org\/itn\/2026\/04\/21\/committees-international-investment-agreements-joshua-paine\/","title":{"rendered":"Committees in International Investment Agreements: Sketching a research agenda for a growing trend"},"content":{"rendered":"

This contribution analyzes questions arising from UNCTAD<\/span><\/span>\u2019s recent findings that 60% of IIAs concluded between 2020 and 2024 include a committee to facilitate cooperation between the treaty parties, and the proportion of IIAs that include a committee has grown markedly since the early 2010s (UNCTAD, 2025, p. 5<\/a>). UNCTAD\u2019s new IIA<\/span> Facilitation Mapping database<\/a> also finds that 95 of 424 mapped treaties (i.e., around 22%) include an investment-specific committee, whereas UNCTAD\u2019s more general IIA Content Mapping database<\/a> finds that 245 of 2,808 mapped IIAs (i.e., around 9%) include some form of committee.<\/p>\n

At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that the rise of committees in recent IIAs contrasts with the traditional design of the investment treaty regime where most issues were delegated to investor\u2013State arbitral tribunals to decide and where, besides such delegation to arbitral tribunals, there were not significant institutions created to facilitate ongoing cooperation between the treaty parties after treaty conclusion (Kawharu, 2017<\/a>, pp. 87, 89, 91; UNCTAD, 2023<\/a>, p. 8; Ost\u0159ansk\u00fd & Bonnitcha, 2024<\/a>, p. 29).<\/p>\n

This contribution will suggest that there is much that we do not know about committees in IIAs, and there are various questions concerning their operation in IIAs that warrant future research. One important question that merits further investigation is whether providing for committees in IIAs leads to increased meaningful cooperation between the treaty parties beyond what would occur anyway in the absence of a committee structure. Researching this question is likely to require interviews with officials\/negotiators who have participated in committee meetings, as committee-related documents are not always publicly available. Indeed, for many IIAs with a committee, based on publicly available information, it is difficult to determine whether such committees have been convened at the frequency envisaged in the agreement, let alone what has been discussed in committee meetings. Kawharu<\/a> (2017, p. 101) notes that such meetings are not always held. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that some IIAs provide greater transparency regarding the operation of committees, e.g., with publication of reports of committee meetings or committee documents (for suggestions regarding how to increase transparency in the operation of treaty-based committees in EU<\/span> agreements see G\u00e1sp\u00e1r-Szil\u00e1gyi, 2017a<\/a>, p. 399\u2013404).<\/p>\n

Background<\/strong><\/h2>\n

While there is much that we do not know about committees in IIAs, this is not an entirely untrodden path. For example, there is research in the context of trade-related international agreements that has analyzed the role and operation of committees, mainly focusing on EU agreements, which has suggested that the institutional design of such committees is \u201cfar from uniform\u201d and there are a variety of indicators of committee strength (D\u00fcr & Gastinger, 2023<\/a>, pp. 1073, 1081; see also B\u00f6gner, 2025<\/a>; Delev, 2025<\/a>; & Tyushka et al., 2022<\/a>). One contribution to this literature has suggested that \u201cthe express powers delegated to trade committees can generally be substantively divided into three broad categories: (1) powers to conduct information-sharing and monitor treaty implementation, (2) powers to adopt binding decisions and recommendations, and (3) powers to interpret and amend the FTA<\/span>\u201d (Delev, 2025<\/a>, p. 140). It will be suggested below that the functions conferred on committees in investment-related agreements are somewhat more diverse and do not necessarily fit within this typology developed in the trade context. To the extent that there is literature on committees in IIAs, it has largely focused on the role of committees in adopting binding interpretations of IIAs (e.g., Chernykh, 2020<\/a>; G\u00e1sp\u00e1r-Szil\u00e1gyi, 2017b<\/a>; Lenk, 2019<\/a>; Kawharu, 2017<\/a>). As will be shown below, while adopting binding interpretations of an IIA is a power given to some committees, this is only one of a variety of functions conferred on committees in IIAs.<\/p>\n

It should also be highlighted that providing for committees in investment-related international agreements is not entirely new. Specifically, United States Trade and Investment Framework Agreements<\/a> (TIFAs) have been concluded since 1989, and their core feature is to create a committee constituted of representatives of the treaty parties that is typically envisaged to meet at regular intervals (e.g., annually). It is tasked with discussing issues concerning facilitating trade and investment relations between the parties (e.g., U.S.\u2013Argentina TIFA<\/a>, Arts. 2\u20133, U.S.\u2013Vietnam TIFA<\/a>, Arts. 2\u20133). To date, U.S. TIFAs have received virtually no academic attention (Peinhardt & Allee, 2012<\/a>, p. 762). For certain TIFAs, there is some information provided on the agreement\u2019s operation (e.g., joint statements from committee meetings) on the U.S. Trade Representative\u2019s website (e.g., here<\/a> and here<\/a>).<\/p>\n

As UNCTAD has previously suggested, broad commitments to cooperate in IIAs, e.g., with the aim of promoting and facilitating sustainable investment, are more likely to be effective where an agreement identifies the specific domestic agencies responsible for implementation, sets up mechanisms to monitor implementation, and ties the content of commitments to \u201cspecific actions on the ground\u201d (UNCTAD, 2023<\/a>, p. 12). One way that treaties can move in this direction is by including a future work programme for a committee to address. Such future work programmes are not unheard of (e.g., Brazil\u2013Malawi Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement<\/a> [CFIA], Art. 7 and Annex 1; Brazil\u2013Ecuador CFIA<\/a>, Annex 1), but they are not yet widespread. For example, UNCTAD\u2019s IIA Facilitation Mapping database<\/a> finds that only 8 of 424 mapped agreements include a \u201cdefined work programme\u201d and only another 32 agreements include a broader implementation\/monitoring programme. Interestingly, some U.S. TIFAs also include a work programme for the committee to address (e.g., US\u2013Argentina TIFA<\/a> Annex 1, US\u2013Vietnam TIFA<\/a>, Annex, US\u2013CARICOM TIFA<\/a>, Annex).<\/p>\n

Functions of Committees in IIAs<\/strong><\/h2>\n

One question that we can attempt to answer based on currently available information concerns the types of functions that are conferred on committees in IIAs. The overall point the below text seeks to demonstrate is that the range of functions conferred on committees is diverse, and yet some functions are more common (i.e., appear in more IIAs) than others.<\/p>\n

It is common for committees to be given the role of discussing and reviewing the implementation and operation of an IIA (e.g., New Zealand\u2013 United Arab Emirates (UAE) BIT<\/span><\/a>, Art. 18(3)(a)(b); Japan\u2013Korea BIT<\/a>, Art. 20(1)(a)). Many committees are also tasked with exchanging information on and discussing matters relating to the improvement of the investment environment (e.g., Japan\u2013Peru BIT<\/a>, Art. 25(2)(a); Israel\u2013UAE BIT<\/a>, Art. 27(3)(d)). Somewhat less commonly, certain agreements give committees the role of reviewing \u201cthe possibility of further facilitation of investment between the Parties\u201d or similar (e.g., New Zealand\u2013UAE BIT<\/a>, Art. 18(3)(e); India\u2013EFTA TEPA, Annex 7.A<\/a> (1)(b)(f)). It is also not unheard of for committees to be given a role in consulting with the private sector (e.g., Australia\u2013UAE BIT<\/a>, Art. 20(2)(f); Brazil\u2013UAE CFIA<\/a>, Art. 18(4)(d)).<\/p>\n

In those agreements that contain investment liberalization commitments and also include a committee, it is common, particularly in Japanese IIAs, to give the committee a role in reviewing each party\u2019s non-conforming measures \u201cfor the purpose of contributing to the reduction or elimination of such \u2026 measures\u201d (e.g., New Zealand\u2013UAE BIT<\/a>, Art. 18(3)(c), Japan\u2013Myanmar BIT<\/a>, Art. 24(1)(b)(c)). Agreements focusing on investment facilitation also provide for a transparency\/information-sharing role for committees in relation to the provision of technical assistance and capacity building (EU\u2013Angola SIFA<\/a>, Art. 42(4); WTO<\/span> Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA)<\/a>, Arts. 35.4, 36).<\/p>\n

In those agreements that include a committee and provide for investor\u2013state dispute settlement, particularly before a standing tribunal, the committee is often given various governance functions concerning dispute settlement, such as appointing tribunal members or adopting supplemental dispute settlement rules (e.g., EU\u2013Vietnam IPA<\/a>, Art 4.1(5), EU\u2013Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (IPA)<\/a>, Art. 4.1(4)). Some IIAs that include a committee also give the committee a role in preventing or managing disputes that may arise in relation to the agreement, sometimes with express reference to preventing\/managing investor\u2013state disputes (e.g., New Zealand\u2013UAE BIT<\/a>, Art. 18(3)(f); Brazil\u2013India CFIA<\/a>, Art. 18; Cabo Verde\u2013Morocco BIT<\/a>, Arts. 26.5(d) and 29.3\u201329.6). IIAs that include a committee also often empower the committee to adopt interpretations of the agreement that are binding for the parties and for tribunals under the agreement (e.g., EU\u2013Singapore IPA<\/a>, Art. 4.1(4)(f), EU\u2013Indonesia IPA<\/a>, Art. 6.2(2)(c)), although agreements without a committee also frequently empower the treaty parties to jointly adopt binding interpretations (e.g., Australia\u2013Uruguay BIT<\/a>, Art. 14(22)).<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The above sketch of the different functions conferred on committees in IIAs is representative rather than exhaustive. The key point is that, as new trends in treaty-making emerge, we need a deeper understanding of how committees in IIAs have (or have not) performed the above functions to support evidence-based policy-making on the ability of these frameworks to foster lasting cooperation. The current limited understanding is partly due to a lack of publicly available information concerning the work of many (although not all) committees, combined with not all the IIAs noted above having entered into force. For example, in relation to the function conferred on some committees of reviewing each party\u2019s non-conforming measures seeking to reduce or eliminate such measures, as I\u2019ve highlighted previously, we have little understanding of whether committees have undertaken such reviews and whether this has led to additional investment liberalization between the parties over time (Paine, 2025<\/a>, p. 401). Similarly, based on publicly available information, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which the exchange of information between the parties aimed at improving the investment environment has occurred, or the extent to which committees have reviewed the potential for further investment facilitation between the parties. It seems likely that at least some committees would have discussed such issues at some point. Thus, as suggested above, interviews or perhaps surveys with officials\/negotiators are likely needed to develop a better understanding of whether and how committees established by IIAs have performed the functions envisaged by such agreements.<\/p>\n

\n

Author<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Joshua Paine<\/strong> is an associate professor in international law at the University of Bristol. This contribution partly draws on ideas first published in his 2025 article Beyond Investment Protection and ISDS<\/span>: Towards an Investment Law Research Agenda Focusing on Investment Facilitation and Liberalization Commitments<\/a>. World Trade Review, 24<\/em>(3) 387\u2013403. The sketch of committee functions partly draws on a 2025 submission by Joshua Paine and Elizabeth Sheargold to the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available here<\/a>.<\/p>\n